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
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
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
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"Dean is reviving a tradition of small-town, New England civic and religious fervor that is all but forgotten in American politics today." PAGE 30

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
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
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
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A Foreign-Policy Emergency

The hallmark of the Bush foreign policy has been a naive radicalism married to an operational incompetence. A small clique with a preconceived blueprint took advantage of a national emergency and a callow president, blowing a containable

threat into war while dismissing more ominous menaces. These people are out to remake the world, with little sense of risk, proportion or history. At this writing, the president's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, has seized some authority over the Iraq policy from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who responded with adolescent pique. The long-abused Secretary of State Colin Powell offered new respect for the UN. President Bush even directly contradicted Vice President Dick Cheney's discredited claim of a link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.

In a different administration, these shifts would signal that the chief executive, clearly in control, had recognized the misjudgments and costs of a failed policy, demoted those responsible and shifted authority to others. But Bush seems incapable of that kind of decisiveness or discernment. These are mere skirmishes, indicative of the absence of leadership at the top. Bush is as callow as ever. The man even boasts that he never reads the papers.

By mid-October, the administration was mainly in PR mode, with Cheney insisting that Iraq is on the mend; the latest UN initiative, meanwhile, was extinct, a casualty of U.S. refusal to give the UN authority. The Bush presidency remained a kind of regency, in which the real power reposes with Cheney, Rumsfeld and the neoconservative intellectuals. And American foreign policy remained captive to the same bellicose dreams of unilateralism and hegemony.

Meanwhile, little progress has been made in stabilizing Afghanistan or rooting out al-Qaeda. The so-called road map to a durable Israeli-Palestinian peace is in tatters, while the administration fails to rein in Ariel Sharon's excesses. America's own homeland security is in the hands of an agency that has largely failed to assist first responders or coordinate the federal bureaucratic fragmentation. Instead, the administration keeps taking short cuts at the expense of civil liberty.

Two historical parallels come to mind: Vietnam and the Cuban missile crisis. In the former, it was not foreign-policy extremists but the best and brightest of the mainstream that led America into a disastrous quagmire. The

familiar faith in American technology and contempt for facts on the ground, echoed today in Iraq, produced a calamitous overreach, which was reversed only by a public groundswell. Yet the disaster never turned to holocaust because the 1960s counterparts of today's neocons, who wanted to expand the war to China or to nuke Hanoi "into the Stone Age," were overruled.

By the same token, the Cuban missile crisis narrowly missed triggering a nuclear exchange and World War III. Instead, thanks to John Kennedy's leadership, it led to a new turn in U.S. foreign policy, with small, mutual, confidence-building steps between the United States and the Soviet Union. These eventually produced a partial détente, in which seeds of democracy could sprout in Soviet satellites and communism could collapse of its own weight.

The post-September 11 world is an even more difficult challenge than the Cold War. Our adversaries have no nation-state to hold hostage, no stable interests to inject a note of prudence. The threat is hydra-headed and reactive to what America does.


That new, alarming context demands rare wisdom from our leaders. What we have is unprecedented hubris. Otto von Bismarck once said, "God watches out for fools, drunkards and the United States." But this is more of a historical inference than a future guarantee. We are pushing our luck.

This issue of the *Prospect* includes a special report on the foreign-policy emergency, in which thinkers who have served five different administrations offer a better, more secure path. The report is timed to coincide with a national leadership conference on American security, convened by *The American Prospect*, The Century Foundation and the Center for American Progress. The conference, Oct. 28-29, will be webcast. See www.prospect.org for details.

Americans have been understandably traumatized by 9-11, and only in the past two months has broad public opinion turned tentatively against the administration. In the world of expert opinion, however, the neocons have always been a tiny, radical minority. The Bush policy is not just arrogant and isolating. It also makes America a less safe place.

—ROBERT KUTTNER

**The new reality
demands uncommon
wisdom. Our leaders
have delivered
instead rare hubris.**



"Kusnet too readily dismisses the 'moralism' of Joe Lieberman... Elsewhere, he praises another presidential candidate for adding 'a moral dimension' to the populist message about tax fairness."

—DANIEL BURNSTEIN, Seattle, WA

Correspondence

Earth to TAP

IN "BUSH'S SAUDI CONNECTIONS" [October 2003], Michael Steinberger makes the statement, the likes of which I've often seen and heard in the media, that "unless the Democrats can convince the public that they can be trusted with homeland defense, they are almost surely headed for defeat."

Whenever I read a statement to that effect, I wonder, am I living on the wrong planet? The Republicans have demonstrated over the past three years that they are utterly without a clue regarding homeland defense. At best, George W. Bush has waged two wars with inconclusive (to be charitable) outcomes. I don't need to repeat the extensive catalog of his questionable results here at home.

BOB FLEISCHER
Groton, MA

Take it From Ike

TAP'S EXCELLENT SECTION on language and politics [September] addresses tactical issues too often neglected by the left. I agree with Geoffrey Nunberg's article "The Liberal Label" that discrediting the liberal label is a semantic, not an ideological, victory for the right. But it is a real victory nonetheless, and one that is probably irreversible.

Sentiment aside, we

should not be unhappy to replace "liberal" with "progressive" on the banners of the left. It is neither a retreat nor an evasion to avoid using a label whose meaning has become so badly distorted. Moreover, identifying our opposition to the current Washington regime as "progressive" serves to highlight the essentially backward-looking nature of the right-wing agenda.

We also need to change the way we characterize our opponents. "Conservative" is, both literally and in the minds of many voters, practically a synonym for "moderate." The hard right calls itself conservative, but why should we acquiesce and use this self-serving euphemism? Most of us have learned by now not to refer to enemies of abortion rights as "pro-life." The Bush agenda is not conservative—it is radical, or, to use a term that should be revived, reactionary.

Dwight Eisenhower was known to refer in private to the "reactionary wing" of his party. How would Ike characterize today's GOP?

ANTHONY F. GRECO
New York, NY

Don't Merge, Organize!

THE LETTER "UNITE OR Die" [October] incorrectly asserted that most workers

who have joined the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) since the union intensified its commitment to organizing in 1996 were added through mergers with other unions. The most recent figures show that more than 600,000 workers have organized to join the SEIU since 1996 *in addition to* those who joined through mergers.

The letter also wrongly claimed that the goal of recent reorganization within the SEIU was "to combine small locals into megalocals," thus supposedly reducing union democracy. The SEIU's reorganization has been designed to unite workers who do the same kind of work in single-focus local unions, rather than having health-care workers, public employees and janitors mixed together in the same locals. This change has helped dramatically increase participation by union members inspired by strategies to win improvements in their industries or sectors. It has also been an essential key to winning gains from today's employers, such as huge hospital and nursing-home chains and wealthy real-estate owners.

TOM WOODRUFF
Executive Vice President
Service Employees
International Union
Washington, DC

Time & Data

IN "NEW GENERATION, NEW Politics" [October], Anna Greenberg argues that "the percentage of Democrats and Republicans in the electorate changes over time largely because one generation dies out and another enters, not because contemporary events alter party identification across generations." However, the evidence that she presents from Democracy Corps polls conducted during 2001–2002 actually supports just the opposite conclusion. The generational differences shown in the table are miniscule, but several of those generations are significantly less Democratic and more Republican than they were during the 1960s and 1970s.

The "GI Generation," which is really the New Deal Generation, was once heavily Democratic. Likewise, the "Baby Boom Generation" started out with a strongly Democratic tilt. The roughly equal proportions of Republicans and Democrats now found in these two generations reflects an ideological realignment of party loyalty that has taken place over the past quarter-century.

The good news for the Democratic Party is that while the proportion of Democrats in the electorate is smaller than it was 25 years ago, those who iden-

tify with the party today are more likely to agree with its policies and more likely to vote for its candidates. Party loyalty is on the upswing because voters have been choosing their party identification on the basis of their policy preferences.

ALAN ABRAMOWITZ
Alben W. Barkley
Professor of Political Science, Emory University
Atlanta, GA

Mind Your Morality

THERE'S MUCH TO ADMIRE in David Kusnet's article "Talking American" [September], but he too readily dismisses the "moralism" that he attributes to Joe Lieberman. This is odd, because elsewhere Kusnet, rightly, praises one of the other Democratic presidential candidates for adding "a moral dimension" to the populist message about tax fairness.

I believe that the eventual Democratic nominee should forcefully assert the moral basis of his or her policies and outlook. For years numerous Christian evangelicals have been hoodwinked by Republican politicians into thinking that their party has a monopoly on that which is proper, moral, American, patriotic and godly. Many of these evangelicals would instead respond well to the genuine


moral message, which is at the heart of all great religions, that we as a people are responsible for aiding the poor and disadvantaged (as long as the candidate also emphasizes that those who receive aid are reciprocally responsible as well).

In opposition to the divisive Republican rhetoric that casts Democrats as outside the fold of moral America, Democrats should emphasize that supporters of both parties typically want the same basic goals (such as safe neighborhoods and stable, two-parent families), but that we differ on some of the solutions. Candidates could build on this theme to highlight, in a colorful and down-home way, how social problems are connected with crime, family instability and other negative phenomena, explicitly noting how social-policy proposals could address these problems and stating that the conservative cry for moral order and values is simply hollow if there is not a sufficient pool of tax money with which to implement such proposals.

DANIEL BURNSTEIN
Associate Professor of History, Seattle University
Seattle, WA

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
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
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
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Devil in the



On Hold: Democrats want nominated EPA chief Mike Leavitt to vow that he'll put science ahead of politics.

Indoor Pollution

CONFIRMATION HEARINGS are pending for Utah Gov. Mike Leavitt, the nominee to replace Christie Whitman at the troubled Environmental Protection Agency. Leavitt surprised many in mid-August when he accepted the nomination, as he'd been offered the post just two months earlier and had turned it down because he was still undecided about seeking a fourth gubernatorial term. When the

nomination was announced, it was praised, as they say, on both sides of the aisle.

But lately, Leavitt has become a symbol of boiling Democratic discontent in the Senate. His hearings are being held up by a group of lawmakers fed up with the deceit of the Bush administration, and with the morass that is the EPA.

Leading the charge are Hillary Rodham Clinton and three other Senate Demo-

crats and presidential candidates: John Edwards, Joe Lieberman and John Kerry. Clinton's concern has nothing to do with Leavitt himself but with the question of whether the White House and the EPA covered up the extent of the air pollution in lower Manhattan after September 11. After requesting more information from an EPA inspector general's report in August, Clinton's office received

new details of heated infighting between the White House and the EPA over the health threat posed by World Trade Center rubble. Documents distributed to the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee depict intense arguments between some White House and EPA staffers, in which members of the White House Council on Environmental Quality insist on minimizing the threat and extent of the pollution.

To back up their charges, the four Democratic senators, along with colleague Jim Jeffords, have placed a hold on Leavitt's nomination to prevent a full Senate vote. At press time, another Democratic Senator, Harry Reid of Nevada, had pulled his hold on Leavitt, but the other five were standing fast.

Leavitt is likely to win confirmation from the full Senate eventually. But he'll be inheriting an organization where politics has a habit of overpowering science. In early October, Jeffrey Holmstead, head of the EPA's Air and Radiation Office, was accused of lying during sworn testimony to Congress regarding the impact of softened air-quality standards on various clean-air lawsuits against utility companies that were filed during Bill Clinton's administration. Holmstead insisted—surprise, surprise—

Details

"It is not his type of writing, actually. He's 20 years old. And I think he's a little bit busy right now to be writing a letter."

—AMY CONNELL, on a pro-war form letter from her GI son Adam in her local paper

that the new rules would do no damage to the government's case. Two senior members of the EPA's enforcement office specifically advised him otherwise, and both have since left the EPA. Patrick Leahy, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee, is currently gathering evidence to investigate whether Holmstead perjured himself during his testimony. Looks as if Leavitt, assuming he does get the job, had better be monitoring indoor pollution as well as the other kind.

Ashcroft on the Case

IT'S NOT EVERY INVESTIGATION that lays its cards on the table at the outset, but the modus operandi of John Ashcroft, public eye, became apparent at the very moment the Justice Department got on the Joseph Wilson retaliatory leak case. As all signs pointed to a White House leaker, Justice announced that it would widen its net to look for suspects at the Defense and State departments.

Now, in theory, it's conceivable that some neocon at Defense decided to out Wilson's wife. But State? Why stop there? Why not Agriculture? How about the Bureau of Labor Statistics?

Not that Ashcroft's approach to the case is without precedent. We think, particularly, of the climactic moment in *Casablanca*, when Humphrey Bogart's Rick, the smoking weapon still in his hand, stands over the fresh corpse of Conrad Veidt's Maj. Strasser, while Claude Rains' Louis, the prefect of police, utters the immortal words, "Round up the usual suspects." A few moments later, in the film's final shot, Bogart and Rains walk off together, Bogart telling Rains, "Louis, I think this is the beginning of a beautiful friendship," as "La Marseillaise" swells in the background. Imagine Karl Rove as Bogart (profuse apologies to Bogie here), Ashcroft as Rains and substitute "Deep in the Heart of Texas" (or maybe "Stand By Your Man"), and you have, we fear, the final shot of the Bush administration's investigation of itself.

FOXic Waste

SAY WHAT YOU WILL about its bias and inaccuracies, FOX News is succeeding at its mission. Of course, that mission is to spread bias and inaccuracies that bolster the position of the Bush White House.


A new survey from the Program on International Policy Attitudes (a joint

project of the Center on Policy Attitudes and the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland) asked more than 3,000 Americans a range of questions on foreign-policy matters. Conclusion? If you're a viewer of FOX News, the odds are high that every-

thing you know is wrong. In particular, respondents were asked if it was true that clear links had been found between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, that weapons of mass destruction had been found in Iraq and that world public opinion was favorable to Bush policy in Iraq. Fully 45 percent of the

WHILE YOU WERE SLEEPING

Competing with the recall circus in California and the Valerie Plame leak in Washington, Zalmay Khalilzad's press conference in Kabul, Afghanistan, drew little attention. Speaking to reporters on the second anniversary of the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan minced no words when describing a recent surge in Taliban activity: "I think that in desperation they may try, there are indications they may try, to do something to get a lot of attention. ... There are indications that they are planning even larger attacks, more spectacular attacks, perhaps."



The weeks prior to the anniversary were the most violent since the overthrow of the Islamic militia; since the start of August, 300 people have been killed. Among their number were U.S. soldiers, government officials, aid workers, troops and rebels.

Although NATO announced plans to extend its peacekeeping role outside of Kabul, aid workers criticized the response as too small and slow in coming. Paul O' Brian, advocacy officer at the aid agency CARE, told Reuters that attacks on relief workers over the past year had increased thirtyfold, to nearly one per day. "Things are getting worse and we haven't seen the international security community responding commensurately," he said. "There's been a lot of talk and too little action."

While the president has declared Iraq the "central front" of the war on terror, he would do well to remember Afghanistan. With Osama bin Laden still unaccounted for and militant infiltration from Pakistan on the rise, there's plenty of work yet to do.



BRAVE NEW WORDS

REAL SCANDAL Fake scandal, as in *The Wall Street Journal's* assertion that "the real intelligence scandal is how an open opponent of the U.S. war on terror such as Mr. Wilson was allowed to become one of that policy's investigators." Obfuscation and defamation in one sentence!

INAPPROPRIATE BEHAVIOR Sexual battery when committed by a Republican movie star. Lesser improprieties, when committed by a Democrat, are grounds for impeachment.

IDLE As in *idle poor*. Term graciously used by Robert Rector of The Heritage Foundation to describe low-income people who are unemployed.

FOX News audience believes at least one of these three whoppers is true—compared with 36 percent of CBS viewers, 31 percent of CNN's, 30 percent of ABC's and NBC's, 25 percent of those who cited print media, and 11 percent of the NPR and PBS audiences.

So, is FOX News an abysmal failure or a stunning success? That depends, we suppose, on whether Bush wins re-election.

Book 'Em

LET'S JUST AGREE UP FRONT that there's no augury or metaphor in it, but the fact remains that South Dakota Sen. Tom Daschle spoke at length for the first time about his new book, which is due out in November, at something called the Deadwood Pavilion. Addressing an audience at his state's first-ever book fair, Daschle said he wrote the tome, ti-

tled *Like No Other Time*, because he had "a compelling story to tell," adding, somewhat cosmically, that "history is not written at a constant pace. It is sometimes accelerated."

"Accelerate," meanwhile, is undoubtedly what many Democratic senators—perhaps Daschle included—wish they could do with the number of days remaining in the term of their colleague from Georgia, Zell Miller. That's because Miller, too, has turned authorial; but where advance word on Daschle's book suggests that it will be a polite paean to his colleagues and their will to soldier on after 9-11, Miller's product (published in October) is of a different character. A *National Party No More: The Conscience of a Conservative Democrat* purports to explain, behind that subtitle that consciously echoes a famous book by Barry Goldwater from 40 years ago, how the Dems

have lost touch with the common folk. The money quote that showed up in all the pre-publication wire stories is this: "Once upon a time ... FDR looked south and said, 'I see one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished.' Today our national Democratic leaders look south and say, 'I see one-third of a nation and it can go to hell.'"

Miller has a bit of a point. The Democratic Party understands the South about as well as, um, about as well as the Republican Party understands the Northeast (although something tells us we'll never be seeing a book by Rhode Island GOP Sen. Lincoln Chafee called *National Party No More: The Conscience of a Liberal Republican*). Miller's juxtaposition, though, is a strange one. Is his gripe about the Democratic Party really that it isn't doing enough to house, clothe and feed the multitudes? If so, voting for every Bush tax cut seems a strange way to protest.

The two books land at a fascinating moment in political bookdom. The right wing learned during the 1990s how to buy books en masse and dominate the best-seller lists. Our side has just recently figured it out, and liberals, after not caring for the better part of 20 years, are buying partisan books again in large numbers. It'll be very interesting to see who outsells whom—although it's unlikely that either will catch up to a certain other senator-turned-author whose recently published book you may have heard a little about. We don't know who'll win the sales contest. But we do know who'll be more popular in the cloakroom.

TERRORISTS INCREASE MY INSECURITY...



SO I BOUGHT A CAR LIKE A TANK...



...THAT GUZZLES GAS...



... WHICH ENRICHES THE SAUDIS...



... WHO SPONSOR TERRORISTS!



HON- I THINK WE NEED A SECOND HUMMER!



WASSERMAN@11.03 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT


Head Rush

THE NEWS THAT RUSH Limbaugh will be spending the month trying to kick his OxyContin habit provides a tempting opportunity to kick a thug while he's down. Rush, after all, told his audience just eight years ago that "we have laws against selling drugs, pushing drugs, using drugs, importing drugs. And the laws are good because we know what happens to people in societies and neighborhoods which become consumed by them. And so if people are violating the law by doing drugs, they ought to be accused and they ought to be convicted and they ought to be sent up."

So, is it time to give the king of talk radio a taste of his own medicine and let



HEROES & ZEROES



SEN. RICHARD LUGAR

GOPer tells Bush to get act together in Iraq; says concerns about "the coherence of our policies" are legitimate

CHANCELLOR JAMES MOESER

Vows UNC will cover full costs of education for poor students; first such step for a public university

ALFONSO LOPEZ TRUJILLO

President of Catholic Pontifical Council for the Family tells BBC that condoms don't prevent spread of HIV

RALPH NADER

Arianna Huffington sensibly drops out of recall race; third-party doyen Ralph slams her

him see what's become of America's penal system after 30 years of "tough on crime" hysterics? After all, in the same broadcast he specifically called for the imprisonment of more white drug offenders as a solution to the well-known racial disparities in the justice system. To quote the man himself, "What this says to

me is that too many whites are getting away with drug use. Too many whites are getting away with drug sales. Too many whites are getting away with trafficking in this stuff."

The image of Rush behind bars, ranting away to his fellow inmates about the evils of tax-and-spend prison guards, certainly warms the cockles. And a little spell in the can wouldn't necessarily mean the end of his career; after all, ex-cons G. Gordon Liddy, Chuck Colson and Oliver North haven't let convictions get in the way of their right-wing talk-radio gigs. And with Rush's prior experience, he'd doubtless jump back to the top of the ratings pile in a flash.

Nevertheless, when a hypocrite says one thing and does another it stands to reason that one of the things is right and the other wrong, and in this case Limbaugh is doing the right thing. Drug addiction is a serious problem, for the addicts, for those around them and for the society at large, and those addicted need help. As Rush has apparently now realized, prison is not a particularly good venue for procuring that help. The tragedy here is less that America's leading loudmouth lout will appar-

Devil in the Details


ently go free than that tens of thousands of other addicts—mostly poor, minorities or both—are currently behind bars when they, like Rush, should be receiving treatment aimed at making them better.

Historically, advocates of such policies have not found a friend in Rush Limbaugh, who in 1993 described the theory that drug addiction is a disease as a way of "rationalizing all this irresponsibility and all the choices people are making." Rush further noted that "[a]ll these Hollywood celebrities say the reason they're weird and bizarre is because they were abused by their parents. So we're going to pay for that kind of rehab, too, and we shouldn't." One hopes that he'll have a new perspective by the time this issue leaves the stands and will explain to his army of dittoheads why we should. In the meantime, it will be interesting to see when the "it's not about sex, it's about the rule of law" crowd will dust off their old talking points. But if, as we suspect, they're lost somewhere beneath yellowed copies of the balanced-budget amendment it might take a while.

Funny, They Don't Look Jewish

NEWS ITEM: Latest Contender for President Comes from Long Line of Rabbis

"Raised a Southern Baptist who later converted to Roman Catholicism, retired Gen. Wesley Clark knew just what to say when he



VAST RIGHT-WING CONSPIRACY

Liberal Anglicans and Episcopalians will face off this October in London against their more homophobic co-religionists at a global meeting of delegates from the world's 70 million-strong Anglican communion. Leading the countercharge against recent pro-gay developments in the church's U.S. and Canadian branches will be the conservative American Anglican Council (AAC), whose president, the Rev. Canon David C. Anderson, explained at a special strategy meeting in Dallas last month that he favors "an

inclusive church welcoming all who are sinners, who are broken, and who will repent and ask for transformation."

The U.K.'s *Observer* reports that the AAC's main financial backer is California multimillionaire Howard Ahmanson, who's also funded a video featuring Charlton Heston's praise for the "God-fearing Caucasian middle class," the

anti-evolution Discovery Institute (whose president, coincidentally enough, is vice president of the AAC) and a magazine, the *Chalcedon Report*, that once ran an article calling for gays to be stoned.

Also involved in organizing the Dallas meeting is the Institute for Religion and Democracy (IRD), which shares a Washington office with the AAC and on whose board Ahmanson's wife sits. The IRD, however, isn't dependent on Ahmanson for its cash: It receives generous financial support from Richard Mellon Scaife, famed financier of right-wing schemes everywhere.



strode into a Brooklyn yeshiva in 1999, ostensibly to discuss his leadership of NATO's victory in Yugoslavia. 'I feel a tremendous amount in common with you,' the uniformed four-star general told the stunned roomful of students. 'I am the oldest son, of the oldest son, of the oldest son—at least five generations, and they were all rabbis.' ...

"He told *The Jewish Week* in New York, which first reported the yeshiva comment in 1999, that his ancestors were not just Jews, but members of the priestly caste of Kohens.

Clark's Jewish father, Benjamin Kanne, died when he was 4, but he has kept in touch with his father's fam-

ily since his 20s, when he rediscovered his Jewish roots. He is close to a first cousin, Barry Kanne, who heads a pager company in Georgia."

—*Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, Sept. 17, 2003

NEWS ITEM:

Search for Kerry's Roots Finds Surprising History

"For years, U.S. Senator John Forbes Kerry had sought to know the true story of his immigrant grandfather, Frederick A. Kerry. ... The story, it turns out, began in a small town in the Czech Republic that once was part of the Austrian Empire. Birth records there show that Frederick A. Kerry was born as Fritz Kohn to Jewish parents, according to a genealogy

specialist hired by the *Globe*. Kohn changed his name to Kerry around 1902 ...

"Kerry said he learned about fifteen years ago that his grandmother was Jewish. ... Numerous publications, including the *Globe*, have stated that Kerry is Irish-American."

—*The Boston Globe*, Feb. 2, 2003

Improbable Jewish roots are an old story. In 1964, presidential candidate Barry Goldwater belatedly acknowledged that he had Jewish grandparents, dry-goods merchants named Goldwasser, but his campaign literature described him as the grandson of "Polish immigrants"—leading to Theodore Bikel's priceless riddle:

Q: What do Barry Goldwater and I (Bikel) have in common?

A: We're both ashamed that he is Jewish.

Where will it end?

Rove Startled by Heritage

Presidential adviser Karl Rove told the *Austin American-Statesman* today that he was stunned by the news that his paternal grandfather was a Hassidic rabbi from Minsk. The family name was Shmulowitz, but his grandfather was known to his followers as "The Rov." "We were always told he lit candles on Fridays to commemorate the Alamo, and that he was mumbling in Spanish," Rove said.

Buchanan Past Disputed

Tikkun magazine reported today that conservative candidate Pat Buchanan was really a refugee from Romania named Pesach Bucharestazi. Buchanan, according to the

publication, was brought to the United States as an infant in 1946 from a resettlement camp. His father had been a carver of mezuzahs in Bucharest before World War II. Buchanan insisted that the story was a fabrication, but added enigmatically, "If all those *bubbies* in Palm Beach County who voted for me only knew."

Arafat Faces Possible Fatwa

Yasir Arafat, in a televised interview with Al-Jazeera, disclosed that he was actually born to Egyptian Jews whose surname was Bar-Aravah, or "son of the desert." He denied that he was secretly an agent of the Israeli Mossad and insisted that his struggle for Palestinian independence was real. "I grew ashamed of the way my people were treating our Arab brothers," Arafat said. "I guess I became a classic self-hating Jew."

Lieberman Discloses Secret Life

Joe Lieberman dropped out of the presidential race today after *The Hartford Courant* disclosed that he was leading a secret double life as an elder of a Mormon temple in nearby Springfield. Standing beside his 88-year-old mother, Marcia, who became an iconic Jewish-mother figure in the 2000 campaign, a teary Lieberman admitted that the family had never been Jewish. "When I first ran for office, Gov. Abe Ribicoff was the symbol of rectitude in Connecticut," he said. "My advisers thought it was shrewd to pose as a Jew." His mother, he added, had been an Irish-American vaudevillian in the 1920s whose real name was Mary Margaret O'Leary. ■

—R.K.



OFF THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The \$87 billion that George W. Bush belatedly requested to bail out the U.S. effort in Iraq has embarrassed many conservatives. But not *The Wall Street Journal*, whose editorial page makes Ebenezer Scrooge seem bighearted.

"Where to Find \$87 Billion" was the headline of an Oct. 2 *Journal* editorial. Where, indeed? One logical place would be to rescind most of the Bush tax cuts on the upper brackets. Another would be in the bloated \$87 billion itself, which soaks American taxpayers, who have to pay such contractors as Halliburton, rather than giving the money to Iraqis who could do the job for less.

Instead, the *Journal* proposes cutting health benefits for the poor. "The CHIPS program, which is supposed to insure children," writes the editorialist indignantly, "is providing health care for childless adults in at least two states, according to the General Accounting Office. Ending that would save \$330 million."

The *Journal* also proposes additional cuts in Medicaid, Medicare and home health care. Under Bush, these programs have already been slashed to the bone. The *Journal* cites the General Accounting Office again, claiming that home health-care costs could be cut by about \$2.5 billion a year "by bringing home health payments in line with actual home health-care costs." But the only way to do that is to either eliminate the profits to for-profit agencies or to reduce the wages to home-health aides, which are already appalling low.

The *Journal* thus trumpets the class warfare that the Bush administration has been trying to practice discreetly. War going badly? Payments to contractors embarrassingly large? Tax cuts for the rich leaving a huge hole in the budget? Solution: Cut health benefits. What would we do without the *Journal*?

YOU MAY HAVE NOTICED THAT SHARP-EYED CONSERVATIVE PUNDITS HAVE LATELY BEEN FOCUSING ON A CERTAIN GROUP OF **CRAZY EXTREMISTS** IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY... WE REFER, OF COURSE, TO--


THE ANGRY LEFT

THE "ANGRY LEFT" IS STILL **INFURIATED** BY THE OUTCOME OF THE 2000 ELECTION. BUSH WASN'T **ELECTED**--HE WAS **INSTALLED** BY THE **SUPREME COURT**!



THE "ANGRY LEFT" IS **OUTRAGED** BY BUSH'S ECONOMIC POLICY.

HE'S MORTGAGING OUR CHILDREN'S **FUTURE** TO GIVE HIS RICH PALS A **TAX CUT**!




THE "ANGRY LEFT" IS **INCENSED** BY THE WAR IN IRAQ.

WE STILL HAVEN'T FOUND EVIDENCE OF WMDs--OR OF ANY CONNECTION TO AL-QAEDA!




AND THE "ANGRY LEFT" GROWS **APOPLECTIC** WHEN ITS **PATRIOTISM** IS IMPUGNED.

YOU KNOW, I AM **REALLY** TIRED OF BEING CALLED A **TRAITOR** WHENEVER I CRITICIZE THE PRESIDENT!



ONE THING'S FOR SURE--THE "ANGRY LEFT" IS CERTAINLY **DIFFICULT** TO **PLEASE**!



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

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


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
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Dispatches



Hoosier Favorite?: Retired Gen. Wesley Clark at DePauw University in Indiana on Sept. 23

Red State Army

We all know about “Reagan Democrats.” But 20 years later, there may finally be a counterweight. Could “Clark Republicans” decide 2004?

BY JASON VEST

IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DEMOCRATIC primary, retired Gen. Wesley Clark's campaign seems less like Sherman's quick and decisive March to the Sea and more like Grant's shaky, protracted offensive against Vicksburg. Initially some were heralding the general's candidacy as the beginning of the end for an already-peaked former Gov. Howard Dean (D-Vt.) and an underwhelming Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.). But Clark has proven less than prepared, leaving the media—not Clark—to define the candidate. He seems increasingly disingenuous, if not outright schizoid: a Democratic contender who had not been a registered as

a Democrat; a self-proclaimed outsider with that quintessential token of insiderdom, a Washington lobbying contract; an acerbic critic of the Bush administration who, just over two years ago, lauded the architects of the new Pax Americana at, of all places, a Republican fund raiser; and a self-styled reformer who apparently violated campaign-finance laws by taking money for speeches (he has since returned the money).

It's not exactly the stuff of a Democratic Party standard-bearer—and perhaps not the stuff of a general-election candidate in a country that despises the wishy-washy. But if his campaign gets

its act together and runs the Clark who wowed students and seniors at DePauw University in late September, it might even affect more than Kerry's and Dean's poll numbers. While George W. Bush holds a comfortable lead among both Republican and Democratic voters on national security, many current and former members of the military's officer corps—as well as some civilian conservatives who increasingly see the neocons for the spendthrifts they are—have had it with Bush's crew and are poised to become, as one officer put it, “Clark Republicans.”

Though it was a far cry from Bobby Kennedy's raucous 1968 reception in another conservative corner of the Midwest, Clark's warm welcome by nearly 3,000 people—including folks from as far away as St. Louis, Cleveland and Chicago—in staunchly right-of-center Greencastle, Ind., was significant. Though Clark's hour-long speech began with discursiveness, he soon prompted a string of protracted ovations—several of them standing—in response to everything from his denunciations of Attorney General John Ashcroft to calls for a stronger United Nations to negotiations with Iran, Syria and North Korea.

What explains this unlikely enthusiasm? Interviews with a cross section of Hoosiers at the Clark event—including self-identified Republicans, Democrats and independents—revealed the view that the invasion and occupation of Iraq have come at the expense of both the U.S. economy and the war on terrorism. “It's feeling a lot like 1992 with Bush's father,” explained Don Hopkins, an Indianapolis real-estate appraiser. “A war with Iraq really doesn't matter when people are out of jobs.” Hopkins spent this summer retracing the path of Lewis and Clark, distributing Wesley Clark

pamphlets at every stop, and he found that view relatively widespread. "No one refused any of my literature," he said, "and anytime anyone talked, even if they didn't say what their politics were, they were talking about how bad the state of economic and foreign policy are."

Korean War veteran H.J. Trubitt, a retired colonel in Army intelligence and a professor emeritus of criminal justice at Indiana University, met with nods of approval from fellow veterans as he explained to the *Prospect* his view of Bush versus Clark: "Those of us of my vintage—those who fought or served in the military during the Cold War—remember a time when we had leaders, men like [Dwight] Eisenhower, who understood the importance of unifying nations, not just against something but for something. I think a lot of people here are increasingly unhappy with the 'go it alone' approach."

If Clark peeled off some military-family votes and a smattering of deficit hard-liners and the so-called NASCAR Dads, it would not make for a happy Karl Rove.

Of course, it's no given that Indiana, a state that hasn't gone Democratic in a presidential election since 1964, would go from red to blue on account of Clark. And this support for Clark doesn't necessarily signal a larger exodus from the GOP ranks. But Bush does have a weakness that Clark is singularly well-suited to address: When it comes to national security, as *The Wall Street Journal* noted last month, the president's numbers, though strong, have been dropping among the general public—and, if anecdotal evidence is any indicator, possibly with active and retired military officers, who went all out for him in 2000. In interviews I conducted this summer with more than three dozen current and former military officers and some of their families, the vast majority proffered variations of the line, "I haven't voted Democratic in two decades, but if Wesley Clark runs as a Democrat, I will."

That some of those officers suggesting a party switch are not entirely enamored of Clark—they called him, among other things, "earnestly self-

confident" and, less charitably, "insufferably arrogant"—is telling. Better an arrogant president who understands that military strategy works in the service of political grand strategy, they seem to feel, than one whose besting of the Iraqi army some officers considered a dubious geopolitical endeavor that distracted from the war on terrorism and may do little more than replace one unpleasant regime with another.

That frustration with Bush has become more apparent with the formation of the group Military Families Speak Out and a stream of angry postings from deployed personnel sent to Soldiers for the Truth (www.sftt.org), a Web site maintained by decorated combat veteran David Hackworth. What's more, as evidenced by increased back-channel collaborations between some high-ranking brass and the Department of State, the military has about had it with being lec-

tured to by powerful ideologues who have the president's ear. Whatever their "defense intellectual" credentials, these neocons are resented by the military for their condescension, for having never served and for usurping the military's post-Cold War power niche, which embraced diplomacy as well as combat. By putting ideology and geopolitical dreams before everything else in the service of some truly dubious objectives, and by leaving National Guard members and reservists (and their families) to wonder when they will be coming home, Bush has invited serious discord. What's more, while this doesn't necessarily translate into larger conservative civilian defections, some conservatives—particularly hard-liners on deficit spending—are growing increasingly restive.

While this may not lead to widespread conservative civilian defections, when one recalls how incredibly close Bush's margin of "victory" was in 2000 (537 votes), it's clear it wouldn't take many to defeat the president. If Clark peeled off some military-family votes

along with a smattering of deficit hard-liners and the so-called NASCAR Dads (described by *The New York Times* as "Bush Republicans who could be won over if a Democratic man's man came along"), it would not make for a happy Karl Rove, indeed.

CLARK IS UNIQUELY POISED TO EXPLOIT these gaps. Whether or not he wins the primary, his powerful presence on the campaign trail as an articulate critic of Bush's foreign and national-security policy is sure to hurt the president. But in the near term, the problem for Clark is one of image, of how to replace the stumbling novice backpedaler with the engaging and nimble stump speaker and glad-hander.

The latter was evident at DePauw during a small, private forum with students after the speech. Hit with trenchant questions posed in less than deferential tones about everything from his abortion-rights and pro-affirmative-action views to his historically Republican inclinations, Clark responded with clarity and earnestness. Asked how a general recently ensconced in a Belgian chateau could relate to the average American, Clark spoke of his pre-four-star days, when he lived close to the bone. He recalled wrecking the family car as a lieutenant colonel; with only \$4,000 in savings, he spent a leave in the Fort Carson, Colo., auto shop rebuilding the vehicle. Queried about affirmative action, he discussed how, as a major general at Fort Hood, Texas, several events forced him to recognize prejudice and discrimination in his beloved Army.

Explaining his history of voting mainly Republican, he presented a story of evolution fused with apostasy, of how, as a young officer, he'd faced a society hostile to the military. "In the summer of 1971," Clark recalled, "I was a captain, and 100,000 people converged on the Pentagon, throwing blood on the steps. They probably weren't going to vote Republican, and it was pretty clear most of us in the military weren't going to vote with them." Yet after the Cold War ended, he continued, when it came to the state of the armed forces, "Republicans became more interested in weapons than in people. I found that the Democrats believed more in people.

I saw few in the Republican Party who had the right answers."

Clark ultimately charmed his questioner, ending on an endearing note: "This is a Methodist college, right? It was? You know the story of the prodigal son? My real father was a Jewish lawyer in Chicago. I recently found a cardboard square that says, 'Delegate, 1932 Democratic Convention, Chicago.'" Clark paused, a self-effacing grin spreading across his face. "I'm just coming back."

This went over well with the crowd, which responded with applause and laughter, but Clark's words were more than a tad disingenuous: The same ar-

guments for military reform that have gone unheeded in the Bush administration also languished under Bill Clinton's. But given the choice between such sleight-of-hand rhetoric from a former general and the Bush administration's Iraqi and economic muddles, some traditionally on the right, it's becoming clear, will take the former. ■

JASON VEST is a Prospect senior correspondent and a contributor to The Nation and The Village Voice. His book on national security and the neoconservatives will be published next year.

Not Quite the Big One

Arnold Schwarzenegger's election is sending out shock waves, but he may find that recent progressive reforms won't be so easy to terminate.

BY HAROLD MEYERSON

SO, IS IT A WRAP FOR PROGRESSIVE California?

According to many political observers, largely but not entirely on the right, the recall of Democrat Gray Davis and the election of Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger mark a tectonic shift in California's political makeup. Over the past decade, as Latinos have voted in greater numbers and independents have trended Democratic, California has become just about the most reliably Democratic state in the nation. Since Davis became governor, at the prodding of a liberal-dominated legislature, he's signed landmark legislation establishing the state as a progressive beacon in a reactionary time.

California, for instance, became the first state to enable workers to take a paid family or medical leave. It forbade financial institutions from sharing data on their customers without their customers' approval. It placed far stricter restrictions on auto emissions than the federal government has, and it mandated that utilities produce 20 percent of their power from renewable sources by the middle of the next decade. And on the Sunday before the recall vote,

Davis signed into law a bill requiring employers of more than 50 workers to provide health insurance (for which they'd get special tax breaks) to their employees by 2006 or 2007.

Is that what Californians were rejecting when they turned against Gray Davis? Did Cruz Bustamante acquit himself so appallingly (he got 32 percent of the vote in a state that's 45 percent Democratic) because he was seen as just another tax-and-spend liberal?

Hardly. Davis was rejected not because he was perceived as a woolly-headed leftist but as a consummate opportunist who'd come to stand for all that was rotten about the state's big-money politics. Bustamante, all but unknown to state voters when he declared his candidacy, quickly defined himself as a walking, talking conflict of interest by hitting up tribal casinos (which are constantly negotiating with the state for new concessions) for millions of dollars. Before anyone could even attack him, Cruz had doubled his own negatives in the polling.

And Schwarzenegger? California's new governor ran a deliberately fuzzy left-right campaign that affirmed as many progressive principles as it de-

nied. He made it clear that he would continue Davis' financial commitment to education. He criticized Davis for failing to expand the state's health coverage for poor children fast enough. He put forth an environmental program that environmentalists conceded was comparable to what the Democrats had proposed. And he was, as no statewide Republican had been in years, in favor of both abortion rights and gun control.

Schwarzenegger did attack Davis from the right, of course. He vowed to overturn the increase in auto-registration fees that the budget shortfall had triggered. He promised to repeal (by sponsoring an initiative, if need be) legislation granting drivers licenses to undocumented immigrants. He complained incessantly that California was losing jobs, and that this was due to the anti-business climate that Davis and the Democratic legislature had created.

The appeal of this message was apparent well before the voting. On the Friday immediately prior, Schwarzenegger's cross-state bus tour chugged into a park in Arcadia, one of the last remaining Republican enclaves in Los Angeles County, to a rally of about 3,000 screaming followers—at 8:30 on a weekday morning.

As he did throughout his campaign, Schwarzenegger cheerfully decried the car tax, the state's \$38 billion deficit, the state's high energy costs, the staggering rate of taxation. Most of this was nonsense, of course. The budget deficit had been closed. California's rate of taxation ranked 19th among all the states. Energy costs had risen, but they were nowhere so high as the level they would have reached if Davis had simply let consumers pay what Enron had been demanding, which is what deregulation advocates called for during the crisis. And the car tax had indeed been increased, as had college and university tuitions, but only because the Republicans in the legislature had refused to raise taxes on the wealthiest Californians to close the deficit.

Schwarzenegger correlated the allegedly anti-business climate of California to job loss: 300,000 jobs had fled the state, he bemoaned, manufacturing jobs in particular. If this attack sounded perilously similar to the one that Democrats are making against one George W. Bush,

well, Schwarzenegger's strategists were certainly aware of that. It was one reason why no one attending a Schwarzenegger rally ever so much as heard Bush's name spoken. Indeed, according to an election-night survey by Republican pollster Frank Luntz, it was discontent over the state of the economy, even more than Davis' personal unpopularity, that fueled the recall. The No. 1 desire of state voters, Luntz found, was "bringing back jobs that left the state and creating new job opportunities." (There's precious little in Luntz's poll that should lead Republicans to think that Bush has even a prayer to carry California next year.)

Luntz's figures make clear why Davis was at such a disadvantage: California's governor never figured out how to run on his economic record, or on any economic platform at all. The measures he'd taken to improve the state's economy—chiefly, investing more in schools and improving health care—proved difficult to highlight in a way that carried as much impact as the GOP's attacks on the car tax. Moreover, in a time of cutbacks, he couldn't plausibly offer an economic program of his own—expanding university research facilities, say, or putting more money into K-12 schools. Hence, voters viewed the car tax as a levy, pure and simple, and not as a way to fund a needed public program.

Davis' agenda was inherently defensive. And he himself was so icy an individual that even the staunchest Democrats had trouble warming to his defense. His rallies, even in the campaign's closing days, were attended dutifully by union officers, elected officials and their staffers. But all the passion, and almost all the regular Californians, were to be found at the Schwarzenegger events.

Under these constraints, the ability of the state's union movement to produce union and Latino votes for the woeful duo of Davis and Bustamante was limited. Union members and Latinos each opposed the recall by roughly 55 percent to 45 percent margins, while the recall was passing with precisely the opposite numbers, 55 percent "yes" to 45 percent "no." By the standards of recent elections, these are anything but resoundingly Democratic totals, but then this election amounted

to a perfect storm for the Democrats.

Indeed, Republicans voted their quick and their dead in the recall, while the Democrats had trouble turning out their living. In the networks' exit polls, Democrats constituted just 39 percent of the electorate and Republicans 38 percent. By contrast, Democrats outnumbered Republicans 42 percent to 37 percent in the 1998 gubernatorial contest and by a full 10 points—44 percent to 34 percent—in the 2000 presidential vote.

Now Schwarzenegger comes to power, and all the choices he was able to elide while campaigning loom before him. The post-steroidal governor has already signaled that he wants to govern as a social moderate and fiscal conservative. His transition team was a cloud of bipartisan atmospheric; it had no function, but it did include such staunch Democrats as San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown. Called in to do the cutting for Schwarzenegger's first budget, however, was Donna Arduin, Jeb Bush's finance director in Florida, whose reputation is that of a hard-right enemy of all social welfare.

It remains to be seen if Schwarzenegger has the courage of Arduin's convictions. It's possible that—his campaign rhetoric to the contrary—the state's economy has recovered to the point that the deficit he confronts will be a manageable one. If not, he may go along with those GOP legislative leaders who

favor floating bond issues to paper over the deficit, though he then opens himself to attack that he's visiting the deficit on the next generation, much as Bush is doing at the federal level.

In the legislature, the flow of new bills favoring workers over employers will either stop or meet the governor's veto. Whether Schwarzenegger thinks that he can reverse by initiative the recent bills mandating employer-paid health insurance and family leave, or restoring overtime pay for the eight-hour-day, is another question. The law granting drivers licenses to the undocumented looks sure to be repealed at the polls, but universal economic programs are far more difficult to assail, polling exceptionally well among Latinos of all classes and ideologies. In fact, Schwarzenegger has already suggested that he may just leave family leave in place.

The new governor may have considerable success going after some of the Democrats' less popular constituencies—trial lawyers and the undocumented, for instance. Going after universal programs is another matter altogether. Progressives may not be able to expand their achievements during Schwarzenegger's tenure, but they should be able to defend the programs they've already enacted. ■

HAROLD MEYERSON is *the Prospect's* editor-at-large.

NOW What?

NOW's endorsement of Carol Moseley Braun was a symbolic act. But some feminists wonder: Is this the right time for symbolism?

BY SARAH WILDMAN

WHEN CAROL MOSELEY BRAUN MADE her formal announcement on Sept. 22 that she was running for president, newspaper stories on the senator-turned-ambassador ran with a paragraph reminding readers that the announcement came on the heels of twin endorsements by the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the National Women's Political Caucus. The news of

that support hit with such a soft impact—the aforementioned paragraph usually appeared well down in the piece—that it went all but unnoticed. The only major headline about NOW's endorsement ran on the editorial page of *The New York Times*, which chastised the "feminist outpost" for its "silly" choice of a "vanity" candidate. Kim Gandy, president of NOW, slammed the *Times* for

“trivializing... women and our concerns.”

But some in the women's movement are wondering whether it wasn't NOW that was trivializing women's concerns. That the organization chose Moseley Braun as only its second endorsee in its 37-year history forces some tough questions about the logic of endorsing a candidate who clearly will not win the nomination. It also warrants some tough comparisons—to the organization's last presidential endorsement, Walter Mondale in the 1984 election, and to NOW's sister organizations, namely Emily's List, that have developed a more sophisticated approach to politics in the nearly 20 years since a woman last had a slot on a party's presidential ticket.

When NOW's political action committee declared support for Moseley Braun on August 26, it baffled many feminists, progressives and just plain old Democrats. Moseley Braun is an intelligent and well-spoken former politician who certainly doesn't lack for charisma. But her one-term tenure in the U.S. Senate was marked by questionable ethical judgments. More than that, her candidacy strikes many as half-hearted and gestural: Moseley Braun may appear to be a full-time candidate because she has participated in all of the televised debates, but in fact she has been conducting more of a speaking tour than a full-fledged campaign. She has appeared in key states like Iowa just five times and raised a meager \$217,109. So many saw NOW's endorsement of her as, at best, an empty gesture.

It was not, however, “silly,” as the *Times* editorial claimed. “Silly” implies “girlish,” which immediately raises hackles and throws the context of the endorsement into a false binary: women versus the establishment. (Feminist leaders who were quick to dismiss the endorsement were nevertheless angry about the tone of the *Times* editorial.) NOW's endorsement wasn't silly at all. As Gandy pointed out in an interview, “When Carol is at the table, women's issues are talked about, and when she's not, they're not.” Symbolically, having a woman onstage at the debates next to nine men is clearly important: Her presence highlights both the issues dear to American women as well as the painful lack of women who have risked the run

for the top tier of politics in this country.

But is this the right time for acts of symbolism? The 2004 presidential election is the first of the post-Ralph Nader era, and the whole of progressive Washington is desperate to do everything possible to remove George W. Bush from office. The private consensus among activists is that there isn't room to throw support to candidates who aren't really running serious campaigns.

“I think people mostly just shrugged and said, ‘What were they thinking?’” says one longtime activist who refused to be named. “Because whatever argument people might want to make about

board was torn over whether to endorse Mondale or Jackson, the issue came down to viability. Then-President Judy Goldsmith said at the time that NOW “felt it essential to make the strongest possible statement for the one candidate we felt could, indeed, do the best for women and defeat Ronald Reagan.” Stories ran in papers around the country about this “most influential” women's organization and its helpful endorsement.

The endorsement wasn't helpful enough, of course, and Mondale wasn't that viable after all. And though more women than men voted Democratic, Reagan still carried the women's vote over-



Hear Them Roar: Moseley Braun (center) with NOW leader Kim Gandy (right) on Aug. 26

a symbolic endorsement, this is not the time for that.”

NOW had it right the first time. In 1983, women were feeling bruised after three years under Ronald Reagan. A handful of influential feminists—including Kathy Bonk, then communications director for NOW—were part of the effort to get a woman on the Democratic ticket. Armed with information about a new phenomenon called the voting “gender gap,” which showed that women were consistently voting more Democratic than men, women's groups and Democrats were convinced that women would provide a winning margin of error to the party's presidential candidate.

Walter Mondale, Gary Hart and Jesse Jackson all competed for NOW's endorsement. Though the organization's

all. Though Geraldine Ferraro made it onto the ticket, as a politician she wasn't ready to be in the VP slot. The difficulty was, there weren't many women to choose from: There were no women governors, no woman who had been elected to the Senate in her own right and only a handful of female House members.

The problem of the pipeline was addressed the following year with the founding of Emily's List. Born to ensure, implicitly if not explicitly, that there would never again be a moment when the search for a woman candidate would be so embarrassingly difficult, Emily's List was an almost instant success. By the 2000 election cycle, it had given more than \$20 million to candidates—compared with the slightly more than \$200,000 ponied up by NOW's political ac-

tion committee. In the 18 years since its founding, the organization is credited for helping elect seven governors, 55 House members and 11 senators. Though Emily's List was chastised in 2002 for challenging incumbent Democrats, the group remains a genuine force, both in raising women's issues and in getting candidates elected. It may be controversial at times, but it's never ignored.

One of the criteria for receiving an Emily's List endorsement? Viability—women are turned down when they don't have a shot. Says longtime Democratic strategist Donna Brazile about the decision to back Moseley Braun, "I understand why NOW and the [National] Women's Political Caucus wanted to make a statement. On the other hand, when you decide to run for office, you have got to really plan. You can't just run." NOW's most recent choice threatens to leave it sidelined, which means less attention will be paid to the important work that it continues to do: registering voters, energizing women and encouraging them to be a part of the political process, pushing women's issues from the margins into the mainstream. But unfortunately, supporting an outlier candidate doesn't mainstream the candidate; it makes the organization an outlier.

Leaders of women's organizations and progressive groups are deeply reticent to critique their older sister NOW, demanding that comments be on background before whispering words like "marginalized" when describing the Moseley Braun endorsement. Many feminists say that choosing viability over symbolism is a sign of maturity. "[S]ophistication," says one member of Washington's feminist activist community, means "recognizing that advancing your issues is best served by having people in office who are going to help enact them." Another reluctant feminist critic concurs. "They have huge name recognition and a long history," she says, "and yet ... they should be more sophisticated in their politics than they are. They should raise and give more money away, organize their chapters in ways to harness and work on campaigns more. It does marginalize them. Because politics has become a real profession."

Gandy implies a second endorsement may be on the way. "The most impor-

tant thing to our organization is that we stick to our principles and that we support the candidate who is the best candidate at each stage. ... Our No. 1 goal is to defeat George Bush," she says, with a nod toward Moseley Braun eventually bowing out.

But won't that just make their initial endorsement moot? And contrary to 1984, when Democrats actively sought

NOW's backing, how aggressively will the front-runners pursue NOW's endorsement knowing that they are, as far as NOW's concerned, second choice? Women have come too far—and risk too much, if this president is re-elected—to put their faith in symbolism alone. ■

SARAH WILDMAN is a writer living in Washington, D.C.

Head Cases

How else to describe a president and House that would carve up a widely embraced program like Head Start? Thank God for the Senate.

BY DRAKE BENNETT

THROUGHOUT AMERICAN HISTORY, the Senate—where small and conservative states have disproportionate weight and where rules allow one senator to block key legislation—has far more often been a force for reaction than for progress. But these are unusual times, and with an ideologically rigid administration and scores of zealots in the House, it's often fallen to the Senate to bring sanity to the legislative process. The latest case in point is the Head Start debate, which shows just how extreme the White House and the House of Representatives really are—and exposes the increasingly glaring fissures within the GOP over the administration's extremism.

The debate over Head Start reauthorization is usually the legislative equivalent of a wedding rehearsal dinner. Legislators from both sides of the aisle rise to extol the early-childhood program's virtues and speed it on its way to a lopsided vote of approval. Of all the components of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, Head Start has proven the most universally accepted. Even Ronald Reagan increased Head Start's funding while making deep cuts in other children's services. George Bush Senior gave the program the biggest funding increase in its history, only to be outdone a few years later by Bill Clinton.

But if there's one thing that defines our current President Bush, it's an impressive ignorance of history. Head Start

is the latest federal program to find itself at the receiving end of Bush's "if it ain't broke, break it" policy. A House bill modeled on the Bush administration's Head Start proposal threatens some of the core provisions of the program, handing control over to cash-starved states without mandating that they maintain the program's high standards. During the rancorous House debate, critics like Rep. George Miller (D-Calif.), the ranking Democrat on the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, accused the administration of trying to "annihilate an entire program."

Things have gone differently in the Senate. Liberal stalwarts like Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) have blasted the bill, but key Republican senators have also sought to distance themselves from it, meaning that whatever emerges from the Senate later this month is likely to look much more Head Start-friendly than the House bill. Given the Bush administration's fierce response to dissent, one might wonder why senior Republican senators (and some moderate Republicans in the House) aren't falling into line—until one looks at what they'd have to sign on to, that is.

Head Start began in 1965 as an eight-week summer program, designed by a panel of child-development experts to help meet the needs of the nation's disadvantaged preschool children. Southern governors balked at the prospect of a

program that would give so much of its benefits to poor blacks, so President Johnson bypassed the states, sending the funding directly to the local level, a distinctive arrangement that remains to this day. Head Start children are taught reading, language and math skills, plus get their immunization shots, have their teeth checked, are screened for disabilities and are regularly fed. The comprehensive care has also included parents of Head Start children, who are encouraged to participate in the program either as volunteers or members of Parent Committees or Policy Councils. Nearly a third of Head Start employees are former or current Head Start parents.

Head Start kids enter kindergarten far better prepared than they would have been otherwise. A recent study by the Department of Health and Human Services shows Head Start giving its graduates a decided edge in vocabulary and writing skills over other disadvantaged children. In 1999, Head Start finished at the top of the American Customer Satisfaction Index (an independent measure of consumer attitudes toward everything from government agencies to Fortune 500 companies), beating out not only every other federal agency but also private companies like Mercedes-Benz and BMW. And in a study whose preliminary results were released earlier this year, John Meier, a clinical psychologist and adjunct professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, tracked more than 600 Head Start graduates from the San Bernardino area. His findings showed improved scores in reading, language and math. Adding up other factors like the increased earnings, decreased welfare dependence and reduced grade repetition of Head Start graduates, he also calculated that San Bernardino County saved \$8.74 for every dollar spent on the program.

Bush, however, has chosen to ignore this record and focus instead on the program's alleged shortcoming: that Head Start graduates are not as well prepared for kindergarten as their better-off peers. So the administration proposed turning the program over to the states, a move that most certainly would have weakened it. While that proposal didn't make it into the House's version (thanks to stiff resistance from the program's

grass-roots supporters), the bill does provide for a watered-down version in the form of an eight-state pilot program. It also carries another Bush stamp: In a feature familiar to those who have followed the etiolating of Bush's No Child Left Behind education act, the Head Start bill creates a new mandate—that half of Head Start teachers must have bachelor's degrees by 2008—without providing any new money for it. The funding increase the bill does mandate is barely enough to keep pace with inflation, and nowhere near enough to attract college graduates who could make nearly twice as much working in a public school than at Head Start.

The bill also carries that other Bush hallmark: flexibility. In the House version's pilot program, the eight participating states would be able to use Head

his vote for the bill to his constituents by promising that his state wouldn't participate in the pilot program—and that every one is now radically scaling back social services in the face of near-record budget shortfalls, the House bill could be nothing but unpopular. The more consensus-minded Republicans in the Senate realized that such a divisive proposition didn't have a prayer of passage. In response, Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.) proposed his own plan. It centered around giving bonus funding to 200 Head Start "Centers of Excellence" nationwide, gestured toward more state control but generally kept the program's administrative structure as is. When asked what Alexander thinks of the House bill, Alexia Poe, his press secretary, diplomatically demurred, "He likes his bill better. ... He hopes that his bill

Bush's Head Start bill creates a new mandate—that half of Head Start teachers must have bachelor's degrees by 2008—without providing any new money.

Start money to supplant federal funding they get for other child-care programs. In effect the states would be cutting their overall child-care spending to free up money to, say, plug one of their yawning budget gaps. Most strikingly, the bill does not require states that opt for the pilot program to keep Head Start's strict standards on everything from staff qualifications and child-staff ratios to children's nutrition, health and safety. And, as Sarah M. Greene, president and CEO of the National Head Start Association, points out, "Most states that have any form of pre-kindergarten have very weak standards in comparison to Head Start's." Defenders note that the bill does suggest that states adhere to those standards. But it's hard to place much stock in that seeing as those same defenders dismiss many of the standards as "hundreds of pages of needless regulations," as House Education and the Workforce Committee Chairman John Boehner (R-Ohio) wrote in a June press release.

Given that few states have shown any interest in taking on a whole new social-services bureaucracy at this time—in deed, Rep. Ron Lewis (R-Ky.) justified

is a way to address more state involvement without giving the money directly to the states."

Sen. Judd Gregg (R-NH), who as chairman of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions has presided over the Senate bill markup, has been similarly coy about his position on the House bill. He hasn't criticized it, but he hasn't endorsed its key provisions, either. What he has done, over and over, in public and—according to Kennedy spokesman Jim Manley—privately, is state his desire for a truly bipartisan bill. And that's not what the House had to offer. In Manley's words, "Sen. Gregg has already conceded that the block grants are a nonstarter."

So the true Republican partisans in the House and White House will likely be disappointed by the Senate bill. The rest of us, however, may see a bit of hope, however, not only in the prospects for Head Start but in the weakening of the White House's iron grip. ■

DRAKE BENNETT is a freelance writer living in Boston and a former Prospect writing fellow.

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
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
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Importing Government

BY DEBORAH STONE

As Congress diddles with a Medicare prescription-drug plan, citizens are busing and clicking their way to Canadian pharmacies, where drugs are affordable. U.S. politicians, refusing to control drug prices, are also flocking to Canada for help by

endorsing what's euphemistically called "reimportation." But make no mistake: What we are really importing from Canada is effective government regulation.

Spurred on by tax breaks, patent protections and deregulation, the pharmaceutical industry keeps inventing a bounteous pharmacopoeia that ever fewer Americans can afford. Caught between popular pressure to lower drug prices and industry pressure to preserve profits and free markets, the Bush administration came up with voluntary drug discount cards for senior citizens. But the cards have bewildering eligibility rules and offer only modest savings. As a recent General Accounting Office report found, the cards reflect and perpetuate the massive price discrimination in the drug business. Manufacturers give huge discounts to large purchasers—Medicare, Medicaid, the Department of Veterans Affairs, HMOs and now discount-card companies—while gouging the tens of millions of people without effective drug coverage.

Faced with the default of the U.S. government, Congress wants to import drug policy along with drugs. In July, the House of Representatives, with broad Republican support, passed a bill to allow citizens and retail pharmacies to import drugs from Canada. Unlike the counterpart Senate-passed bill, the House doesn't require the Food and Drug Administration to bless imported drugs as safe. What a great free ride for the United States: Let other governments do the hard work of regulating the American drug industry while our politicians keep their blinders on.

How does Canada keep its drug prices so much lower than ours? First, as Canadian economist Steven Morgan points out, Canadian prices *aren't* lower than the prices American bulk purchasers typically pay. They are significantly lower than the inflated prices Americans without drug coverage pay. Second, Canada uses government muscle instead of market muscle to keep drug prices tolerable—for *everyone*. Canada's federal Patented Medicine Prices Review Board limits prices for new breakthrough drugs to the median rate charged in seven industrial countries, and it pegs other patented drugs to these prices. Third, provincial governments add their own controls. Ontario, for example, permits new drugs into its formulary only if they

meet price criteria, while Quebec refuses to pay more for its drugs than the best available price in the rest of Canada.

Meanwhile, the reimportation fix is spreading like crack cocaine. In July, the mayor of Springfield, Mass., launched a program to encourage city employees to purchase their drugs from Canada, saving the city money. Springfield skirted the federal ban on buying and reselling pharmaceuticals from abroad by having individual employees do their own purchasing. Buoyed by Springfield's apparent success (the Department of Justice went after it in September), other city and state governments began exploring how they, too, might help themselves and their citizens in the face of federal government abdication.

The reimportation issue creates a curious alliance between liberals, fiscal conservatives and libertarians. For liberals, opening the Canadian drugstore to American patients is a way to import at least one positive spin-off of Canada's national health insurance: affordable drugs. City and state officials see budget savings in reimportation, and, perhaps, even enhanced local government capacity. Springfield Mayor Michael Albano, fed up with suggestions that he was compromising his citizens' safety with imported drugs, countered, "[A]s mayor, I cannot guarantee my citizens safety with fewer police and firefighters." And while conservative business allies have sided with Big Pharma against reimportation, the pro-import folks invoke free-trade rhetoric, access to world markets and consumers' rights to seek best prices.

For decades conservatives have been promising that if only government gets off corporate backs, free enterprise will make life better for everyone. Republicans, abetted by New Democrats, have so gutted government that Americans are now dependent on other governments to keep us secure. With prescription drugs, most foreign governments do a better job securing the welfare of their citizens by structuring a healthy relationship between business and the rest of society. In strapping itself to industry and ideology, the U.S. government has literally sacrificed its independence, not only from big business but from foreign rule as well. ■

DEBORAH STONE is a longtime Prospect contributor.

Gimme Shelters

BY ROBERT S. MCINTYRE

If you thought President Bush was done with tax cutting for the rest of his term—as Bush’s budget director promised in June—you’ve got another think coming. Pending in Congress this fall, with Bush’s avid backing, is still another round of huge

tax cuts. This time our lawmakers are planning their third major corporate tax reduction in the past two years.

In light of the government’s dire budget straits, more tax cuts might seem pretty reckless. After all, in the just completed fiscal year, combined federal personal and corporate income taxes fell to only 8.4 percent of the economy, their lowest level since before World War II and a third lower than in fiscal year 2000—with no relief in sight.

A lot of that shortfall, of course, reflects the Bush cuts in personal income taxes, which have fallen to their lowest level as a share of the economy in more than 50 years. But corporate taxes have plummeted even more than personal taxes. In fact, at only 1.2 percent of the economy over the past two fiscal years, corporate taxes are at their lowest level since the 1930s (except for one year during Ronald Reagan’s first term).

Some of the corporate tax shortfall reflects the weak economy, but most of it stems in roughly equal parts from Bush’s big corporate tax cuts enacted in 2002 and 2003 and the huge amount of offshore tax sheltering that corporations now engage in. Together, these recently created loopholes have slashed corporate tax payments by \$100 billion or more annually—more than a 40 percent reduction since 2000. And now they’re coming back for more.

In the Senate, Finance Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) has expressed deep outrage over the past year about rampant corporate tax sheltering, particularly offshore abuses. And he does include some useful curbs on corporate shelters in his new bill. But those reforms would raise a total of only \$39 billion over the next decade, when 10 or 15 times that amount would be more serious. Even worse, he wants to use the revenue raised from his modest reforms to open even more corporate loopholes, at a 10-year cost of \$103 billion, including \$37 billion to facilitate offshore tax avoidance!

Grassley actually asserts that his bill is “revenue-neutral”—as if that were the goal of corporate tax reform—

by taking credit for maintaining \$18 billion in customs fees that everyone agrees will be extended anyway and by asserting that complying with a World Trade Organization ruling against a foolish U.S. corporate export subsidy ought to be counted as a \$45 billion revenue-increasing offset, too.

Grassley’s approach of closing loopholes that ought to be closed, but then using the money to create new tax breaks is a lot like a bank forcing a would-be robber to put down his gun, but then giving him the money anyway so long as he asks nicely. A triumph of form over substance, you might say.


Unfortunately, things in the House are much worse. Rep. Bill Thomas (R-Calif.) is such a terrible chairman of the Ways and Means Committee that you almost wish his state would replace him with an actor who could at least pretend to be competent. Rather than fulfill his committee’s mandate to find the ways and means to pay for the United States government, Thomas, working hand

in glove with President Bush, has been on a mission to destroy the United States as we know it by failing to provide the money to pay for what we do as a nation.

At the end of last July, Thomas, with Bush’s blessing, introduced a bill to provide companies with a staggering \$259 billion in new loopholes over the next decade. Among the items on this corporate wish list are \$79 billion worth of expanded tax shelters for multinational corporations. Thomas doesn’t even pay lip service to covering the enormous cost of his bill. He grudgingly offers a few minor reforms, but they raise a mere \$9 billion over a decade.

Corporate pressure to gain still more concessions is so intense that it seems very likely something will pass Congress this year. And while the details of the final bill are still up in the air, one can be sadly sure that whatever’s left out will be back in the future so long as the current management remains in charge. ■

ROBERT S. MCINTYRE *is the director of Citizens for Tax Justice.*



The Democrats' Military Option

BY PAUL STARR

Count me among the skeptics as to whether a politically untested general can successfully run the gauntlet of a Democratic presidential-primary campaign in America today. The organizational confusion, inconsistent statements and other

troubles that beset Wesley Clark in the first weeks of his campaign all testified to his lack of political experience.

But count me also a believer in the potential payoff in reframing the national political debate if Clark allays these early concerns and captures the Democratic nomination. To many in the party, the chief appeal of the retired general is that he insulates Democrats from charges of being unpatriotic or weak on national security. Yet on domestic issues, Clark's military background may also prove an important, unanticipated asset.

During the past several decades, the American military has become a model of successful social reform. Perhaps the best example is racial integration. While many other institutions remain nearly as segregated today as they were before the civil-rights legislation of the 1960s, the armed services have undergone a transformation. Officers are evaluated for promotion partly on the basis of their handling of race relations, and the military has emerged as one of the most influential defenders of affirmative action.

The introduction of women into the military has also led the services to create child care and other family-oriented programs that are far in advance of what corporate America typically offers. Military training and career ladders provide models of workforce improvement. And, of course, the military has long offered generous health-care and retirement benefits.

In many other countries, particularly in the developing world, the military has played a socially progressive role. Most of us are not used to thinking of the American military that way, and, indeed, the top echelons of the armed forces have been overwhelmingly Republican and conservative. But the social changes within the military have moved it in a more liberal direction. As a result, the significance of a general in American politics is entirely different today from what it would be if the armed forces remained a segregated bastion of social conservatism.

In other words, it's not just that Clark's military back-

ground gives him credibility on national defense. It may also give him credibility on a variety of social issues that the armed forces have addressed. And because of the respect that the military enjoys with much of the public that is otherwise disenchanted with the federal government, Clark may be able to communicate with voters who would otherwise be unreachable by a Democratic candidate.

Clark also needs to connect his military experience to his advocacy of Democratic programs in order to present a coherent narrative of his own political evolution. He says he voted for Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, and, as

recently as 2001, he appeared at a Republican fund raiser. While he's voiced support for Democratic ideas and policies, his recent entry into the Democratic Party risks seeming opportunistic unless he can provide a better explanation than he has so far of his current positions.


The military's record in affirmative action, changing women's roles, child care, health care and other programs can serve him as a credible basis for explaining his decision to enter politics as a Democrat.

He can say, "I learned from our success: We made these ideas work in the armed forces, and I can help make them work for America."

Whether Clark will draw on his military background this way is as yet unclear. And even if he does, he will need to spell out his views on economic policy and other questions that don't have clear analogs in the military. At this point, Clark is a Rorschach test for observers. He may not actually be the kind of candidate many of his supporters hope he is or project that he will become. The path to the Democratic nomination is strewn with land mines, and several of them may blow up in Clark's face as he threads his way through the treacherous landscape.

But the potential is there for a credible reframing of the Democratic argument on both foreign and domestic affairs. The Democrats don't just need a strong candidate; they need a candidate who can make their case in a fresh and forceful way. Clark might just be able to do that. ■

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


The

"This is a contact sport.

They're supposed to try to beat us.

But...nobody gags us!"



Clinton Formula

Forget the left-center divide—it's not 1992 anymore.
Defend government. Fight smarter. Smile. Win.

BY MICHAEL TOMASKY

PHOTOGRAPHS BY SYLVIA PLACHY

When Sylvia Plachy and I walked into Bill Clinton's Harlem office around 2:30 p.m. on Sept. 8, the former president was courteous to me, but he was more interested in telling Sylvia—who, aside from being a world-renowned photographer, is the mother of Oscar-winning actor Adrien Brody—that he'd enjoyed *The Pianist*, but he'd also recently rented and loved *Oxygen*, a 1999 thriller in which Brody played a kidnapper. How Clinton pulled *that* one out we didn't

ask; we just took it as a quick reminder that there is such a thing as a president with broad intellectual and cultural interests, and got down to business.

The bulk of his time now is devoted to his book and to the Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative, which delivers medicines to sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean. But there's always time for politics. The Clinton on display here is combative, and he has some surprising things to say about how this election's crop of Democrats needs to do more than just ape what he did in 1992. But let him tell it.



“I can just hear [Karl] Rove now. Going in there and saying, ‘Let’s just do that. See if we can make *that* work!’”

MICHAEL TOMASKY I’d like to begin by talking about the historical moment. Karl Rove wants to create a realignment along the lines of that which coalesced around

the New Deal. This realignment would undo a lot of the work of the last 60 years, including, of course, a lot of your work. Do you think we’re at such a turning point?

BILL CLINTON I do think it’s a very important moment. Essentially, Karl Rove’s politics are a combination of efforts by the increasingly conservative Republican Party to recover from the ’64 election and assume a dominant position in America—through the advocacy of ideas and policies that were designed to have more appeal to the middle class, through the use of socially conservative issues that were designed to get people to vote for them for reasons other than economic ones, and through the extraordinary ability to increase their dominance in the mainstream press [and to] have a competing right-wing press and label Democrats ... almost turn them into cartoons in a way that got them votes from people who otherwise never would have voted for them. And that’s basically been their strategy.

So they believe those things, coupled with their extraordinary ability to raise money from the people they’re helping financially with the government, will enable them to pursue policies which are way to the right of where the American people are.

I don’t think we’re headed for a realignment. If anything, we should be realigning in the direction I took the country. When I left office we had a 65 percent job approval, or something like that, so two-thirds of the people favored my policies. And that’s why they attacked me personally so much, why they tried to attack Al Gore and make him look dishonest. And to say that compared to President Bush, and their backgrounds in public life, that Gore was dishonest was ludicrous. But they got away with it.

And if you look at these tax cuts, they got a good return for their investment. I mean, people say, “Gosh, how did Bush

raise \$200 million, \$300 million?” I say it’s peanuts compared to the tax cuts he gave. It’s not even a tithe, you know? Not even 1 percent!

MT They continue to get away with it ...

BC Well, they do, but I think that we as a country, including the press and the political opposition, were profoundly traumatized by what happened on [September 11], and we were angered and we wanted to be united. And we were collectively prepared to check our critical judgment in a deep freeze somewhere for a period of time.

And in that period, they actually had a chance to effect their realignment. But instead, they chose to use the moment to try to consolidate their power, to extend the secrecy of government and to move the country way, way to the right. And there was a slow but building reaction to it. ... And no democracy can go without debate for very long. So it was inevitable that one by one, the American people would go back to the deep freeze and get their brains back and start thinking, and that’s basically what’s happening now.

MT But the Democrats participated in this lack of debate for far too long.

BC I think that the only place where we really were derelict was in not being tougher in the last six, eight weeks of the [midterm] election cycle. Because that’s the only time it could have been made manifest to the voters what [the Republicans] were doing. I mean, the idea that they could be against the homeland-security bill for seven, eight months and then decide that ... I can just hear Rove now; I mean, it’s impressive. Going in there and saying, “You know, we can’t make any security votes against the Democrats. One-hundred percent of them are with us in Afghanistan, and two-thirds of them are with us in Iraq. We’ve got to have some issue, so let’s be for this bill we’ve been against. And let’s put a poison pill or two in there that’ll give the Democrats some pause, and hope it doesn’t get passed by election day, and call everybody a virtual traitor that’s not for a bill that we weren’t for either until yesterday. Let’s just do that. See if we can make *that* work!”

MT And they did, and part of the reason that they did is that the Democrats didn't do what you're saying. Why not?

BC I just think a lot of people were just unsure how to proceed after 9-11, and they were somewhat intimidated by the president's big poll numbers. But we always do that in a wartime when we feel threatened. But you know, Max Cleland, the idea that his patriotism could be questioned after he left three limbs in Vietnam, and questioned by a man who had a deferment like I did ... you know, it's just unbelievable to me. [Then] the Bush people took a compromise on the public-employee issue as soon as the election was over. It was just a scam. One of the great scams of modern American history, the way they did that homeland-security bill.

But we shouldn't whine about that. Their job is to beat us. Our job is to beat them. If they come at us with a deal we think is a scam, we ought to be smart enough to expose it. So I'm not mad at them. That's their job.

MT Let me ask you about the schism within the Democratic Party. The liberals and the centrists, when you talk with them, express a lot of contempt for each other. At times, the rhetorical tone has crossed the line from reasoned argument to mockery. And this has happened more from the centrists toward the liberals than the other way around—

BC Yeah, and I think it's a big mistake. And I'd like to say why.

First of all, I think the differences in most cases are overrated. And I'd like to give some examples. When I was president and we did welfare reform, I vetoed the first two bills because they eliminated the guarantee of nutrition, food stamps and health care to poor children. I signed the third bill even though it had restrictions I didn't like on immigrants because I thought that this was a historic opportunity to get a bill that emphasized work over welfare and dependence without hurting poor kids. Now, when I did that we had over two-thirds of the House members and about three-quarters of the Senate voting for it. So we were sort of together.

If you listen to the debate now among the candidates, to take another issue, on fiscal responsibility, there isn't that much difference between the liberals and the conservatives. I reached a judgment that with the baby boomers retiring in a few years, we couldn't keep running these huge deficits and raiding Social Security, and middle-class people were better off having low interest rates in a growing economy.

"It was a scam. One of the great scams in modern American history, the way they did that homeland-security bill."

And that would create more revenues, which we could then spend on poor people. And that's exactly what happened. So we developed a consensus around fiscal responsibility.

I make these two points, just to use welfare reform and fiscal responsibility, to point out that I think it is very easy to overstate the differences.

Now: If there are differences, there's a better way to get them out than having our candidates dump on each other. I have no objection in this primary season [to] Candidate X say-

ing, "I'm for that," and Candidate Y saying, "I'm against it." You've got to have a little of that. But I don't believe that either side should be saying, "I'm a real Democrat and the other one's not," or, "I'm a winning Democrat and the other one's not."

It oversimplifies the issue. The public is operationally progressive and rhetorically conservative. The more they believe that you're careful with tax money and responsible in the way you run the programs and require responsibility from citizens, the more the public in general is willing to be liberal in the expenditure of tax money. The more the public believes the Democrats can be trusted with the national security of America, to protect and defend the country against terror and weapons of mass destruction, the more free they are emotionally to think about the other issues.

Therefore I think it is highly counterproductive to spend a great deal of time trying to identify the wings of the party and [having] each wing criticize the other. I think it's fine to explore specific differences among the candidates. We can't win if people think we're too liberal. But we can't get our own folks out if people think we have no convictions. So the trick is to get them both.

I thought in the [Albuquerque] debate, to be fair to our crowd, they were much better about avoiding these kind of ad hominem attacks, which I think are dead-bang losers.


MT How do you get both? You, in 1992, given where the Democratic Party had been, made certain steps in the direction of showing you were willing to reject some old nostrums. But is that as necessary a politics today as it was in 1992?

BC No, I think it has to be done differently today.

MT How?

BC Well, first of all I think the Democrats ought to all pocket some of the gains I made. They ought to say, "We're the party that gave you responsible welfare reform. We're the party that gave you fiscal responsibility, low interest rates and high growth. And we're the party that gave you the weapons systems and the training programs that won in Iraq and Afghanistan." The question is, what do we do now?

[The Republicans'] argument to their base is gonna be, "We kept our promises. We promised



to cut taxes as much on wealthy people as we could, and we did it. We promised to weaken environmental controls, and we did it. We promised to weaken labor regulations and put less money into workers' safety and more money into investigating unions. We promised to put right-wingers on the court, and we've done it every chance we got. We promised to get rid of Saddam Hussein, and we did

it, and we promised to undo everything Bill Clinton did, and we did a lot of that." So that's their promises to their base.


The only promises they have broken so far are promises to swing voters. So [Bush is] gonna say, "I kept my promises to my base. How am I gonna get the others? The same way I got them in 2002. By convincing people the Democrats can't be trusted with national security."

So what we have to say is, "You can trust us with the national security. If America has to fight, we ain't gonna lose, because we've got the only military in the world. And they won in Afghanistan and Iraq with the training programs and the weapons systems developed during the Clinton years. So what you need a good president for is not to win a war. It's for when you don't fight, for a good diplomacy and a good domestic policy. And we don't agree with the diplomacy or the domestic policy."

But to go back to '92, I don't think we have to do as much conscious adding to the base in the way I did it. I was never against wealth and business creation. My theory was that class warfare wouldn't take us very far, but that if we were growing jobs and growing the economy, the government then should make extra efforts to help the poor. And we did a lot of that.

Now what we should say is that they, not we, have brought class warfare back to America. You know, every time I complain about these tax cuts some conservative says I'm practicing class warfare. I am not. I pay these taxes. And I live in New York state and Westchester County, so I think I probably pay as high [of] rates as anybody in America. And I should. Nobody makes me live in this country. America has been good to me. And I think for somebody to give me a tax cut and then turn around and say, "We've gotta have \$87 billion spent in Iraq, but we're gonna kick 300,000 kids out of after-school programs, 84,000 kids out of student loans ... 25,000 uniformed police off the street? We're gonna kick a coupla thousand

police off the street in New York City who put their lives on the line on September the 11th, and



And the other thing I think is, we can smile when we say that. I don't want our side ever to treat the Republicans with the sort of personal animosity and contempt with which Hillary and I and Al were treated. I don't like that, I don't believe that, I don't think that's necessary. But we *got* to argue. And we got to fight hard. Otherwise they'll run right over us like they did in 2002.

MT How vulnerable is this administration? What are the main targets of opportunity?

BC Well, I think the economy is a target of opportunity. I think the fact that most of the world doesn't trust us anymore is a target of opportunity. I think the assault on the environment is a target of opportunity. I think giving me a tax cut and then [trying to take] overtime away from 8 million workers is a target of opportunity. ... We're gonna spend \$87 billion in Iraq. We're gonna give the 400 wealthiest Americans an average tax cut of \$8-and-a-half million. \$8-and-a-half million! And that's just a start. And they tried to get rid of the children's health-insurance program. That's 5 million kids' health insurance.

Man, if we can't sell that, we ought to get in another line of work! Either that or I don't live in the country I think I live in.

MT Is part of the problem that when Bush says, "It's your money, you deserve it back," that that's so emotionally compelling—

BC It is.

MT What is a good emotional counterargument to that? I believe that Democrats should be willing to make a more direct case for government than they make.

BC Oh, I do, too. I think we should say, "It is your money. And the government should only take your money to do those things which you need done collectively, which we have to do as a community—"

MT Which neither the private sector nor the states—

BC Yes, which the private sector won't do in the economy, and which charity can't do. And those things are plainly national security, basic infrastructure, law enforcement, environmental protection, education and health care for the elderly, for poor children, the disabled and others for whom it is inaccessible. Just to start there. And we have a government, and we raise taxes because we think that we rise or fall together, and we want to live in a country where everybody has a chance to live their dreams.

And so, to say that it's your money does not answer any question. That's a demagogic statement that every Democrat could say as well as every Republican. Of *course* it's their

"I don't want our side ever to treat the Republicans with the contempt with which Hillary and I and Al were treated."

they're gonna give me a tax cut?" That's class warfare! And I think we ought to say that!

money! It's all their money. But the question is, who's doing what with the money? They made a decision to give me a tax cut with the money and kick 300,000 kids out of after-school programs. I haven't met a single person in my income group, Republican or Democrat, who believes that we should get the check and the kids should get the boot. Not one! And I ask a bunch of them. So I think we ought to say, "It's your money, and it's your *country*. What kind of country do you want?"

I also think we ought to say, "It's not like they're not spendin' money! They're creating a big lie here. They're spending the money and giving you a tax cut and printing money to pay the bills." And let me just say, I didn't object to the president's running deficits after 9-11. He didn't make those conditions. But they did decide how to respond to them.

And to give a big tax cut in 2001 before we knew what our income, expense or emergency [costs] were gonna be was not responsible. Except to those who believe it was ideologically dictated. So in 2003 we come back, and usually when you find yourself in a hole you're supposed to quit digging, but people who are ideologically inclined will only ask for a bigger shovel. So the 2003 tax cut was the bigger shovel.

MT One of the problems liberals have had is they haven't found a compelling way to deliver their message. I've been reading lately some scholars who talk about conservatism and liberalism not only as ideologies but as psychological belief systems.

BC Yeah, I read some of that.

"We have to improve turnout to their level, then we have to win among the other 10 percent. That's eminently doable."

MT It says basically [that] conservatives believe in authority, they do see things in black and white, and that makes it easier for them to get their message out—it's stark, it's more reducible to the five-second sound bite. Liberals tend to see more nuance, tend to be more skeptical of authority, and it makes it harder, especially in this media climate, to get the message out.

BC I think that's right. And I think the psychological setting after 9-11 helped them. Because we all wanted to see things in black and white for a while. A grievous thing had been done to us, and we wanted to stand united against it.

But we think there are some things that are not open to debate. One is the historic mission of America, to form a more perfect union. What does that mean? It means widening the circle of opportunity, deepening the meaning of freedom and strengthening the bonds of community. And we feel passionately about that. We feel just as strongly as the Republicans do.


And we are not gonna demonize them the way they demonize us. We will never have the talk-show people saying things about them without regard to whether they're true or not. That's not who we are. But we do show up to fight. We think you're worth fighting for. We think your future's worth fighting for. And we need to use the rhetoric of passion, commitment and combat on behalf of ordinary people without ever slipping into the kind of vicious, personal, evidence-free—to use my wife's phrase—assaults that they're so good at.

We don't have to do that. And it doesn't really sell all that well with our crowd. But people have to believe that we wake up in the morning just as passionately committed to what we believe as they are. And in the process of conducting ourselves in that way, people get the sense intuitively that we're strong enough to defend the country.

This is a contact sport. They're supposed to try to beat us. Now, they do things by and large that we don't think are legitimate. And lord knows they did while I was president. But ... nobody gags us! The press has moved way, way, way to the right. And the mainstream press was incredibly supine in

the face of all this secrecy, you know, covering up the [Ronald] Reagan and [George] Bush [Senior] records, covering up the [Miguel] Estrada legal opinions, covering up the 9-11 report, covering up the global-warming deal and the air-quality issue down there [in lower Manhattan]. And it all started with putting the governor's records in the Bush presidential library. And [the press] just laid down and let it happen. But we don't have to contribute to it.

Now, let me just close on an upbeat note here. I don't entirely buy the Ruy Teixeira [and John B. Judis] analysis about the natural Democratic majority. On the other hand, there is *something* to it.



[Lyndon] Johnson wins big in '64 cuz he marginalizes [Barry] Goldwater. They never got over it

and they've been trying to do it to us ever since. By '68, Nixon wins by a point, but we all know he would have beaten [Hubert] Humphrey handily if [George] Wallace hadn't been in the race. So there was a traumatic coalescing of a culturally conservative majority in the Republican Party between '64 and '68, ratified by the '72 election, OK? So essentially from '68 forward the Republican Party had a hardcore base of roughly 45 percent. The Democrats had a hardcore base of roughly 40 percent.

So in '80, Reagan wins 51-to-41, and [John] Anderson gets, what, [6 percent], [7 percent], whatever he got? Then in '84, [Reagan] wins 6-to-4. And in '88, they win 54-to-46, which means they won 9 points of the undecided vote and we won 6 points. In '92, because of the campaign I ran, if no [Ross] Perot had been in there, all the analyses show that it would have been 52 [percent], 53 percent. In '96, if no Perot had been in there and we'd had a normal turnout, it would have been about 55 percent. [So] by 2000, sometime between '92 and 2000, because of immigration, urbanization and the suburbanite voters developing a more communitarian ethic, both parties had a base of about 45 percent. And what happened in 2000 is they were fighting over an effective 10 percent, and they fought to a draw.

So that means that we're in every race. You start with 45 percent, you're in a race. I don't care what anybody says. So sometime between 1992 and 2000, for the first time—probably in the last four years, for the first time since 1964—we were no longer at a cultural disadvantage in our base. So both parties go into this next election with a natural base of about 45 percent. So in 2004, this race will be about—it goes back to your question about the Democrats' dilemma and our division. We have to improve our turnout to their level, as we did in '98 and 2000 but not in 2002. And then we have to win the votes among the other 10 percent. That's eminently doable.

But we've got to fight. And we gotta look like we're havin' a good time doing it. ■

Shock of the Old

Win or lose, Howard Dean has become town crier for a liberalism that long predates FDR.

BY GARANCE FRANKE-RUTA

THE SMALLEST CROWD OF HOWARD DEAN'S SLEEPLESS Summer Tour in late August consisted of about 450 people. They'd gathered at the airport outside Boise, Idaho, on a splash of tarmac surrounded by sparkling, cloudless sky. There, where the crumpled, arid desert gave way to the pine-covered Boise Foothills, amid the mingled scents of jet fuel and dust, they waited for former Gov. Howard Dean (D-Vt.) to arrive.

When he did, Dean supporter Delmar Stone approached the microphone and introduced the presidential hopeful to the crowd by way of a jaw-dropping comparison. "The last time I was this excited about someone who could change the world was when I heard about Jesus!" Stone said. "Oh, come on!" exclaimed the man standing next to me. It was such an over-the-top thing to say, seeming to reflect more than anything what a neglected bunch the Idaho Democrats are. Few national Democratic candidates come to stump in Boise, and, when they do, the beleaguered partisans get a little overexcited.

But Stone, I learned as I listened to Dean supporters around the country, was not so unusual after all. In Austin, Texas, Melissa Sternberg told me she'd gotten so excited after she caught Dean on the *Charlie Rose Show* in June that she'd become "born-again Dean." On popular political blogs like Daily Kos, readers routinely discuss Dean supporters' "messianic" zeal. Backers of retired Gen. Wesley Clark accuse the Deanies of promoting a "Church of Dean." In each case, the choice of words is instructive, and probably not accidental.

The mainstream media suggest that Dean has roused the Democratic Party's base through his opposition to the Iraq War and straight-ahead criticisms of President Bush. But comments like the ones above suggest that Dean has tapped into something much deeper—and older in American political history—than mere Bush hatred. Irrespective of whether he ends up winning the Democratic nomination, Dean has already accomplished something valuable for liberalism: He has reconnected it to a strain of religiously inflected American history it typically ignores.

In many ways, contemporary liberalism does not reach all that far back in American history. Its emotional roots are located in 1968—that year of great upheaval that, for liberal baby boomers, was year one of the brave new world—and, to a lesser extent, in 1933, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt as-

sembled the bricks and mortar of the welfare state. These are liberalism's historic reference points and the grounds from which its present-day rhetoric and enthusiasms spring.

Dean, though, comes out of neither of these two traditions. He is no '68er; in 1968, he was, by all accounts, a not terribly political Yale University sophomore. Some have argued that Dean's Vermont is '60s dropout heaven, and while this may be true of some in the state, it's not true of Dean himself. As governor, his fiercest fights were always with the state's insurgent left. Similarly, Dean didn't govern Vermont as a latter-day New Dealer. Indeed, his sharpest conflict this campaign season, with Rep. Dick Gephardt (D-Mo.) over reforming Medicare, stems from his statements during that time—when, Gephardt charged, Dean parroted Newt Gingrich's line on the issue. Nor is he, as some have posited, a populist; populism has midwestern and southern roots, and Dean lacks the populist's warm folksiness.


No, Dean is something altogether different. He is more a product of geography—and his was a chosen geography, as he was born in New York City—than ideology. The more one watches him on the stump (and watches his admirers watching him), the more it becomes apparent that he comes out of, and is reviving, a tradition of small-town, New England civic and religious fervor that is all but forgotten in American politics today. He is something the country has not seen in a very long time. He is, essentially, a *northern* evangelist.

The question he faces now, as the campaign enters a more serious phase, is whether he can revive that tradition all the way to the White House, or whether it's lain so dormant for so long that it—and he—has already reached its limits.

DOWN BY THE BANKS OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN, TWO COTTONWOODS hang over the water's edge near Burlington, Vt.'s College Street. Rick Sharp, an attorney who's known Dean since 1980—when they fought to change the downtown waterfront from "derelict, industrial storage yards" into today's popular public park and bicycle path—shows me a scar on one of the trees. It's from beaver bites. "Howard ended up saving that tree by putting some chain-link fence around it to prevent the beaver from chewing all the way through," says Sharp. "The tree was about half the size back then."

Scratch the surface in Burlington and everyone's got a

Dean has tapped into something deeper—and older in American history—than mere Bush hatred.



Boston Glee Party: Howard Dean reaches out to the faithful in Boston on Sept. 23.

story about Dean, from the bricks he laid by hand on the waterfront back in the day to the Junior League meetings he once addressed to his presentation on faith and politics over at the First Congregational Church last year. Interestingly, many of Burlington's townsfolk say that, during his tenure in Vermont government, there was little inspiration to be found in his blunt—even boring—speaking style. The only thing former Burlington City Council member Paul Lafayette saw in Dean foreshadowing the candidate's current oratorical prowess was the "lung capacity" he expended cheering at hockey and soccer games. "Because of the smallness of our area, people aren't used to giving the large types of rallies," Lafayette says. "You can actually go out and meet everyone face to face." Indeed, Vermont demands a retail politics of just the sort the Iowa and New Hampshire contests also favor. And, for the first year and a half Dean was running for president, that's just the sort of politics he practiced.

But then, in May of this year, the crowds started to arrive. First it was 1,200 people in Seattle, when the campaign expected 300. Then some 3,200 showed up in Austin, Texas, in mid-June. More than 5,000 gathered for the Burlington announcement speech June 23. And the crowds just kept getting bigger: 4,000 in Philadelphia at the start of August and 15,000 in Seattle by the end of that month. Something was happening. And as the crowds grew, so did Dean's rhetoric. "Democracy itself is at stake in this election," he told a crowd of more than 2,500 under an overcast sky in Boston on Sept. 23. "You ARE this campaign," he told 5,000 cheering students in Madison, Wisc., in early October. "This campaign is about giving people a voice."

It sounds hokey, and unoriginal, and like exactly what every

politician says every electoral season. Yet over the past six months, these tropes have worked a kind of magic on potential voters in Iowa and New Hampshire, as well as donors across the country, who poured close to \$15 million into Dean's coffers in the last quarter. One astute observer has credited Dean's appeal to the doctor's grasp of psychology and the contemporary rhetoric of self-empowerment that laces many of his speeches. But Dean's grasp of the American political psyche is firmer than that: Dean's bet is that somewhere—buried in some back corner, under layers of Oprah and *American Pie*, *Curb Your Enthusiasm* and Eminem and the latest Field Poll from California—there's a little bit of Thomas Paine in each of us.

This quality in Dean's rhetoric—that he is appealing not just to people's partisan leanings, nor to their particular ethnic or gender identities but to their history and identity as Americans—is what has made him compelling to so many liberal voters who feel America is no longer even trying to be a "City upon a Hill." Instead of fearing the legacy of northeastern liberalism, he has embraced it as the philosophy that founded contemporary democracy, created America, kept it whole during the 19th century and fought to expand the franchise so that African Americans and women could participate as full citizens. When the other presidential contenders have tried to reach back past the Great Society, it has often been to connect with the last northern Democratic president, John F. Kennedy. And Dean? In the Boston speech, he quickly mentioned the 1960s and the New Deal—but he built his address around the Sons of Liberty, who had carried out the Boston Tea Party. At his formal announcement speech, he skipped past JFK and went all the way back to John Winthrop, a Puritan settler, theologian and early governor of the Massachusetts

Bay Colony, quoting these words: "We shall be as one. We must delight in each other, make others' conditions our own; rejoice together, mourn together, labor and suffer together."

This return to origins is, to be sure, partly typical political calculation. "You get beat by not wrapping yourself in American history," says Dean's campaign manager, Joe Trippi. But part of it is also a genuine effort by the campaign to imbue Dean's argument with "a foundation in the history of the country" at a time when democratic practices seem increasingly subject to contestation from the right. "We've got to remind people of why we are the kind of country we are," says Trippi. "We've gotten so far away from some of the original principles."

Dean is, without a doubt, an odd vessel for the quasi-religious fervor he has inspired. He almost never mentions God in his stump speeches and he rarely goes to church himself. Nevertheless, his rhetoric—like his campaign structure—is deeply grounded in the social practices of a branch of radical Protestantism whose tenets still wield power in the structures of Vermont's government. The Pilgrims who gave America its foundational governing documents and ideas—ideas that Dean now routinely references—created a society based partly on the anti-authoritarian religious principles of Congregationalism, their religion (and, since the early '80s, Dean's).

Congregationalism, the dominant religion of colonial and early federal life, had by the 20th century become an obscure New England denomination about as relevant to modern life as covered bridges. Yet the legacy of the Congregationalists—and their Unitarian descendants—is one of the most powerful forces in the history of the American North. It was Congregationalists who landed the Mayflower on Plymouth Rock in 1620. Their descendants founded America's elite colleges, such as Harvard and Yale, and some of its most liberal ones, such as Oberlin and Amherst. Where the South bred agrarian populists and Baptist revivals, the North churned out Unitarian and Congregationalist ministers.

Dean's own conversion to Congregationalism was a more mundane political affair. He'd been christened as a Catholic and was raised Episcopalian. But he converted to the local Vermont religion as a consequence of his battle to make over the shoreline. "I had a big fight with a local Episcopal church about 25 years ago over the bike path," he told *This Week with George Stephanopoulos* in September. "We were trying to get the bike path built. They had control of a mile and a half of railroad bed, and they decided they would pursue a property-rights suit to refuse to allow the bike path to be developed." Dean eventually talked church leaders out of the lawsuit, recalls Sharp, but other railroad neighbors refused to budge and litigated the case all the way to U.S. Supreme Court.

The effort to restore the Lake Champlain shoreline was a turning point for Dean in his transformation from New Yorker to Vermonter: At the same moment, he both adopted the local faith and became involved in local politics. To this day, Dean remains devoted to the idea of local freedoms, local governing solutions and local control. He supports the assault-weapons ban, but other than that, prefers each state

to draft its own gun-control laws—a position that's earned him an "A" rating from the National Rifle Association. He signed the court-ordered civil-unions law in Vermont—indeed, one lesbian couple in the suit that led to the law belong to the same Congregationalist church as Dean—but does not favor any federal law on marriage. He's ferociously opposed to unfunded mandates that make impositions on state governments, such as the No Child Left Behind Act.

As Dean reflects traditions of Yankee independence in governance, he also reflects it in the organization of his campaign, in which local directors have an almost unprecedented autonomy. In New Hampshire, the field operation is using a theory of "relationships-based organizing" that tries to turn every committed supporter into a field operative, says former Seacoast coordinator Myles Duffy. "The rhetoric matches the structure of the campaign," notes Mathew Gross, Dean's blogger in chief and speechwriter. "It goes back to the fundamental unit of democracy, which is the town-hall meeting." (Or, in the case of the Dean campaign, the Meetup.)

It all comes out of the Vermont political tradition centered on the small town. "Congregational government puts power in the hands of the people to determine what they want at a scale that people can relate to," says John Nutting, a Congregationalist minister in Vermont who has written a history of Dean's Burlington church. "It was prized by both the church and by the secular structures of the state of Vermont, so that in many ways a similar pattern of participation existed both in the church and the civil society. Vermont hasn't abandoned it. We're a state of very small communities."

"It's normal to be political here," adds Zephyr Teachout, Dean's director of Internet outreach and a native Vermonter. Teachout, who also worked on Dean's 1994 gubernatorial bid, says she grew up loving the "messiness of democracy" at her annual town meetings. "What we're really trying to do is encourage people to think of politics as a normal part of their life. There's been this weird separation." Through the Meetups and such online organizing tools as "Get Local," the Dean campaign is breaking a national campaign down into units small enough to feel human.

One of the weaknesses of this approach is that Dean himself sometimes gets caught up in the sort of disputes—especially with the press—characteristic of local governance. But the strength is that it also brings a sense of empowerment that's deeper than anything coming out of identity politics or New Age philosophies. There are legitimate questions about Dean's crossover appeal, and he may well be uniquely vulnerable, as his many Democratic critics assert, to the inevitable Republican attacks. But whatever happens to him in 2004, his remarkable 2003 should remain instructive to Democrats and liberals alike. He has built not just a candidacy but a movement, and he's done it by expanding liberalism's vocabulary, giving it fresh historical material from which to draw. It may or may not make him president. But it's what makes him important. ■

GARANCE FRANKE-RUTA is a Prospect senior editor.

THE AMERICAN PROSPECT



SPECIAL REPORT: AMERICA IN THE WORLD

NOVEMBER 2003

THE FOREIGN POLICY EMERGENCY

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What Bush Could Learn From JFK

Kennedy's bold strategy of peace delivered more for America than Bush's simple warmongering.

BY THEODORE C. SORENSEN

JOHN F. KENNEDY WAS DECORATED FOR HIS MILITARY heroism in the South Pacific in World War II. However, he showed even greater courage as president during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. At that time, his right-wing critics were denouncing him for pursuing a "no-win policy" in his approach to the Soviet Union's Cold War military challenge. Nevertheless, when this nation was subjected to its greatest threat, by the sudden, secret emplacement of Soviet nuclear missiles 90 miles from our shores, Kennedy had the courage and confidence to communicate, negotiate, even compromise with his chief adversary, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, the man whose recklessly hostile arms deployment had every appearance of preparing for anything from the intimidation to the devastation of the United States. It was a compromise in the pursuit of a peaceful settlement, under which the Soviets swiftly withdrew all their missiles, under inspection, and without the United States ever firing a shot.

Eight months later, Kennedy demonstrated the same kind of courage, defying his domestic critics with a bold commencement address at American University, a speech without precedent, in which he urged the American people to re-examine the usefulness of the Cold War, to re-examine the very meaning of peace itself. In that same speech, Kennedy also called for the adoption of a nuclear test ban to slow down the arms race, beginning with the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to prevent further poisoning of the atmosphere. Public-opinion polls at the time showed not only conservatives but also most Americans to be deeply suspicious of any treaties with the Soviets. But Kennedy plowed ahead, obtaining Senate consent to ratify the Limited Test Ban Treaty, reaching agreement with the Soviets on a "hot line" communications link between Moscow and Washington to avoid the kind of negotiating delays that kept the world on the brink of disaster in October, and laying the groundwork for the end of the Cold War. That speech was titled "The Strategy of Peace."

Advocates of peace and demonstrations of courage are in short supply in Washington today. The Bush administration has no strategy for peace, only a strategy for continuous war. A government that prefers to ignore the United Nations while paying little attention to the wishes of its allies and even less to international law is a government that feels free to launch preemptive strikes against any nation that it decides is unworthy. It is also a government that will feel free to choose one war after another, usually against smaller adversaries.

With great political and rhetorical skill, George W. Bush was able to justify his action to the American people by convincing a majority that Iraq's Saddam Hussein was behind the September 11 al-Qaeda attacks on the United States, and that America's security was directly threatened by a tin-pot dictator who had neither an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction nor the means of delivering them to our territory. As a result, Bush hastily took our country into a costly war and occupation that is draining our treasury and the lifeblood of too many of our young men and women.

In his reckless zeal to play commander in chief, Bush has endangered both the physical and the financial security of the American people, possibly for generations to come. Lacking either the courage or the ability to stand up to the hawks in his administration and the right-wingers in his party, Bush finds war an easy way, as election year approaches, to rally voters behind a commander in chief who, unlike Kennedy, never discovered the ills of war firsthand.

To be sure, the Kennedy era was a very different one. Though this country possessed the most awesome military force in the world—indeed, in human history—Kennedy took care to see to it that the United States was respected primarily for the economic, educational, and civil opportunities and rights it offered its citizens, for its great institutions of learning and for its commitment to peace, not primarily for its military might. He both represented and conveyed to the world the best instincts and traditions of Americans as a generous, peaceful people, thereby increasing the affection and respect with which we were regarded around the world. This made us a less likely target for resentment and attack from terrorists and other America-haters. "The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war," Kennedy said at American University. "This generation of Americans has already had enough—more than enough—of war ... [W]e shall also do our part, to build a world of peace. Confident and unafraid, we labor on—not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace."

What America most needs now is a new strategy of peace. The centerpiece of Kennedy's strategy was the concept of "world law." This included an emphasis on treaties, alliances, arms control and the United Nations, all of which Bush has backed away from. Kennedy particularly called for strengthening the United Nations as an instrument of world peace and law by improving its financing and its pro-

cedures for the settlement of international disputes. Kennedy would not have seen any sense in Bush's disdain for that organization.

However, it is not too late for Bush to lead the world in enabling the United Nations to have more peacekeepers, more weapons inspectors, more human-rights monitors and more international law prosecutors stationed in the countries that most need them. Americans increasingly realize, as Bush eventually will, that this country cannot maintain global peace, human rights and disarmament on its own. The United Nations is the only impartial multinational, multicultural organization that can effectively address the causes, chaos and consequences of global terrorism.

When America was savagely attacked by al-Qaeda terrorists on 9-11, virtually all the world was with us. The standing of the United States in world opinion was high, reflecting the values communicated around the world by JFK, Franklin Roosevelt, Bill Clinton and a host of other U.S. leaders. But that moment of universal goodwill was squandered by Bush's emphasis on American exceptionalism. His speeches bordered on nationalism, even chauvinism, as though ours were the only country experiencing terrorism and the only one that should lead a war against global terrorism and select its targets. The president called for a new global coalition against terrorism, apparently unaware that one already existed. It is called the

United Nations, which had already developed, with global participation, 12 treaties and conventions against terrorism, the financing of terrorist activities, and the training and harboring of terrorist squads, among other things. Ironically, the same anti-treaty Bush administration had dragged its feet on some of those treaties and conventions.

At the same time, members of the Bush team quickly seized the 9-11 tragedy as an opportunity to invade Iraq, despite the lack of any meaningful communication or cooperation between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. When Bush invoked the war on terrorism in every speech justifying an attack on Iraq, the rest of the world was not convinced. When he used the war on terrorism as an excuse to crack down on civil liberties in our own country, in particular on foreign-born residents and on critics of his foreign policy, it sent an unfortunate message that the United States lacked sufficient confidence in winning its battle to avoid imitating its enemies.

Most perplexing of all was the administration's insistence on undermining the new International Criminal

Court (ICC), the very tribunal that should hold international criminals like Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein accountable for their crimes against humanity. The administration not only refused to subscribe to the Treaty of Rome establishing the ICC but tried to force signatories into agreeing to support provisions holding U.S. soldiers and citizens immune from any charges that might be brought before that court.

Ultimately, the U.S. government suspended military aid to 35 countries that refused to grant such advance immunity, thereby extinguishing any hope that those nations might join us in the war on terrorism or in the coalition occupying Iraq. Among the governments denied long-promised funds for new military training and equipment were Slovenia, on the eve of its entering NATO (requiring


a substantial modernization of its military); Colombia, where a long-running narco-guerrilla rebellion poses a continuing threat to peace and stability throughout the Americas; and a variety of other friendly countries whose help might otherwise have been sought in Iraq. (Colombia has since yielded to U.S. pressure.) It was a move that could only encourage increased resentment of the United States as a unilateral bully, thereby facilitating the recruitment of still more anti-American terrorists.

The International Criminal Court is only the latest and most encouraging of the new interna-

tional tribunals that have sprung up under UN auspices in recent years to hold accountable the authors of genocide in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. These tribunals—and courts of longer standing, such as the International Court of Justice (World Court), the Inter-American and European Courts of Human Rights, and others—form the institutional foundation for President Kennedy's dream of a world law. Given America's worldwide business, diplomatic and other interests, no country has a larger stake than ours in the successful establishment and continued functioning of those institutions of world law. That way lies our best hope for a new strategy of peace.

"What kind of peace do we seek?" Kennedy asked in his American University speech. "Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war." Unfortunately, a Pax Americana is precisely what Bush seems to have in mind. ■

THEODORE C. SORENSON was a speechwriter and special counsel to President John F. Kennedy.



JFK at American University, June 1963: The Strategy of Peace

Safe at Home

At the dawn of the Cold War, America's leaders created new institutions that made us safer. Fast forward to the present. Why isn't the Bush administration following their example?

BY MORTON H. HALPERIN

President Bush got one thing right: The greatest threat to American security is a rogue state providing a terrorist group with a weapon of mass destruction and the means to deliver it in the United States. Unfortunately, almost everything he has done since

September 11 has made this problem worse rather than better. We need new policies, new approaches and new institutions to reduce this risk.

The Bush administration took positive steps immediately following 9-11 that should be built upon. It went to the United Nations Security Council, worked collaboratively with the other permanent members and the entire council, and secured passage of a set of resolutions requiring states to take steps to curb international terrorism. The UN also established mechanisms for international cooperation in dealing with terrorist threats. Acting under the authority of Security Council resolutions, the United States intervened militarily in Afghanistan to destroy al-Qaeda bases of operation and remove the Taliban from power.

Things have gone downhill since then. If our goal is, as it should be, to reduce the risk that international terrorists will acquire true weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, we are most certainly moving in the wrong direction. The immediate post-9-11 impulse to work through the UN and to strengthen universal norms and means for their enforcement has given way to unilateral policies, an emphasis on force rather than legitimacy and an effort to impose rules on others that we refuse to abide by ourselves. The initial post-9-11 focus on addressing the immediate threats abroad—the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups with a global reach—while re-vamping security at home has given way to a preoccupation with Iraq and confrontations with the other members of what the president called the “axis of evil.”

At home, with the exception of the hastily developed and poorly executed plan to cobble together a Department of Homeland Security, the administration has resisted efforts to create the new organizations required to deal effectively with this new threat. Moreover, we have failed to respect civil liberties at home, and by our example and our entreaties have encouraged other governments to take repressive steps that can only breed more terrorism in the long run.

A brief review of what we have done over the past two years provides a basis for determining what needs to be done from this point forward to make us safer.

Global Cooperation Against International Terrorism

Some progress has been made to enhance cooperation on intelligence sharing and money laundering; likewise, many countries have acted against groups on an agreed list of terrorist organizations. The administration has not, however, continued to provide leadership. It has jeopardized cooperation on international terrorism, first by its unilateral actions in Iraq and now by arguing that cooperation there is the test of whether other governments are with us in the fight against terrorism.

Afghanistan What we have done in Afghanistan is a metaphor for all that has gone wrong. In the beginning, this wasn't so. The administration rightly recognized that we needed to destroy the terrorist base camps and send a signal to the rest of the world that we would not tolerate a regime that gave protection to those plotting terrorism against innocent civilians. We used decisive military force to accomplish these objectives, and worked effectively through the United Nations to put in place a new Afghan government committed to democracy and to playing a responsible role in the world.

However, we have failed to follow through, and, as a result, Afghanistan is on the cusp of chaos and could easily become a place where terrorists once again operate with impunity. We are also in danger of sending the signal to the rest of the world that cooperation with the United States ends in havoc, and that we cannot be counted on to meet our commitments.

American military forces have focused single-mindedly on confronting the remaining elements of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In doing so, they have allied with regional warlords but declined to provide security for the legitimate Afghan government. The UN has filled this vacuum with a separate military force, which is providing security in Kabul but whose expansion into the rest of the country the United


States has opposed. Additionally, we are providing only a fraction of the necessary economic assistance to Afghanistan. The administration has belatedly proposed increased aid for Afghanistan, but at nowhere near the country's estimated immediate need.

North Korea Although the president did not link North Korea to Iraq and Iran in the mythical axis of evil until after 9-11, his North Korea policy from the beginning was counterproductive to the goal of keeping terrorists from getting weapons of mass destruction from rogue states. North Korea should have been a primary focus of any such strategy after September 11. It is developing both missiles and nuclear weapons, and already has a large arsenal of chemical weapons. It has also demonstrated a willingness to proliferate them, selling missiles to all comers and cooperating with Pakistan on nuclear programs. For the Democratic

George W. Bush took over. Instead of continuing the process to find out, he simply terminated the negotiations.

The Bush administration further exacerbated the North Korean problem by proclaiming a doctrine of preemption when it came to Iraq's nuclear program. One did not have to be a trained intelligence analyst to predict that this would lead North Korea (as well as Iran) to accelerate efforts to get nuclear weapons before the United States was ready to attack.

Iraq There is not the space here to detail all the mistakes that the administration made in going into Iraq. But on the specific issue of whether the attack helped our efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, it most certainly failed. It is hard to recall now that this was the specific rationale Bush gave for why we could not give the UN inspectors



People's Republic of Korea, this is not a matter of ideology or religion. It is developing missiles and nuclear weapons pragmatically, both for its defense plans and to sell for badly needed foreign exchange.

As the Clinton administration came to an end, Washington was engaged in comprehensive negotiations with Pyongyang. The United States was seeking an end to the North Korean nuclear and missile programs, and the North Koreans were seeking to get off our terrorism list and receive assurances that we would not attack them with nuclear or conventional forces. No one could be sure that the negotiations would succeed, but there was considerable belief that North Korea was serious. It had invited President Clinton to visit and had suspended long-range-missile tests. We had not yet reached the critical stage in negotiations—when it would have become clear what price North Korea would ask for giving up all nuclear weapons and long-range missiles with an effective verification regime—when

more time, and why we could not wait to see if we could get Security Council support before using force in Iraq.

In fact, we now know that there was no basis for such assertions. The intelligence community warned correctly that an attack would increase the risks that Iraq would aid terrorists, and that it was far from having nuclear weapons or other true weapons of mass destruction with delivery systems capable of reaching American targets.

The result is that we have “succeeded” in bringing the war against terrorism to Iraq. American military and civilians are in Iraq and difficult to protect. The borders are open so that members of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups can infiltrate the country and operate fluidly once there. Every day more Iraqis come to feel that the use of force against Americans is justified. Moreover, this is not a conventional war where fighting hostile forces in Iraq keeps them from attacking Americans at home or around the world. Contrary to the president's assertion, what is

now happening in Iraq under U.S. occupation makes it more, not less, likely that terrorists will try to attack Americans elsewhere around the globe.

What's more, the staggering cost of the Iraq operation, which the administration has finally owned up to after months of obfuscation, means that we will not have the funds to fight terrorism effectively elsewhere in the world or to take the necessary steps to guard our borders and increase the capacity of first responders.

One of the reasons that projected costs are so high in Iraq is that we are using American military forces to carry out peacekeeping functions for which they are not equipped and paying more for them than trained peacekeepers would cost. An administration that came into office avowedly against nation building could not have been expected to consider how it should prepare to perform such functions. What remains unclear to this day, however, is why the administration did not seek help in its preparations for running Iraq, at best before, or at the very least following, the war. America and Iraq are now paying a heavy price for that lack of preparation.

Domestic Security While we seek to destroy terrorist groups abroad and reduce the conditions that would per-

CIA came into being during the Cold War, and why the Special Forces Command was created by Congress in 1986 to give support to the Green Berets and other special units capable of acting quickly and with stealth. Urgently needed today are institutions to combat international terrorism and to deal with the problems that follow a military intervention in a failed state such as Iraq. Getting these two tasks right is critical to reducing the risk that terrorists will get weapons of mass destruction from rogue states.

At the moment, the task of dealing with international terrorist groups is split between the FBI and CIA, with the new Homeland Security Department playing some role in reviewing intelligence and protecting our borders. The FBI is assigned to do both intelligence and law enforcement at home, as well as law enforcement abroad through the investigation of terrorist acts directed at Americans. The CIA has responsibility for intelligence gathering abroad. There is little sign that either agency has changed in any meaningful way since 9-11, or that they have learned to share information effectively.

What is needed is a new agency that has both law enforcement and intelligence functions at home and

The staggering cost of the Iraq operation means that we will not have the funds to fight terrorism effectively elsewhere in the world.

mit them to recruit and to train around the world, we should also be working to ferret out terrorist activity, prevent the introduction of weapons of mass destruction and increase our capacity to respond to terrorist attacks at home. That is not happening. An administration that believes that the best way to deter suicide bombers is to threaten them with the death penalty cannot be expected to get this homeland strategy right. Beginning with the so-called USA PATRIOT Act, John Ashcroft's Department of Justice has proceeded from the assumption that acquiring more power to conduct surveillance here, doing so with less supervision from federal judges, and eliminating legal barriers to sharing information between intelligence and law-enforcement agencies are central to reducing terrorist threats. Every outside group that has studied this problem, however, argues that our real focus must be on changing the culture of the FBI and the CIA while simultaneously working to strengthen our border protections—starting with the inspection of incoming cargoes for radioactive material. Little if any progress toward those goals has been made, and America is less safe for it today.

What is to be done?

I start with the assumption that institutions do not easily adapt to new tasks. Hence, when we confront a fundamentally new task, we need to consider whether new institutions with their own career services and *raison d'être* would better serve than shifting around the same old structures. This is why the Air Force and the

abroad, but whose jurisdiction is limited to dealing with international terrorist groups targeting Americans. When dealing with such terrorists, there is no meaningful distinction between intelligence and law enforcement, as al-Qaeda and other such groups operate within a complex and well-financed global network. Such a U.S. agency would focus exclusively on them wherever they are, aiming both to indict potential terrorists as criminals and to prevent terrorist acts. Putting the law-enforcement and intelligence functions in one agency under a specific mandate would also increase the likelihood that civil liberties would be respected. This new agency would be the clearinghouse for information on this small number of terrorist groups. It would cooperate with the FBI and the CIA in a cross-jurisdictional relationship no different from that which the FBI already shares with other agencies such as the Secret Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco and Explosives.

At the same time, we also need a new agency for nation building. In Iraq—as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti and East Timor—the collapse of the existing authority created an immediate need for an international police force to provide stability and to help create an indigenous police force and criminal-justice system. There are also urgent humanitarian problems, including the need to capture evidence of human-rights violations so that accountability and healing can begin. Over and over we find that neither

the American government nor the international community possesses an agency explicitly dedicated to these tasks. So we rely on our military to perform tasks for which it has no training and capability; it does it reluctantly and poorly and comes away more reluctant than ever to intervene in similar situations. The message we are sending in Iraq is that we will act whenever our interests are threatened, but will not stick around to sort through the messy aftermath of our interventions.

We need to create a new civilian agency reporting to the secretary of state (and perhaps lodged in the same structure as the present USAID) that would be explicitly charged with this set of tasks, endowed with the necessary resources and mandated to plan as intensively as the military *before* we intervene. It would be critical to create a robust, standby police capability with a small, permanent staff and a larger number of reservists who, like those in the military reserves and National Guard, would train on weekends and over the summer and be sent abroad in times of crisis to carry out police functions. Other parts of the agency would focus on training indigenous forces, which could be done in advance with nationals who are outside of their home countries.

IN ADDITION TO CREATING THESE TWO NEW DOMESTIC agencies, we need to work with other nations through the UN Security Council to consolidate and invigorate an international regime designed to deter states from developing weapons of mass destruction and providing them to terrorist groups. This regime must be global, and the rules must apply to all nations, not simply those the United States designates as rogue or "evil." Nuclear weapons in the hands of Pakistan, which has shared technology with North Korea, must be just as unacceptable as Iranian nuclear weapons.

The United States for its part, must accept the same rules as apply to every other state. This doesn't mean that we should renounce our nuclear arsenal, which has important deterrent value, but it does mean that we must renounce the resort to threatening other states with nuclear weapons. We have already signed international treaties committing us to not using chemical and biological weapons. But it is with regard to nuclear weapons that more fundamental changes in the American posture are required. The United States not only asserts the right to maintain nuclear weapons while demanding that most other states give up this option, it also asserts the right to use its nuclear weapons whenever it determines that to be in its national interest.

This must change. The United States must lead the way away from, not toward, a nuclear world. One step would be for America to organize its defenses around the undeniable fact that we can deal with any threat other than the nuclear one using our conventional forces. The United States will spend more on defense next year than all of the other nations of the world combined. No potential enemy can survive for any period against our con-

ventional forces. As we showed in Iraq, we can defeat a conventional army with overwhelming firepower while incurring minimal casualties.

We also must confront the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs by strengthening existing anti-nuclear regimes. The first step is for the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to renounce any efforts to develop new nuclear weapons. We must join with the other nuclear powers in swearing off first use of nuclear weapons. We must lead an effort in the UN Security Council to provide credible guarantees to states that renounce nuclear weapons and open themselves to full and effective inspections.

In dealing with the North Korean problem, the United States must first recognize, as China seems finally to have done, that if we are to unite the world in insisting that the Pyongyang regime not test a nuclear device we must be willing to renounce such tests ourselves and work relentlessly to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into existence. We should also propose a treaty creating a nuclear-free zone that includes at least Japan and the Korean peninsula. That pact would also commit the six powers now in talks not to use nuclear weapons against one another, and to come to one another's aid if there were a nuclear threat.

Finally, the United States must recognize that we need the cooperation of the rest of the world to bring rogue states back into the community of nations, to help failed states mend so that they do not become havens for terrorists, and to build a more open and just world so that states do not become breeding grounds for terrorism. This begins by accepting that the UN Security Council must have the lead role in helping Iraqis to regain control of their own country, by working cooperatively with other states to find solutions to security problems, and by assisting nations that are seeking to establish democracy and reduce the suffering of their peoples. This will require substantial resources, but we could triple the amount we now spend on such efforts and it would still be less than the \$87 billion we are now proposing to spend on Iraq. This will also demand a willingness on the part of the United States to adopt a more humble approach to the rest of the world, by identifying and helping to enforce just rules that apply to all.

None of this argument is based on altruism. It is a straightforward claim that the administration's policies to date have failed to make us safer, and that a new approach is more likely than the path we are now on to prevent rogue states from sharing true weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery with terrorists who would wish us harm. ■

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Regime Change: The Legacy

Since 1953, U.S. presidents have been toppling other governments. Now, the consequences.

BY STEPHEN KINZER

A very happy group of men convened at the White House on Sept. 4, 1953, to hear a cloak-and-dagger story that would resonate through all of subsequent American history. Two weeks before, the Central Intelligence Agency had overthrown Prime

Minister Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran. It was the first time the CIA had deposed a foreign leader, and on this day the agent who ran the operation, Kermit Roosevelt, was to explain how he did it.

Roosevelt's account of bribes, staged riots and artillery duels was almost too hair-raising to believe. It transfixed everyone in the room, including President Dwight Eisenhower, who later wrote that it "seemed more like a dime novel than historical facts." If there was a single moment when the United States can be said to have entered the modern era of covert action and regime change, this was it.

"One of my audience seemed almost alarmingly enthusiastic," Roosevelt later recalled. "John Foster Dulles was leaning back in his chair. Despite his posture, he was anything but sleepy. His eyes were gleaming; he seemed to be purring like a giant cat. Clearly he was not only enjoying what he was hearing, but my instinct told me that he was planning as well."

Roosevelt's instinct was true. Soon after his triumphant White House briefing, his CIA superiors approached him with a new offer. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wished to be rid of troublesome Guatemalan leader Jacobo Arbenz. Seeing as Roosevelt had already shown his skill at toppling elected governments, would he like to try again? He demurred, but the project went ahead anyway. It was another brilliant success, as Arbenz was forced from power and replaced by a pliant colonel. In the space of less than a year, the CIA had deposed two popular leaders whose nationalism and refusal to accommodate foreign capital had made them anathema in Washington.

These two "regime change" operations set the United States on a course to which it still holds. Over the 50 years that have followed, driven by a combination of idealism and arrogance, successive American administrations have assumed the right to topple governments around the world. Only now, in the wake of the shocks that the world system has suffered in the last few years, is the full aftereffect of those operations being felt.

The coups of the 1950s in Iran and Guatemala, like the recent Iraq invasion, were planned with a stubborn insistence that everything would turn out all right in the end. This relentlessly naive optimism, this unbounded faith in the ability of the United States to work its will in the world, has become a guiding principle of American foreign policy. It has led some in Washington to conclude that the United States represents such a unique combination of lofty principles and great power that it can triumph even over history itself.

During the Cold War, the United States could depose foreign governments only through covert action. Armed invasions were out of the question because they had the potential to set off global cataclysm. Today, however, invasion is once again considered a realistic option. With no Red Army to fear, regime change is now a job for the CIA if possible, the military if necessary.

There are obvious differences between the recent Iraq War and the coups that brought down the leaders of Iran and Guatemala half a century ago. One was a full-scale military campaign, while the others were covert operations. The target in Iraq was a monstrous tyrant, while those in Iran and Guatemala were democratically elected leaders. But the Iraq War resembles those first two CIA coups in important ways.

Economic factors have often played a crucial role in American decisions to plot regime change. The target country almost always has a valuable resource that it is refusing to share on terms that the West considers fair. Prime Minister Mossadegh nationalized Britain's fabulously lucrative Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and American leaders feared that if the nationalization were allowed to stand, it would set a dangerous precedent that could undermine corporate power around the world. President Arbenz's offense was his campaign to force the United Fruit Company to sell off its vast unused lands so they could be distributed to Guatemalan peasants. Similarly, Saddam Hussein was sitting atop a huge reserve of oil and was decidedly hostile to U.S. companies eager to extract, refine and sell it. In all three of these countries, regime-change operations were designed in part to show that the United States does not tol-

erate foreign leaders who restrict the ability of Western corporations to make money.

The drive to control the world's most valuable resources is not the only factor that pushes the United States into action abroad. Eagerness to strike against global enemies is also a strong motivation. During the Cold War, the enemy was communism. An alarming series of communist advances in the late 1940s and early 1950s terrified many Americans. Secretary of State Dulles and his brother, Allen, who ran the CIA during the Eisenhower administration, took office eager to demonstrate their determination to fight this enemy.

British leaders tried to overthrow Mossadegh in 1952, but he learned of their plot and foiled it by expelling all British diplomats from Iran, among them secret agents assigned to stage the coup. Desperate to remove their tormenter, the British asked Washington for help. President Harry Truman refused, worrying quite rightly that such a violent interruption of Iranian political life would have unpredictable and perhaps disastrous consequences. That left the British angry and frustrated. But when news came of Eisenhower's election in November 1952, they were thrilled. Kermit Roosevelt stirred their hopes by visiting London soon after the election and telling his friends in the Secret Intelligence Service that the new administration's approach to Iran might be "quite different" from Truman's.

This prospect so excited the British that they could not even wait until Eisenhower was inaugurated to make their appeal to his incoming team. They sent one of their top agents, Christopher Montague Woodhouse, to Washington to present the case for a coup. Woodhouse realized that the Americans would not swing into action simply to recover Britain's oil company, so he shrewdly came up with another argument. "Not wishing to be accused of trying to use the Americans to pull British chestnuts out of the fire," he wrote later, "I decided to emphasize the communist threat to Iran rather than the need to recover control of the oil industry." The Dulles brothers leaped at that argument, just as Woodhouse knew they would.

A similar confluence of economic and political factors drove the decision to overthrow Arbenz in Guatemala. Arbenz was a figure much like Mossadegh. Both were nationalists who wished to improve daily life for their countries' suffering masses. Neither saw why his government's dispute with a foreign corporation should throw him into the vortex of the great East-West confrontation. The Dulles brothers, however, saw every local conflict through the lens of that con-

frontation. In their eyes, every leader not explicitly tied to the United States was a potential enemy. Arbenz's sin, like Mossadegh's, was his insistence on embracing the domestic challenge of alleviating poverty rather than the global one of supporting Washington's anti-communist crusade.

Neither Mossadegh nor Arbenz was a communist, but that didn't matter. In fact, it helped. Not even the Dulles brothers would have risked nuclear conflagration by attacking China, the Soviet Union or one of their satellites. Yet their desire to strike back against communism was so intense that almost any target would do. Iran and Guatemala were ideal because, by subduing them, the United States would not only remove a perceived enemy but also acquire a strategic platform from which it could project its power across an entire region of the world.

Precisely the same impulse fueled the operation against Saddam Hussein. Once again, the United States felt threatened by a ruthless global enemy, in this case terrorism and its most deadly practitioners, the leaders of al-Qaeda. Once again, finding and destroying the real enemy was too difficult, so some other enemy had to be found. Iraq was chosen, even though it was no more responsible for terrorist attacks on the United States than Iran or Guatemala had been responsible for the spread of communism during the 1950s. With Iran long since lost to U.S. influence and Saudi Arabia looking ever shakier, the Bush administration envisions Iraq as the new center of American power in the Middle East.

This combination of economic and political motivations is not the only way in which the template set in Iran and Guatemala during the 1950s shaped this year's Iraq operation. Neither Iran in 1953 nor Guatemala in 1954 posed an imminent danger to the United States. Those early coups were operations of choice,

warnings to the world that no regime is safe if it defies the United States. So was the Iraq War.

Planners of those early CIA operations distorted intelligence data to make their case. The Dulles brothers fed Eisenhower a series of highly exaggerated reports suggesting that Iran was about to turn communist. At a National Security Council meeting in March 1953, they gave him one asserting that communists "might easily take over" in Iran and deprive the West of "the enormous assets represented by Iranian oil production and reserves." Years later, however, retired American officials who were posted in Iran in 1953 told an American scholar, Mark J. Gasiorowski, that Iran's communist party "was really not very powerful, and



Ousted: Mossadegh, Arbenz, Hussein

that higher-level U.S. officials routinely exaggerated its strength and Mossadegh's reliance on it."

This manipulation of intelligence was repeated in 1954 as the CIA sought to portray the Guatemalan government as a captive of communism. From those two operations, American spymasters around the world learned an insidious lesson: that intelligence should be shaped to meet the political needs of the White House. So it was in the case of Iraq, as American leaders justified their invasion plan on the grounds that Saddam Hussein was sponsoring terrorism and building weapons of mass destruction.

WASHINGTON'S FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO THINK SERIOUSLY about the long-term consequences of intervention is the most disturbing factor that binds the CIA's early covert operations to the Iraq War. In seeking regime change in Iran and Guatemala (and later in the Congo, Indonesia, Chile and elsewhere), American planners sought to achieve short-term victories against what they considered intolerable regimes. They did the same thing when they plotted this year's invasion of Iraq. In each case, those who warned about the effects that these operations might have years or decades later were dismissed as wimps or, in one

presidency and permanently poisoned Iranian-American relations, struck because they feared the CIA was plotting a second Operation Ajax that would once again bring the hated shah back to his "Peacock Throne."

It is always dangerous to draw cause-and-effect lines through history, but the impact of the 1953 coup in Iran on Middle Eastern history, and even on the United States itself, is today impossible to ignore. "With hindsight, can anybody say the Islamic Revolution of 1979 was inevitable?" one Iranian intellectual mused in a recent article. "Or did it only become so once the aspirations of the Iranian people were temporarily expunged in 1953?"

The 1954 coup in Guatemala also led to a terrible tragedy, the apocalyptic civil war that lasted for three decades and killed hundreds of thousands of Guatemalans. Like the Iran coup, the one in Guatemala led to the establishment of a brutal military regime that not only oppressed its people but also served as a model for nearby countries.

President Truman refused to sponsor a coup in Iran not because he was a Middle East expert and believed he could predict the long-term results, but for precisely the opposite reason. He realized how little he and most Americans knew about matters Middle Eastern, and common sense

Those who predict a good outcome in Iraq should not look to the CIA coups in Iran and Guatemala. The legacy of those operations is too frightening.

of the most memorable phrases to emerge from the Iraq War, "cheese-eating surrender monkeys."

From the perspective of 50 years of history, the horrific aftereffects of the 1953 Iran coup are becoming clear. That coup showed emerging leaders throughout the Middle East that the United States preferred strongman rule to democracy, a message that encouraged budding tyrants including Saddam Hussein. It also placed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi back on his throne, leading to 25 years of dictatorship that finally produced the Islamic Revolution of 1979. That revolution brought to power a band of militantly anti-Western clerics who not only sponsored acts of murderous terrorism against the United States but also inspired fundamentalist sects in other countries. Among those sects was the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan, which gave sanctuary to Osama bin Laden and other violent fanatics.

Until the Eisenhower administration staged Operation Ajax, as the coup was code-named, most Iranians felt great admiration for the United States. Hundreds of altruistic Americans had worked selflessly in Iran as doctors, teachers and development specialists, and none had ever sought to exploit the country's resources or intervene in its political life. The coup changed all that. It turned countless Iranians bitterly against the United States and led growing numbers of them to embrace radical Islam, the ideology most closely associated with anti-Americanism. Iranian militants who seized American diplomats as hostages in 1979, an act that brought down Jimmy Carter's

made him fear the consequences of intervening there. Eisenhower had no such reservations. Neither did presidents who followed him, most notably George W. Bush.

With a confidence born of ignorance, millenarian vision and boundless faith in military power, President Bush plunged the United States into an operation that was not urgently necessary but that satisfied the desire for revenge against *someone* for the losses of September 11. He turned aside the advice of many friends and deeply divided a nation that had come together in the depths of its grief. Perhaps he has even set in motion a series of processes that will not only further destabilize Iraq and the Middle East but also weaken America's national security.

Those who predict a good outcome in Iraq should not look to the CIA coups in Iran and Guatemala. The legacy of those operations is too frightening. If the long-term results of the Iraq invasion are anything like what has happened in Iran and Guatemala since the United States deposed their governments half a century ago, the world is in for a new wave of horrors. That would confirm the truth of Truman's dictum, "There is nothing new in the world except the history you do not know." ■

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Bush's Flawed Revolution

"If we're an arrogant nation," said George W. Bush, "they'll resent us." He was right.

BY IVO H. DAALDER AND JAMES M. LINDSAY

GEORGE W. BUSH HAS LAUNCHED A REVOLUTION IN American foreign policy. In less than three years in office, he has discarded or redefined many of the key principles governing how America engages the world. He has relied on the unilateral exercise of American power rather than on international law and institutions to get his way. He has championed a proactive doctrine of preemption and abandoned the tested strategies of deterrence and containment. He has preferred regime change to direct negotiations with countries and leaders that he loathes. And he has promoted forceful interdiction and missile defenses to counter weapons proliferation, all the while downplaying America's traditional support for nonproliferation treaties and regimes.

While recognizing that Bush has made radical changes to American foreign policy, many are now convinced that he is in the midst of a U-turn. The mounting American death toll in Iraq, the soaring price tag of Iraqi reconstruction and Europe's talk of constraining American power have convinced Bush of the errors of his unilateralist ways—or so the argument goes. The shadow of the presidential elections will further prod him to embrace more moderate and sensible policies. In 2004, George Bush Junior's foreign policy will not look much different from George Bush Senior's.

This new conventional wisdom, however, is wishful thinking. It assumes that Bush's foreign-policy choices reflect political expedience—or the pressures of aggressive presidential advisers—more than principle. Yet Bush, like Ronald Reagan, brought to the Oval Office a deeply felt and coherent foreign-policy worldview. Bush's critics missed it at the time—and continue to miss it—because they focus on how little he knows rather than how intensely he believes. It is a worldview that emphasizes the need to act, disparages the counsel of the cautious and promises that events will vindicate those


willing to stand alone. Because Bush really believes he is right, he is unlikely to chart a new course abroad for the United States as long as he remains president. The Bush revolution will continue, and continue to inflict substantial damage to America's ability to influence events overseas for the duration of his presidency.

WHAT PRECISELY IS THE BUSH REVOLUTION IN FOREIGN policy? At its broadest level, the revolution embraces one fundamental pillar of the foreign-policy vision that Wood-

row Wilson laid out nearly a century ago even as it rejects another. When Wilson called for a League of Nations, he rejected the idea that the United States would harm its interests or sully its values if, to borrow the famous words of John Quincy Adams, it went abroad "in search of monsters to destroy." For Wilson, the danger lay in not acting. So, too, for Bush. "Time is not on our side," he warned in his "axis of evil" speech. "I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."

Where Bush departs from Wilson, and from much of the

practice of American foreign policy over the past half-century, is on how to exercise America's immense power overseas. Bush rejects the traditional Wilsonian faith in international law and institutions. To the contrary, he and his advisers are convinced that in a dangerous world, the best—if not the only—way to ensure America's security is to shed the constraints imposed by friends, allies, and international rules and organizations. Because of its power, America is threatened like no other nation. And it would be folly to count on others to protect the United States; countries invariably ignore threats that do not imperil them. Moreover, formal arrangements—be they



Tough crowd: Bush at the U.N.

alliances or other multilateral security institutions—invariably impede Washington's ability to make the most of its unrivaled power. Bush, in short, believes that maximizing America's security requires minimizing constraints on its freedom of action.

These fundamental beliefs about how America should act in the world have informed Bush's conduct of foreign policy in three distinct ways. The first is his disdain for the sorts of formal multilateral arrangements developed by presidents from Harry Truman through Bill Clinton, and his preference instead for exercising American power unilaterally. This is not to say that Bush flatly opposes working with others. But his preferred form of multilateralism—to be indulged when unilateral action is impossible or unwise—involves ad hoc coalitions of those who are willing to follow Washington's direction.

Second, preemption should no longer be the last resort of American foreign policy. In a world in which terrorists and rogue states can lay their hands on weapons of mass destruction, Bush has said, "We cannot let our enemies strike first." Indeed, Washington should be prepared not only to preempt imminent threats but also to prevent potential threats from materializing. Vice President Dick

in Germany and Russia, only a quarter; and in Spain and Turkey, less than a fifth.

Hostility toward the United States is even greater in much of the rest of the world, especially in Arab and Islamic countries. In Jordan, Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan and among the Palestinians, near majorities say they believe that Osama bin Laden would do the right thing in world affairs. By contrast, overwhelming majorities say they have no confidence in Bush's leadership.

The president and his advisers worry little about America's deteriorating image abroad. On the contrary, they express surprise that foreigners resent the United States. This surprise derives from a deep conviction in the White House that America is a uniquely just great power and should be seen as such abroad. "I'm amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about," Bush said in October 2001. "Like most Americans, I just can't believe it. Because I know how good we are."

Bush had little reason to be amazed. Many of his foreign-policy initiatives are, on the merits, deeply unpopular abroad. And his administration has consistently failed to launch diplomatic efforts to soften differences

Many of the most important challenges America faces overseas can be tackled successfully only with the active cooperation of others.

Cheney stressed the need for preventive actions on the eve of the Iraq War. "There's no question," he said, "It is going to be cheaper and less costly to do it now than it will be to wait a year or two years or three years until [Saddam Hussein has] developed even more deadly weapons, perhaps nuclear weapons."

Third, the United States should use its unprecedented power to change the regimes in rogue states. The idea of regime change is not new to American foreign policy. Just think of Mohammed Mossadegh, Fidel Castro or the Nicaraguan contras. What is different in the Bush presidency is the willingness, even in the absence of a direct attack on the United States, to use U.S. military forces to topple other governments. This was the gist of both the Afghanistan and the Iraq wars—the belief that the most effective way of dealing with rogue states is to send in troops to change who rules them.

"IF WE'RE AN ARROGANT NATION, THEY'LL RESENT US," Bush observed about other countries during his second debate with Al Gore in 2000. "If we're a humble nation, but strong, they'll welcome us." But Bush ignored this axiom once in office. Resentment, not respect, best characterizes how most other nations have reacted to the Bush revolution. As recently as three years ago, substantial majorities in European countries viewed America favorably. Polls now show that in Italy and France, only a third of the public holds a favorable view;

and emphasize shared interests. To the contrary, whether it has been Bush ostracizing other heads of state, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice presumptuously declaring the Kyoto Protocol "dead" or Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld equating Gerhard Schröder's Germany with Fidel Castro's Cuba, the Bush team has been all elbows. The administration's disdain for the sensitivities of others has encouraged speculation that it has taken the tyrant's motto as its own: *Oderint dum metuant*—"Let them hate as long as they fear."

The whole Iraq experience has underscored that the way that America leads is as important as the fact that it leads. The cumulative effect of the United States behaving as the "SUV of nations," as columnist Mary McGrory has put it, hogging the road and guzzling gas, has been to alienate even America's closest allies. Many of them now see their role not as America's partner but as a brake on the improvident exercise of its power. Ironically, the casualty in all this has been America's ability to lead—to the point that the White House has now resorted to listing Micronesia and Palau as members of the coalition in Iraq because many major allies have refused to participate.

ALTHOUGH BUSH'S IMPERIOUS STYLE ENTAILS GREAT and needless costs for American foreign policy, it is far from the only shortcoming of his revolution. To be sure, Bush would be wiser to show what Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence called "a decent respect to

the opinions of mankind.” But graciousness alone is not enough. The deeper problem is that the fundamental premise of the Bush revolution—that America’s security rests on an America unbound—is mistaken.

For all the talk of the United States as a superpower, the world at the start of the 21st century is beyond the ability of any one country to control. Many of the most important challenges America faces overseas—defeating terrorism and countering weapons proliferation, promoting economic prosperity and safeguarding political liberty, sustaining the global environment and halting the spread of killer diseases—can be tackled successfully only with the active cooperation of others.

The question for the United States is how best to secure that cooperation. Bush believes that other countries will tackle these challenges because it is in their national interest to do so. Countries that object to Washington’s direction will ultimately fall in line once they see the benefits of American action. When the United States leads, Bush argues, others will naturally follow.

The Iraq War has illuminated the flaw in this thinking. No doubt many countries, including all the members of the United Nations Security Council, shared an interest in seeing that Iraq did not possess nuclear and other horrific weapons. But that common interest did not automatically translate into participation in a war to oust Saddam Hussein from power—or even into support for such a war. A few countries actively tried to stop the march to war, and many others simply sat on the sidelines.

Little changed after the toppling of Hussein’s statue in Firdos Square. Although most countries believe that stabilizing postwar Iraq is vitally important—for regional stability, international security and their own national safety—they have not rushed to join the reconstruction effort. American troops now constitute more than 80 percent of all foreign troops in Iraq. Twenty-nine other countries have contributed about 23,000 troops, but nearly half of those are from Britain. Many of the remainder have contributed troops only after Washington agreed to pay for their transportation and support—giving a whole new meaning to the concept of burden sharing. The American taxpayer is left to foot the bill, which is \$79 billion so far, with another \$87 billion slated for the coming year.

The lesson of Iraq, then, is that sometimes when you lead, few follow. This, ultimately, is the real danger of the Bush revolution. America’s friends and allies might not be able to stop Washington from doing as it wishes, but neither are they necessarily willing to come to its aid when their help is wanted or needed. Indeed, the more others question America’s power, purpose and priorities, the less influence America will have. If others seek to counter the United States and delegitimize its power, Washington will then need to exert more effort on its own to reach the same desired end—assuming it can reach its objective at all. If others merely step aside and leave Washington to tackle common problems as it sees fit, the costs to American tax-

payers will increase. That risks undermining not only what the United States can achieve abroad but also domestic support for engaging the world. Americans, wary of being played for suckers, will balk at paying the price of unilateralism. They could rightly ask, if others were not willing to bear the burdens of meeting tough challenges, why should we? In that respect, an unbound America could lead to a less secure America.

BUSH’S WAY IS NOT AMERICA’S ONLY CHOICE. IN FACT, Washington has chosen differently before. America emerged from World War II as the world’s predominant power. It could have imposed an imperium commensurate with its power. But Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman wisely recognized that American power is more acceptable, and thus more effective and lasting, if it is folded into alliances and multilateral institutions that serve the interests and purposes of many countries. So they created the United Nations to help ensure international peace and security, set up the Bretton Woods system to help stabilize international economic interactions and spent vast sums of money to help rebuild countries (including vanquished foes) that had been devastated by the war. Rather than hobbling American power, these efforts legitimated and sustained it, building up a reservoir of goodwill that made it easier for the United States to act unilaterally, as on occasion it inevitably would have to.

Bush shows no signs of recognizing the wisdom of FDR and Truman. He prefers to build an empire on American power alone rather than on the greater power that comes from working with friends and allies. Even as critics decry the costs of Iraqi reconstruction and rising anti-Americanism abroad, Bush trumpets the ability of the U.S. military power to unseat the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. In that regard, his Sept. 7 address to the nation and his speech to the United Nations two weeks later were vintage Bush. He admitted no error in how he went to war or on what occurred in the aftermath. Instead, he insisted others had an obligation to put things right in Iraq by deploying many troops and contributing many billions of dollars for reconstruction. He did not offer them a meaningful say over the creation of a new Iraqi government or over who should govern the country in the interim.

From the first day he entered office, Bush has embarked on a revolution whose motto has been “foreign policy done my way.” For all the feints and seeming tactical changes in policy—“yes” to a UN resolution one day, “no” to sharing real power the next—that sentiment will no doubt continue throughout the remainder of his presidency. And so, no doubt, will continued frustration and anger abroad at the arrogance of American power. The final bill, unfortunately, will be ours to pay. ■

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The Homeland Security Muddle

A year later, Tom Ridge's department still lacks a coherent strategy or adequate authority. His critics need to get serious about domestic preparedness.

BY JULIETTE N. KAYYEM

When word leaked that the Department of Defense had funded a scheme to allow investors to use futures-market analysis to predict the likelihood of terrorist acts or international incidents—and to profit if their predictions were correct—the public

reacted with both shock and awe. The \$8 million idea, known as the Futures Markets Applied to Prediction (FutureMAP), was the brainchild of retired Adm. John Poindexter, an indicted figure in the Iran-Contra scandal. The plan would have allowed online betting by terrorism specialists regarding the likelihood of, for example, another attack in Israel or the overthrow of the Jordanian monarchy. The idea was to use a bettors' market to provide government specialists access to what the best thinkers were anticipating. Not surprisingly, it was quickly canceled. Poindexter soon thereafter resigned his post as head of the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency's Terrorism Information Awareness program—the same program that previously had drawn fire for its proposal to track potential terrorists via broadly scouring Americans' credit-card records, driver's licenses and passport applications.

For Democrats, FutureMAP was an obvious target. "The idea of a federal betting parlor on atrocities and terrorism is ridiculous and it's grotesque," said Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.). But when Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld concurred—even if it had been a brilliant idea, which I doubt, it would not have been able to function in the environment that it was created—FutureMAP became just a lively August imbroglio. The story was over.

It shouldn't be. Behind FutureMAP lie the broader flaws in the administration's domestic-preparedness policy. An effective national-preparedness policy requires three things. First, a coordinating agency with authority to set comprehensive federal policy; second, an agency willing to use that authority to establish clear and effective strategies; and, finally, a recognition that a domestic-preparedness policy must not only prepare for and prevent terrorist attacks but also ensure that such efforts don't threaten a free society. The FutureMAP story reveals that this administration's policy lacks all three elements.

At first blush, it might seem like the administration has in place an effective coordinating agency. When President Bush switched gears in June 2002 and accepted Democratic

congressional proposals to establish a Department of Homeland Security (DHS), he conceded the need for a permanent, centralized agency with budget authority over the domestic-preparedness mission. That change reflected a grudging recognition that the White House Office of Homeland Security, set up right after the terrorist attacks of September 11, was simply too weak. To rectify that, the new department was given direct supervisory and budgetary control over 22 agencies, plus its very own secretary, Tom Ridge.

Behind the headlines, however, the behemoth known as the DHS is less than what it seems. Guided by advisers from the Defense and Justice departments and the CIA, the administration ensured that the DHS has quite limited authority. So, now, while the DHS oversees a number of areas—everything from federal airline safety to federal responses to hurricanes and floods—it has no authority to oversee the counterterrorism activity and priorities of other agencies. These include the Defense Department, the Justice Department and the CIA, the very agencies that are crucial for homeland defense. Instead of streamlining our domestic preparedness strategy, the DHS has simply become another agency added to the mix, equal but not primary.

Now it may be true that vesting all counterterrorism and domestic-preparedness powers in the DHS would be unwise, as doing so could make the agency too unwieldy and even Orwellian. And it may also be impractical to craft legislation that would perfectly protect against ideas like FutureMAP being implemented. But it remains deeply problematic that the administration left the Pentagon, the Justice Department and the CIA untouched. As a consequence, the DHS has no legal power to monitor much of the spending for domestic preparedness, and people are free to launch far-fetched, multimillion-dollar schemes like Poindexter's. Without that authority, the DHS has bowed to the agendas of distinct, rival and often warring agencies. And, of course, by virtue of its limited jurisdiction, the DHS has no real power to do anything about what Congress identified as perhaps the most glaring hole in our counterterrorism effort:

the absence of an effective system for intelligence sharing.

Surely the administration can do better. In other areas, it has used executive orders to achieve central oversight. Indeed, when it comes to environmental or health and safety regulations of numerous departments, including the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services, the White House has seized direct coordination of policy making. Yet there seems to be no similar attention from Pennsylvania Avenue when it comes to the anti-terrorism efforts of the Pentagon, CIA and Justice Department. In fact, those agencies responsible for fighting the war on terrorism are in some ways the ones freest from direct control by the commander in chief.

BUT THE PROBLEM ISN'T ONLY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION failed to give the DHS sufficient power. The DHS has failed to use even the limited power that it does have to identify clear homeland-defense priorities. The department set out its agenda in its National Strategy for Homeland Security only a month after the most massive restructuring of government in more than 50 years. Not surprisingly, the strategy was a catalog of conventional wisdom, suggesting such evident steps as "Secure Our Borders" and "Protect Cyberspace." Indeed, when asked before its release what the nation could expect, Ridge replied that the strategy would contain "no surprises." He was right. The 90-page report detailing 80 agenda items is all things to all people.

Worse, about a year since he took office, Ridge seems no closer to crafting clear, specific guidance. During that time, there has been an outpouring of suggestions from think tanks and universities on how to prioritize domestic-preparedness programs. But Ridge is still talking in generalities. As he speaks to governors, first responders, chambers of commerce, police and fire officials, citizen groups, think tanks and public-health managers about beefing up their systems, there is little sense of the critical priorities that must be satisfied, let alone how and with what money. It cannot be, however, that supporting a citizen corps is as equally compelling, or necessary, as enhancing money and equipment for first responders. A reader of DHS statements would be justified in concluding that the current strategy is "try anything and everything."

IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE DEMOCRATS TO CRAFT AN alternative vision that sets clear priorities. That doesn't mean simply criticizing the total spending the administration is, or is not, committing to the war on terrorism, nor

does it mean merely providing a laundry list of hoped-for programs. The more Democrats focus on analyzing weaknesses and setting priorities, the more the holes in our current homeland-security strategy will become apparent.

There are some key places to begin. For example, throughout the country, first responders, who are critical actors in securing the American homeland, need increased federal funding and guidance from a central authority. Shockingly, even two years after the September 11 attacks, New York firefighters still cannot communicate with police, nor can they communicate with their counterparts from New Jersey or Westchester County. This lack of compatibility among first responders, noted in April in a *New York Times* editorial, remains a problem in much of the nation. The DHS should have assisted in overcoming just such jurisdictional and geographic boundaries. Outlying and

out-of-state hospitals, emergency crews and shelters must be part of any metropolitan area's terrorism-response plan. Legal and practical barriers, such as the ability of public-health workers in one state to provide medication in areas where they are not certified, also need to be resolved. And it must be the DHS that provides such best practices, model regulations and hands-on guidance.

Furthermore, the DHS has, to date, done little to integrate the private sector in domestic-preparedness planning. As any lawyer in the Washington area will tell you, while federal government employees were being evacuated on 9-11, the law firms surrounding much of downtown D.C. received no similar guidance. During the subsequent an-

thrax attacks, the administration remained silent on what private institutions—many of them with their own mail and delivery services—should be doing. While the DHS has provided its much-maligned list of must-haves for those at home, including the notorious duct tape, the truth is that the institutions—some as large as mini-cities—where most working people spend a good portion of the day have received virtually no guidance on terrorism preparedness.

Finally, the DHS' most notable attempt to guide the country in terrorism response was with its color-coded threat scheme, where colors change as the perceived risk of terrorism increases or decreases. But that scheme is now understood to be unworkable, forcing jurisdictions to respond to vague threats, pay police overtime and wait it out. So the DHS has revamped it to make it harder for the threat level to change. But that doesn't help with the big question: What should jurisdictions *do* in response to fluctuating terrorism threats?



THESE CHALLENGES PRESENT A TALL ORDER. BUT THERE is one even taller. As much as a domestic-preparedness strategy must focus on protecting soft targets and citizens, and as much as it must focus on enlisting the public-health community and the private sector in its efforts, it must also recognize that the very act of preparing the nation for terrorism must not threaten the freedoms of our society. Domestic preparedness is as much about *feeling* that our government knows what it is doing to keep us safe as about actually *being* safe.

In its cold calculation that you could bet on assassination, destruction and death, the Defense Department utterly missed the point that such a scheme does little to ease public concerns that the government has a thoughtful and benign policy toward our security. The outrage that followed the FutureMAP story in some sense reflected just this concern: Are people like Poindexter and Ashcroft fixated on security over any other consideration? Obviously we should not just trust in the good judgment of specific policy-makers to be attentive to these concerns. We need institutional structures of congressional oversight and objective internal review in place to ensure that they become a key part of the kind of evaluation of any domestic preparedness strategy.

gressive office were rejected during the debates leading up to the creation of the DHS, and the law now permits the DHS secretary to prohibit the OIG from continuing any investigation that might disclose sensitive national-security information.

To be fair, other agencies also have similar national-security exceptions written into their OIG statutes. The difference is that in the war on terrorism that has followed 9-11, a war that has tremendous impact on the domestic home front, those exceptions are more easily invoked. It is for this reason that the oft-criticized USA PATRIOT Act was drawn to remedy part of that loophole at the Department of Justice. Democrats successfully required the Justice Department's OIG to provide a report every six months related to claims of civil-rights and civil-liberties violations allegedly committed by Justice Department employees. It was this authority that gave Glenn Fine, the Justice Department's inspector general, enough foundation to release his compelling report regarding department misuse of detainee handling after September 11.

The Fine investigation was important not simply because Ashcroft was blindsided by an internal watchdog finding. The most important aspect was that the Justice

Shockingly, two years after 9-11, New York firefighters still cannot communicate with police, nor with their counterparts in the suburbs.

As currently configured, however, the DHS is poorly suited to the task of ensuring that a homeland-security strategy, whatever it might be, properly assesses the competing interests of security and liberty. That's not an accident. The administration fought proposals to establish an Office of Civil Rights and Liberties within the DHS, one that would monitor the department's compliance with constitutional norms as it conducted the war on terrorism. Such offices exist in other agencies, such as the Department of Education, where an independent review of government actions is deemed necessary. And certainly there are few agencies as likely to have as significant an impact on civil rights and liberties as the DHS. After all, the department may have a good justification for violating Americans' civil rights: It's just trying to prevent the worst from happening. All the more reason for an internal oversight body.

In addition to offices within the DHS focused on the personal rights of the citizenry, it is also critical that a department charged with as massive a mission as the DHS be relatively transparent to the public and generally open to self-criticism. To that end, the legislation establishing the DHS created an Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to "prevent and detect fraud, abuse, mismanagement, and waste" in DHS programs. Hereto, however, due to Republican congressional efforts, the OIG has less power than it needs. Democratic proposals to create a more ag-

Department itself adopted virtually every recommendation that the inspector general made. Without such an office in place for the Department of Homeland Security, there will be no such oversight, and no such needed revisions of protocol.

There is one more lesson in the FutureMAP story, and it is one that the Democrats would do well to take to heart. In an effort as massive as the current war on terrorism, there are sure to be missteps by any administration, and these are sure to make for easy targets in political debates. But a Democratic strategy that depends on such missteps to set its own homeland-security agenda is a mistaken one. Democrats must seize upon the big picture. They did this when they proposed the idea of a Department of Homeland Security. Now they need to go further: They need to offer a comprehensive plan for true coordination of counterterrorism policy, to emphasize the need for centralized setting of priorities to address holes in our frontline domestic defenses, and to focus on the paramount importance of making the homeland secure in a way that honors a free society. ■

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Rumsfeld's Folly

The radical Bush doctrine for America's military was cooked up long before 9-11. Now, theory has become practice—and it doesn't work.

BY LAWRENCE KORB

Since coming into office, the Bush administration has radically altered national security and military doctrines that had successfully safeguarded American interests for more than 50 years. The changes, as the current crisis in Iraq demonstrates,

have actually undermined U.S. security.

George W. Bush's new national-security doctrine, officially promulgated on Sept. 17, 2001, discards the long-standing American policy of using American military and economic power, in conjunction with international support, to create a stable international order by deterring and containing those who would challenge this order.

The Bush strategy, by contrast, is to make the United States the world's dominant military power and to use that power—unbound by the need for allies or United Nations approval—to take unilateral, preemptive military action against tyrants who support terrorists or who seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the president contends that in order to deal with the root causes of terrorism, American power must be used to create free-market democracies to replace these rogue regimes. The Bush plan, in other words, is not just to make the world safe for democracy but to make it democratic.

Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has just as radically altered the nation's military strategy. Ever since the Vietnam debacle, the Pentagon's civilian and military leaders have argued, in what has been known as the "Powell doctrine," that before this nation commits its troops to battle, it must be willing to deploy overwhelming force to the theater of operations and have a clearly defined exit strategy. Under Rumsfeld, Pentagon policy is to use advanced new technologies to reduce the military's need for large numbers of forces to wage military campaigns. Moreover, Rumsfeld is introducing these changes dramatically rather than gradually, with an abrupt reversal of the Powell doctrine. This, in effect, throws out the baby with the bath water.

The Bush administration claims that the terrorist attacks of September 11 necessitated the new doctrines, but, in fact, many of the people the president appointed to high positions on his national-security team came into office with these agendas. As early as September 1999, in a speech at the Citadel, then-Texas Gov. Bush criticized

President Clinton for grossly underfunding the military, overusing it for such social enterprises as nation building and allowing it to become obsolete. Clinton, Bush said, had failed to take advantage of the revolution in technology to develop a network of space, sea, air and ground sensors capable of pinpointing enemy forces, and then had failed to build a network of precision-guided munitions that could destroy the enemy from long range.

These criticisms resonated with many Americans because Clinton was perceived to be weak on defense, but, in fact, none of Bush's claims was true. Clinton had actually increased the size of the defense budget over and above the program he inherited from the outgoing administration of George Bush Senior, and he had never deployed more than 40,000 troops (out of an active duty force of more than 1.4 million) on peacekeeping activities. Moreover, during the Clinton years, the military was gradually building precisely the systems Bush named. Between 1993 and 2000, the Pentagon increased its stock of smart bombs ninefold, developed lighter, more agile tanks and armored personnel carriers, and began producing unmanned aircraft like the Predator.

After September 11, however, the strategy changes that the administration wanted were matched to increasingly hyped notions of the threat America faced. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Bush declared war on terrorists with a global reach. By late fall, after prodding by some nations whose support Bush needed to wage the war in Afghanistan, the enemy had become terrorism around the globe. And in his January 2002 State of the Union address—the "axis of evil" speech—the threat was all evil.

THE U.S. MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAQ SHOWS just how foolish it was for the country to embrace the Bush and Rumsfeld doctrines and such a grandiose concept of the threat we faced. This can be demonstrated in at least eight ways.

First, the Iraq campaign has set a new and dangerous standard for the use of force in the international arena. To have any shred of legitimacy, preemptive military action should be based on accurate, precise intelligence. The Bush administration and its British allies claimed, based upon their intelligence, that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, that we knew where they were and that they could be launched against us with as little as 45 minutes warning. These claims have proved to be empty, as have those about cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Even if we give Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair the benefit of the doubt and say that they were acting in good faith, the experience demonstrates how difficult it is to obtain the intelligence necessary to legitimately invade another country under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which permits the use of force only in self-defense. But how can we now tell India that it is illegal to take preemptive action against Pakistan?

Second, before the attack there was no evidence that Saddam Hussein, with or without weapons of mass destruction, was not being contained. In fact, the sanctions and inspections that were part of the containment regime since 1991 had proven remarkably effective. They prevented Iraq from rebuilding its conventional military

projected, Rumsfeld would like to reduce the number of ground troops in the force. Never mind that the U.S. military is already the most technologically advanced in the world and doesn't need to undertake a crash program to upgrade further at the expense of its ground forces. Moreover, to avoid enlarging the active military, Rumsfeld has resisted calls to move peacekeeping forces such as military police and civil-affairs specialists from the reserves to the active force, even though the need for them, under the "Bush doctrine," is active and long-term.

Fourth, in taking unilateral, preemptive military action against a state that does not pose an imminent threat, America has diverted its attention from more serious threats to national security. While the United States was focused on invading Iraq, it was forced to postpone dealing with the crisis in North Korea, a rogue nation that, if it does not yet have them, is much closer to obtaining nuclear weapons than Iraq was. North Korea has already exported nuclear-weapons technology and ballistic missiles. While focusing on Iraq, the United States has also let nation building in Afghanistan drift and has not been able to play its proper role in implementing the "road map" in the Middle East.

Fifth, by claiming that its goal in the Iraq War was to pro-

The U.S. military is already the most advanced in the world and doesn't need to undertake a crash program to upgrade further at the expense of its ground forces.

forces or reconstructing its program for developing weapons of mass destruction. But even if Hussein had developed the ultimate weapon, a nuclear bomb, the United States could have deterred him from using it. As Condoleezza Rice pointed out in a *Foreign Affairs* article in early 2000, before Bush became president and appointed her national-security adviser, even if Hussein had managed to obtain nuclear weapons, any attempt to use them would have brought national obliteration.

Third, while the United States can militarily defeat just about any state in the world, without ongoing international cooperation we do not have the capacity to turn military victory into a stable peace or to fully remove the threat of terrorism. As the current phase of the Iraq War has demonstrated, the United States, despite spending almost as much as the rest of the world combined on its military, does not have sufficient forces to stabilize the situation on the ground without upsetting its standard rotation practices for active and reserve forces or drawing down its forces in other areas of potential conflict, such as the Korean peninsula. The U.S. Army now has two-thirds of its 33 combat brigades deployed—16 in Iraq, two in Afghanistan, two in South Korea and one in the Balkans. In order to maintain a reasonable rotation policy, it should be deploying no more than half of its brigades at any one time.

The "Rumsfeld doctrine" is only exacerbating this situation. In order to pay for more sophisticated gear more quickly without increasing the defense budget more than

mote democracy in the Middle East, the Bush administration exposed itself to charges of rampant hypocrisy. In order to remove Saddam Hussein, the United States had to rely on such authoritarian regimes as Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain to provide military staging areas. Had those nations allowed a popularly elected legislature to vote on the matter, as Turkey did, there is no doubt that they, too, would have been unable to support the war.

In fact, the administration has undermined the president's goal of promoting democracy and free enterprise by giving a pass to regimes that rarely hold free elections and routinely trample on the human rights of their citizens—for example, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and China—in return for their support of Bush's overall war against terrorism.

Sixth, by refusing to wait either for a second resolution from the United Nations authorizing an attack or for the inspection process to proceed, the Bush administration has made it more difficult for the UN and its inspectors to help deal with North Korea and Iran, two countries that pose far greater risks to international peace and security than Iraq.

Seventh, by committing itself to making Iraq a democracy, the United States has committed itself to a long and costly engagement in an unstable part of the globe. To create a democracy in a nation without much of a history of liberal constitutionalism will require a generation of involvement, as the administration should have known. It was warned by the outgoing Army chief of staff, Gen. Eric Shinseki, and by

the first head of the president's economic council, Lawrence Lindsey, that it would take several hundred thousand military people and hundreds of billions of dollars to win the peace in Iraq. And without much international support, the United States will have to bear most of that burden itself. But to admit this before the war, Bush might have undermined public support, and it certainly would have called into question Rumsfeld's plan to reduce the Pentagon's reliance on ground forces. Now, as casualties mount and costs rise, there is a real danger that Americans will grow unwilling to support the necessary expenditures on the military, not to mention such other components of national security as diplomacy and homeland security.

Eighth, preemption of terrorists is actually achieved much more effectively by nonmilitary means. Over the past two years, the United States and its allies have arrested more than 3,000 potential terrorists and dried up more than \$125 million of their assets. By invading Iraq, the Bush administration has undone much of this progress, rallying more people and more money to the cause of global terrorism.

INDEED, WE REMAIN AT WAR, though wedded to a strategy that can win the battle against the enemy's conventional forces but simply doesn't provide the manpower to sustain a fight for peace and stability. Under the Powell doctrine, which Rumsfeld jettisoned in his attempt to transform the military, American combat commanders would estimate how much force would be needed to accomplish an objective. The civilian and military leaders would then add more forces to provide a margin for error, to break the will of the enemy and to reduce casualties. With Rumsfeld, the opposite occurs. He takes the estimates of the combat commanders, guesses how many forces he can trim and then puts pressure on the field commanders to accept this smaller number.

The Powell doctrine worked well in the Gulf War, in Bosnia and in Kosovo. In the Gulf War, fighting Hussein's million-man army, which at the time sported very modern French and Russian equipment, the United States suffered fewer than 150 combat deaths. In the attacks on Bosnia and Kosovo, and the peace-enforcement activities in the Balkans since then, no American man or woman has died in combat. Such is not the case in Iraq. More Americans have now died in combat in Iraq than in the Gulf War, and many more

have been wounded, though we faced a smaller and less well-equipped Iraqi military this time around. Moreover, with a much lower ratio of troops to population in Iraq than in Kosovo, we will continue to have difficulty bringing order and stability to the country—or even guarding its borders to prevent foreign fighters from entering.

Astoundingly, Rumsfeld threw out even the part of the Powell doctrine that calls for an exit strategy. He and his advisers simply assumed that U.S. forces would be greeted as liberators and that the Iraqi army and police forces would remain intact. American frontline troops were led to believe that they would come home as soon as Baghdad was liberated. The reservists who were mobilized to defeat Iraq's


military expected to be demobilized as soon as the major combat was completed. But many of the frontline forces and reservists have now been told that they will be in Iraq for much longer. Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, once called Shinseki's warning grossly exaggerated. The Bush Defense Department predicted that U.S. troop strength would decline to 30,000 by the end of the summer. It is now clear that this was more a hope than a plan.

The irony is that the military did not need to be radically shaken up to produce a technological transformation. It was actually transforming itself throughout the 1990s, but in an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary way. For example, in

the Gulf War, less than 10 percent of the bombs dropped on Iraq were classified as "precision" or "smart." In the Iraq War, that figure rose to almost 70 percent. And it was the supposedly underfunded and obsolete military inherited from Bill Clinton that acquired and deployed them.

By going back to the United Nations and asking for UN help, the Bush administration has essentially admitted that the Bush and Rumsfeld doctrines, at least to date, have been counterproductive. As Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) noted earlier this year, "At this precarious juncture in American history, America needs more humility than hubris in the applications of American military power, and the recognition that our interests are best served through alliances and consensus." ■

LAWRENCE KORB, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, was an assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration.



West Pointlessness: The Bush doctrine has been a needless about-face.

A Well-Regulated Militia

The National Guard, not the military, should protect the homeland.

BY GARY HART

Few Americans know that we have two armies and that both are acknowledged by the United States Constitution. One is the military that we know best, the regulars: the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy, joined later in history by the Marines and the Air

Force. The other, originally known as the militia, is now called the National Guard.

Why would our Founding Fathers invite confusion and duplication by creating two separate military establishments? The answer dates to the earliest city-state republics in Greece. Throughout 2,800 years of republican theory and practice, a standing army has always been considered a threat to republican liberty and a potential instrument of tyranny. A standing army composed, necessarily, of professional soldiers rather than citizen-soldiers represented too convenient an instrument of power for a putative dictator, tyrant or “man on a white horse.”

Educated in the classics, familiar with both Greek and Roman republican history and culture, and animated by the language and values of the republic, the founders were keenly aware of this danger. And it led to one of the most bitter struggles in the establishment of the new American Republic. Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists saw the future of the United States as a commercial republic, with expanding trade frontiers and intricate alliances between political and business establishments. These alliances would be threatened by circumstance from time to time, whether by local political unrest or foreign commercial rivals. American commercial interest would have to be protected by land and by sea, and, therefore, in Patrick Henry’s memorable and sarcastic formulation, “a standing army we shall also have ... to execute the execrable commands of tyranny.” As glorious as such an army might be, Henry’s anti-Federalist allies believed, it would also be expensive and politically dangerous. They were only partially satisfied by the constitutional provision limiting military appropriations to two years, and by civilian command and oversight of the military.

Though neither Federalist nor anti-Federalist, and largely absent as ambassador to France during the constitutional debates, the ardent republican Thomas Jefferson urged his ally James Madison and others to, at the very least, isolate domestic politics from the standing army and its international commercial concerns by providing for a

separate army, a distinct military establishment, to protect and defend the homeland. This separate military force already existed in the form of state militias. Following ancient republican precedent and history, as well as radical Whig ideology, the core of this homeland militia would be citizen-soldiers, the successors to the Greek farmer-warrior. The militia would continue to be under the command and control of the respective states, but the Constitution also allowed Congress and the president limited authority to “federalize” the militia under certain circumstances. Article I, Section 8 of the U. S. Constitution gives Congress the authority “[t]o provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions” and “[t]o provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States.” Article II, Section 2 provides that the president shall be commander in chief of the state militias “when called into actual service of the United States,” just as he is to be commander in chief of the regular forces.

In his first inaugural address, Jefferson counted among the principals forming “the bright constellation which has gone before us, and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation ... a well-disciplined militia, our best reliance in peace, and for the first moments of war, till regulars may relieve them.” Quaint as it seems now, Jefferson stood modern defense on its head: Citizen-soldiers would repel invaders until the regulars arrived, rather than regulars invading elsewhere, as today, with the National Guard (militia) relieving them. Jefferson’s philosophy on the military’s role in American society remained constant throughout his presidency. In his eighth and last annual message to Congress and the American people, he wrote, “For a people who are free, and who mean to remain so, a well-organized and armed militia is their best security.”

The events of September 11 changed all that. After the attacks, government officials began suggesting that the military would do a better job than the National Guard at protecting the homeland. Prior to the terrorist attacks on

the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, having warned that terrorists would surely attack America, strongly recommended that the National Guard be trained and equipped primarily for the homeland-security mission, its original constitutional purpose, in addition to supporting regular expeditionary forces, as it presently does in Iraq and Bosnia. In its final report to the president, on Jan. 31, 2001, the commission stated, "We urge, in particular, that the National Guard be given homeland security as a primary mission, as the U.S. Constitution itself ordains."

Though not yet adopted as official government policy or even comprehensively debated, this issue must be addressed with considerable urgency. Unless the National Guard's primary homeland-security mission is clearly understood, presidents will continue to be tempted to use it exclusively as an auxiliary expeditionary and invasion force.

The question of which army should defend America's homeland was raised only obliquely post-9-11. Not too long after the terrorist attacks, voices in Congress and the administration raised the ancient issue, whether realizing its rich history or not, by urging reconsideration of the Posse Comitatus Act. The act was passed in 1878 in the wake of the threatened use of military forces following 1876's razor-thin national election. "Posse comitatus," according to *Black's Law Dictionary*, is simply "the power or force of the county," the entire adult population, which the sheriff may summon and deputize to guarantee the peace. The act forbade regular military forces from occupying or conducting operations on American soil: "From and after passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States, as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said forces may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress."

Sen. John Warner (R-Va.), chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz have both urged reconsideration of the act in order to permit a greater role for the standing military in defense of the U.S. homeland. This is an absolutely crucial issue, though not so far recognized as such by opinion leaders and the public alike. That infamous date, 9-11, raises fundamental constitutional issues hitherto largely ignored or evaded: Which army, regular or militia, professional or citizen-soldier, should have the

primary responsibility to protect the security of America's homeland? And does the age of terrorism justify overturning a 225-year-old American belief system and reversing a 2,800-year-old history of the republican ideal?

This just might be the most important issue raised by the age of terrorism, for it could well determine how and by whom our constitutional rights and civil liberties will be protected on domestic soil in the future, whether indeed we must sacrifice those liberties to protect our security, and even what kind of nation and people we are. If the Pentagon becomes our principal public-safety agency, if uniformed standing soldiers guard our streets, if our primary domestic guardians are professional military forces, the American Republic, whose flag we salute and to which we pledge allegiance, will no longer exist as such.

Few would argue that, should a major catastrophe strike the United States, the organization, manpower and strength of our military forces should not be employed. Clearly, in a time of great national emergency our nation will call upon all its resources to protect itself and respond in every conceivable way to the demands of that emergency.

Our military forces have communications, health, transportation and other systems—almost all mobile and portable to one degree or another—that could prove critical in an emergency. No abstract theory should dictate that these systems and capabilities not be de-

ployed domestically. But that is not the issue. According to the ideal of the historic republic, and the principles of the American Republic particularly, the front line of homeland defense is composed of citizen-soldiers who formed the original militia, for whom the Second Amendment was designed and who now form the 50 state National Guards. This was their original constitutional mission and one for which the National Guard must be urgently trained and equipped rather than, as at present, used almost exclusively as combat support. Only when their homeland-security training, equipment and resources prove inadequate—when a disaster or attack is of the greatest magnitude—are the regular forces to be called upon. As Jefferson counseled, under our Constitution and history the standing army is the last, not the first, resort for domestic security against terrorist attack.

Further, as a practical matter the National Guard is "forward deployed," that is to say living and working, in 2,700 communities, including all major cities, across the country. The Colorado National Guard, for example, has much more immediate access to the urban areas of Colorado than



Guarding the homeland

most major U.S. Army units. The one exception is the Fourth Army division, stationed at Fort Carson, Colo. But this is the exception that proves the point: If Colorado were to be attacked, the frontline forces are the Colorado National Guard, which would be supplemented and backstopped, if necessary, by the regular U.S. Army.

What services could the National Guard provide, if adequately prepared? Specially trained units can supplement local SWAT teams in terrorist-attack prevention. Guard units can also substantially augment local authorities in chemical, biological and nuclear emergency treatment, as well as damage limitation, population evacuation, establishment of emergency communications systems and a wide variety of attack-response roles. As they did in New York City, state Guard units can seal off attack sites and carry out crowd-control measures. The National Guard can also play a crucial role in protecting critical infrastructure facilities, including financial centers, transportation facilities, energy production and distribution systems, communications networks, petrochemical plants and food-distribution centers. What's more, it can supplement U.S. Customs Service and Coast Guard capabilities in protecting vulnerable ports and backstop the Border Patrol on our land borders.

Nevertheless, very little in fact changed. More than a year after the first major terrorist attack (almost all experts agree there will be others), a task-force report by the Council on Foreign Relations titled "America—Still Unprepared, Still at Risk," following the recommendations of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, urged the president and Congress to take all actions necessary to train and equip the National Guard for the homeland-security task. "A year after September 11, 2001," the report read, "America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent and respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil. ... An aggressive approach to revamping the capabilities of National Guard units designated to respond to domestic terrorist attacks can in the short term provide a more robust response capability while states and localities work to bring their individual response mechanisms up to par."

To date, that has not been done. Indeed, now that we seem bogged down in Iraq for the foreseeable future, probably for a number of years, it will be even more difficult to assign this mission to the National Guard. Guard units are currently deployed, in some cases for many months, for reconstruction, peacemaking and peace-

The Bush administration has it backward: The National Guard should be protecting our homeland while the military engages foes abroad.

No advocate of the homeland-security mission for the National Guard envisions the Guard in an aggressive counterterrorism role or believes it can prevent terrorism except in its protective mode. As frontline homeland defenders, the Guard would not replace existing intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, including the FBI. But, given the constitutional and statutory history outlined here, giving the Guard, rather than regular forces, the homeland-security mission avoids the serious constitutional threats presented by the stationing of regular military forces in America's communities. However, because the Bush administration has not undertaken to train and equip—let alone formally task—the National Guard for the homeland mission, operational relationships between the Guard and local law-enforcement and emergency-response organizations can only be surmised.

One of the great perplexities of post-9-11 America is this administration's lack of urgency about homeland security generally and preparation of the National Guard particularly. This lack of urgency is made even more inexplicable by a statement made by President George W. Bush to a National Guard unit less than 30 days after he took office. "As threats to America change," he said, "your role will continue to change. The National Guard and reservists will be more involved in homeland security, confronting acts of terror and the disorder our enemies may try to create. I welcome the important part you will play in protecting our nation and its people."

keeping chores in Iraq, Bosnia and Afghanistan (and very soon quite probably in Liberia). This will prevent preparing the citizen-soldiers, now quasi-permanent expeditionary forces, for the more crucial and urgent task of defending America's home shores. Further, a disproportionate share of National Guard members double as "first responders"—local police officers, firefighters and emergency health workers—thus making America's communities doubly vulnerable to attack. Jefferson, and possibly even Hamilton, would be dismayed.

Were we to heed the sage of the Revolution, Benjamin Franklin, on this basic issue, we might appreciate both his foresight and his wisdom. When asked by a concerned citizen outside the Constitutional Convention in 1787 about the nature of the new nation, he described it as "a republic, if you can keep it." Almost 20 years earlier, he'd acknowledged the difficulty of keeping it intact. "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety," he wrote. Franklin would no doubt conclude today that by seeking domestic security through the deployment of a professional army on America's homeland and in its neighborhoods, we are giving up essential liberty to obtain safety and are taking a giant step toward losing the republic. ■

GARY HART is a former U.S. senator from Colorado. He co-chaired the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century.

A Durable Middle East Peace

Oslo didn't achieve it, nor has the Bush "road map." So what would satisfy both sides?

BY ROBERT MALLEY AND HUSSEIN AGHA

HAD THEY SURVIVED, THE OSLO ACCORDS WOULD HAVE turned 10 this year. Instead, a disheartening record of on-again, off-again negotiations has been followed by three years of deadly conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Year after year, the Oslo approach and variants thereof have been tried, always with the same dispiriting results: agreements not reached or not implemented, accompanied by a gradual erosion in mutual trust. The price of failure has risen with each effort—for the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, first and foremost, but for the United States and its national interests as well.

With each successive turn, there are renewed calls to try better, try harder but basically try more of the same: interim agreements designed to boost confidence and gradually pave the way for negotiations over a final deal. True, one can always attribute failure to the shortcomings of the various parties. In the latest iteration of the diplomatic effort, the U.S.-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian "road map," some lament that Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas did too little on the security front, that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon did too much on the military one, that the United States stood on the sidelines and that Yasir Arafat stood in the way. But that this has become a 10-year-old refrain ought to tell us something about the process itself—namely that the setbacks, skirted obligations, clear-cut violations and violence are not deviations from the current process but its natural and inevitable outgrowth. And that there is no reason to believe that what has failed before will suddenly work now, that what the parties have stubbornly resisted doing in the past they can—with a little additional pressure or persuasion—be brought to do in the present.

Much time has been spent assessing who or what derailed the so-called road map, but in truth it derailed itself. Ill-adapted to the conflict it purports to settle, the road map may vanish, or it may survive under a different

guise. But even under the best of circumstances, its success would mean managing the conflict, not resolving it, and deferring the next crisis rather than preventing it.


THREE INTERRELATED REASONS EXPLAIN WHY THE process inaugurated in Oslo and reincarnated in the road map has failed. First, it was premised on an incremental approach in which the parties lacked a well-defined vision

of the ultimate goal. As a result, both Israelis and Palestinians treated the interim period as a time to shape the final deal through unilateral steps rather than through joint effort. Both sides were determined to hold on to their assets (territory in Israel's case, the threat of violence in the Palestinians') as bargaining chips to be deployed in the endgame. Because the objective remained vague, neither side had a sufficient incentive to carry out its obligations, the goal always

being appeasement of the United States rather than pursuit of desired purpose. And so each interim step became an opportunity for a misstep, and the logic behind the Oslo process—that interim measures would gradually boost mutual confidence—was turned on its head as each incremental violation further deepened the existing mistrust.

Second, the process lacked a credible means of implementation. As the parties refrained from carrying out their obligations, the rest of the world refrained from stepping in. There was no genuine incentive for compliance or disincentive for breach. The second reason is related to the first: Failure to implement a series of piecemeal, incremental agreements is hardly enough to mobilize the heavy hand of the international community.

Third, Oslo and its offspring were predicated on the notion that an agreement would flow from direct negotiations between leaders of the two sides. But, as constituted, the process required leaders to make difficult decisions in a political environment that was stacked against them. Clamping down on militant Palestinian groups is politi-



cally feasible in return for the end of occupation; it is far less so when those groups are seen as resisting the occupation and where little certain can be said about the final destination. Withdrawing from territory and freezing settlement construction are realistic in return for an end to violence; these actions are less plausible if Israel remains unsure whether Palestinians will accept its existence. In both instances, and even assuming the best of intentions, concessions carry well-known costs and ill-defined gains.

THESE SHORTCOMINGS HAVE BEEN EVIDENT MOST RECENTLY as Sharon and Arafat tried to deal with the Bush-sponsored road map. Though both leaders said “yes” to the road map, neither believed in it. Though they pay lip service to its incremental steps, both view these as minor distractions in which the goal must be to mollify the United States, placate the international community and, to the extent possible, avoid being blamed. For both, the road map is a rather inconsequential diversion in their longer-term existential struggle.

For Sharon, the goal is to protect Israel’s moral and territorial security, which he sees threatened by the existence

THERE IS AN ALTERNATIVE PROCESS THAT BETTER MATCHES the nature of the conflict. It is a process that bypasses leaders’ proclivities and weaknesses, provides the finality that has so sorely been lacking, ensures implementation and places decision making in an arena far more supportive of a final deal than the current one. It is at once the most ambitious and the most pragmatic process available.

First, the United States should lead a coalition including the European Union, Russia, and Arab and Muslim countries, and should sponsor a new United Nations Security Council resolution spelling out the shape of a final, comprehensive deal. It is clear by now, based on the parties’ negotiations from Oslo onward, that a plan that protects the two sides’ vital interests can be put together. The plan would not require either party to forsake what it considers its fundamental rights or aspirations. Rather, it would propose a practical solution to the problems they confront so that they can live in peace and security. Its core elements would be as follows:

- A two-state solution through which Israel would preserve its Jewish character and Palestine would enjoy freedom and sovereignty.

Though both Ariel Sharon and Yasir Arafat said “yes” to the road map, neither believed in it. They pay lip service to its incremental steps.

of a unified Palestinian national movement. In this endeavor, the road map is a nuisance, but little more. He will do just what he must to satisfy Washington without deviating from his central objective: ensuring that the Palestinians will not, by dint of demographic growth, violent confrontation or political consolidation, menace Israel’s longer-term safety. To that end, he has accumulated a long list of assets—prisoners detained, land reoccupied, threats yet to be carried out—that he can hold on to or give up, thereby creating the impression of forward movement in a game that remains desperately still.

For Arafat, the goal is to maximize the strength of the Palestinian people, which he equates with the strength of the nationalist cause, and with his own. It is a matter of being there and staying there, demonstrating political determination and not giving up. At this stage, interim steps are not about their implementation, and this moment is not about the peace process. It is all about assessing and asserting power. And so Arafat measures the road map’s usefulness not by its content but by whether and how he can emerge from it if not stronger, at least intact.

There may be much that separates them, but in this respect at least Sharon and Arafat are very much alike: Both are convinced that, road map or no road map, the battle goes on. Both are sure that time is on their side. Both believe that they have more to lose by desperately seeking to end the chaos than by simply withstanding it. And both are convinced that the other feels absolutely and precisely the same way.

- The borders between Israel and the new state of Palestine would be based on the lines of June 4, 1967, with minor modifications through a land swap that would take into account demography, security, and the viability and contiguity of the two entities. Israel would annex enough West Bank land to enable most settlers to live within Israel proper, and the Palestinians would recover the equivalent of 100 percent of their land.

- Jewish areas of Jerusalem—West Jerusalem and the Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem—would become the capital of Israel, and Arab areas of the city would become the capital of Palestine. Each religion would have control over its own holy sites.

- Palestinian refugees would be given the choice to live in Palestine, resettle in areas of Israel that would be relinquished to Palestine by virtue of the land swap, relocate to some third country or be absorbed in their current country of refuge—the latter two options being dependent on those countries’ sovereign decisions. All refugees would be offered financial compensation for harm incurred and property lost, as well as resettlement assistance. Israel would reinstate its policy of family reunification and humanitarian return.

Second, and as part of this plan, the international community would propose a U.S.-led international mandate to administer the territory that would make up the Palestinian state, verify compliance, help provide security and take control of land turned over by Israel. The mandatory powers would be the ultimate arbiters, transferring land and full

sovereignty to the Palestinians when appropriate. Israel would be offered a U.S. defense treaty and membership in NATO, and U.S. and European security guarantees would be extended to the Palestinian state.

Third, the United States and its allies would ask Israeli and Palestinian leaders something very straightforward and politically difficult to refuse: not to agree to the plan but to submit it to their people for approval or rejection. While the leaders may balk, a vigorous campaign in which the United States and the Europeans, but also Arab and Muslim countries, would play a significant part would build tremendous pressure and affect political dynamics, producing a change of heart—or a change of leaders. And, if opinion polls are to be trusted, there is every reason to believe that the referendums would yield the desired outcomes.

Some have urged the imposition of a solution by the international community. But that is highly unlikely to work. It would trigger an immediate nationalistic backlash on both sides, and, from Israel, cries of unfair treatment at the hands of a trusted ally. Others have called for the establishment of a mandate or trusteeship as a prelude to a final deal, exercised over less than 100 percent of the future Palestinian state. But that is a recipe for continued violence. Palestinians would view it as an extension of the occupation under a new guise, and Israelis would be reluctant to give up their principal strategic asset (territory) in return for an uncertain outcome.

Still others believe that the parties ought to return to final status negotiations and seek to resolve their outstanding differences at the bargaining table. But negotiations have exhausted their usefulness. The differences that persist may not be significant, but neither side will put forward or accept ideas that risk inviting domestic challenge and weakening their bargaining position absent the certainty of reaching a final deal. At this point, given the extraordinary stakes involved, negotiations will not bridge the remaining gaps but highlight them.

Putting forward a comprehensive deal would provide the clarity that has so far been missing, creating genuine incentives for Israelis (security) and Palestinians (the end of the occupation) to confront extremists within their ranks and deprive them of their legitimacy. Proposing a U.S.-led mandate would make up for the lack of trust. Submitting the plan to a referendum would endow it with popular legitimacy while shifting the locus of decision making to an arena where the balance of power is far more favorable to proponents of an agreement.

OF ALL THE ARGUMENTS RAISED AGAINST SUCH A PROPOSAL, the most salient is the lack of political willpower in Washington. Domestic constraints, the risk of political backlash and the United States' longtime strategic alliance with Israel make it difficult to imagine this administration—or any other—taking on such a risk in the absence of the most exigent of circumstances. The administration, it is said, has been unwilling to put its full muscle behind the

far less ambitious road map. How could it possibly be expected to do significantly more?

The point, of course, lies precisely there: The United States has, year after year, expended precious energy, as well as political and economic capital, on behalf of a process that has promised little and yielded even less. Any type of engagement involves risks and costs. These only ought to be borne for the sake of an enterprise that merits them. Here, the cost-benefit calculus is clear: A successful U.S.-led effort along these lines would dramatically change America's posture in the region, isolate militant forces, mute the anti-Americanism that has become so widespread and reassert the United States' position as defenders of Israel's vital interests without being oblivious to Arab concerns. Nor would the international forces deployed to the region face significant risks. In Iraq, the United States is seen to have initiated an occupation. In Palestine, it would be seen to have ended one.

This solution would likely be embraced by those from whom the hardest concessions are being asked (the Israeli and Palestinian people) and would serve U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East perhaps more dramatically than any other step the United States could take. The irony is that such a solution is unlikely to occur at this point precisely because of resistance from within the United States itself.

For now the public debate should narrow down to two simple questions: Is the current process working, and would the one suggested stand a fair chance to succeed? The answer to the former is a definite "no" and to the latter a possible "yes." Given that, broad pressure should begin to build in the United States as elsewhere to lay the groundwork for the pursuit of this realistic approach rather than of the costly illusions for which Americans and others have paid so dearly over the years.

This is ultimately an argument that will be won either by the power of logic or by events on the ground. Not a day goes by without the possibility of some calamitous event that could set the Middle East on fire and put U.S. national interests at risk. It took the tragic attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon to get the United States to dislodge the Taliban. Will the United States have to await the Middle East's September 11 to come to its senses in this instance as well? ■

ROBERT MALLEY is a Middle East program director at the International Crisis Group. He was special assistant to the president for Arab-Israeli affairs from 1998 to 2001.

HUSSEIN AGHA is a senior associate member of Oxford University's St. Antony's College. He has been involved in Israeli-Palestinian affairs for more than 30 years. Readers who desire a more detailed discussion of some of these ideas can consult Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, *The Last Negotiation*, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002; *Three Men in a Boat*, The New York Review of Books, Aug. 14, 2003; and "Ditch the Road Map. Just Get There, Already," The Washington Post, Sept. 7, 2003.

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Currents

MEDIA



Heart of Glass: Slobodan Milosevic, reflected in the eyeglasses of a survivor of Srebrenica.

Through a Lens, Starkly

For U.S. networks that think documentaries are a snore, it's time to wake up and watch the gripping work of Brits Norma Percy and Brian Lapping.

BY TODD GITLIN

TO HEAR AMERICAN TELEVISION NETWORKS talk about documentaries—well, there's a self-canceling sentence. If they did talk about documentaries, they'd say that they're like bomb threats: they clear the room. Those eye-glazing, ad-killing relics of a stodgy age might be good for awards, but they're bad for thrills and therefore bad for business. It's supposed to be axiomatic that today's twitchy audiences—at least the folks who aren't yet drawing Social Security checks—won't sit still long enough to let documentaries set the scene, juxtapose diver-

gent memories, let the story unfold. People want drama, and docs aren't dramatic, right? Pass the remote.

If the networks were committed to unearthing significant truth, they'd not only feel obliged to air documentaries but would look for ways to make them watchable without dumbing them down—as Ken Burns' best work has done on public television. In his 1990 *Civil War* series, for example, Burns showed that you can produce high drama using still photos, talking heads and voice-over readings from musty documents. The notion that doc-

umentaries can't be dramatic bites the dust when you look at the work compiled in Britain over the last 25 years by the journalistic team of Norma Percy and Brian Lapping. (Percy is the producer, Lapping the executive producer.) Their multipart series on, among other subjects, Watergate, the breakup of Yugoslavia, Israel and the Arabs, Northern Ireland and the Afghanistan war, have aired on the BBC, various other European, Israeli and Arab networks, and sometimes (albeit at times in truncated versions) on the Discovery Channel and PBS' *Frontline*. Blending actuality footage and meticulous interviews with people in positions to know, these sagas are riveting—even when you already know that, in the end, Richard Nixon and Slobodan Milosevic will fall. Combining wide scope and devilish detail, these living histories are positively Tolstoyan in their lively sweep and attentiveness to the human scale. They forswear the ponderous. Bypassing the boilerplate “context” footage that American television often uses to affect seriousness, they start from the premise that history is both human and comprehensible.

Part of what makes these programs gripping is access. Percy and her colleagues avoid sound bites and gotchas, specializing instead in crisply edited, anecdotal interviews with the principals, who are close enough to the events to remember them vividly, far enough away from them to want to justify their actions and closely enough scrutinized by the astute filmmakers not to be able to get away with cheap self-extenuations. Few central figures turn the filmmakers down for long, so the history-makers reconstruct, often in splendid detail, the turning points when they colluded, collided or plain conferred. Sometimes we hear these

principals—Tony Blair and Wesley Clark, Bill Clinton and Jacques Chirac—recall their own dialogue.

The producers' reputation for scrupulous care attracts most of the history-makers for lengthy sit-downs. For example, their five hours on Watergate, first broadcast in 1994, stars Bob Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, John Dean, Alexander Haig, Charles Colson, Jeb Magruder, G. Gordon Liddy, Howard Hunt, Richard Helms, everybody's favorite bagman Tony Ulasewicz and the unindicted co-conspirator himself, speaking in clips from David Frost's 1977 interview. The whole sordid plot receives the most lucid exposition. The famous 18-minute gap on one of Nixon's tapes has never been more carefully—one might even say tenderly—explored. Daniel Schorr's narration avoids golly-gee clichés and minces no words: The

the dictator again, his wife, Mira Markovic, Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright ("I want Milosevic gone before I'm gone."), top Serb dissidents, French President Jacques Chirac, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and NATO's Gen. Wesley Clark. But it also includes a teacher from Kosovo who, in 1999, shot a home video of the mutilated bodies of his family, killed by Serb special units, as well as the mother-in-law of a pregnant woman killed during an errant NATO cluster-bomb attack on the Serb city of Nis. Also in Nis, a dissident describes his audacious raid to gather evidence of Milosevic vote fraud, and the camera nimbly reconstructs the adventure. But in these documentaries, no one gets a free pass. Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)

massacres in Kosovo can't bring himself to drop tear gas on a crowd of Serb protesters outside the parliament building in Belgrade.

Most of these programs are only slightly narrated, and they are refreshingly pundit-free. Every head that talks is a participant, a perpetrator or an eyewitness. There's a bit of music to punch up the proceedings, and an occasional snatch of portentous narration, but mainly it's dialogue that moves the story along.

You don't get to make too many of these extraordinary productions in a lifetime. Percy and Lapping take an average of two years apiece. They approach their subjects when memories are still fresh, then build the script from the interviews. As television goes, these productions are cheap (*The Death of Yugoslavia* cost a bit more than \$3 million.). For news divisions, of course, they're expensive (though hours of film come in at a good bit less than a network anchor's annual salary).

As inquiring minds everywhere wonder what has possessed American policy-makers in recent months and where to go with Iraq from here, it comes as especially welcome news that Percy, Lapping and their collaborators have now embarked on *Pax Americana*, two hour-long programs reconstructing the decision to bring down Saddam Hussein, the maneuvers behind United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 and the question of a UN role in the postwar denouement. These should air next summer, before the presidential conventions.

Who cares? In Britain, as many as 1.3 million households watched parts of *The Death of Yugoslavia*. Is that a big or a small number—it's a bit more than 5 percent—in a country of 23.9 million households with TV? The purely market-minded would see it as failure, no doubt. And it's partly to scotch such ventures that privatizers are campaigning to loosen the BBC's subsidy (It collects an annual license tax on all TV sets.). On the other hand, opinion leaders pay attention to these shows. Many have attributed a shift in British attitudes toward intervention in Bosnia to the 1995 broadcast of *The Death of Yugoslavia*. Our educated classes like-

Every head that talks is a participant, a perpetrator or an eyewitness. There's occasional narration, but mainly it's dialogue that moves the story along.

Watergate break-in was "one of a series of crimes instigated by the president himself." "The newly sworn-in attorney general [Richard Kleindienst] ordered that the Watergate investigation proceed like any other case, yet he was sitting on the information that could have cracked it wide open on its first day The chief law-enforcement officer of the United States was closing his eyes to the cover-up."

The Percy-Lapping team's five-hour *Death of Yugoslavia* series, which aired in 1995, features the presidents of all six post-Yugoslav republics, including the communist-turned-nationalist superstar and marauder in chief, Slobodan Milosevic. It incorporates astonishing government film of the leaders of the republics meeting in the defense ministry and voting to authorize the federal army to attack Croatia.

This year's four-and-a-half-hour *The Fall of Milosevic* series, aired on BBC 2 and in several other countries, including Serbia (three times) and the United States (on the Discovery Times channel this August and September), features

commanders killed Serbs to provoke the brutal reactions that sure enough followed. A KLA commander told a Kosovo delegate to the international talks in Rambouillet, France, that he would shoot down his own delegation's plane if an agreement was signed.

You want objectivity? Percy and her collaborators are unstinting in collecting multiple accounts and making something coherent and revelatory out of them. Many characters criticize Milosevic mercilessly, but the film starkly shows Serb civilian casualties and the feelings of the bereaved. You want suspense? *The Fall of Milosevic* shows the regime collapsing, henchman by henchman, in 2000. Protesters fight the police with their bare hands. A construction contractor drives his bulldozer into state TV headquarters, earning 80 bullet holes in the process. As miners outside Belgrade strike, we hear from the strikers, the mine official, the police official ordered to fire on them and the victorious President Vojislav Kostunica at the police barricade. The same paramilitary commander who committed

wise deserve more than the bland, inside-the-Beltway, he-said-she-saids of public-broadcasting “debates” and the bombast of march-of-time newsreels.

If there were indeed a “liberal media,” this sort of investigation, putting the depth back in “in-depth,” is one thing they would be doing regularly—not because the deep truth of our time veers automatically leftward in its slant but because thorough investigation, wherever it leads, serves the cause of public enlightenment, and public enlightenment defeats the casual lies and quackeries that radiate from all

governments. At a time when many Americans still believe that Saddam Hussein was involved in the massacres of September 11—in January, fully half held to the easily discredited hoax-claim that at least one of the hijackers was an Iraqi—the shallows of TV news have never been so, well, shallow. Television, take a cold bath in the depths of recent history! ■

TODD GITLIN is a professor of journalism and sociology at Columbia University and the author of *Letters to a Young Activist*.

trations who participated in the decisions on Vietnam acted according to what we thought were the principles and traditions of this nation,” he wrote.


He offers the same kind of ambidextrous explanations throughout *The Fog of War* documentary, which in a way functions as a sequel to the book. There are distinct differences, however. The book was McNamara’s; the nearly two-hour film is the work of Errol Morris, a gifted documentarian who demonstrated against the war in his student days. While Morris seeks to show McNamara as a complicated man rather than the simplistic “monster” conjured by the anti-war movement, his movie is anything but a puff piece. He had approached McNamara after reading *In Retrospect* in 1995, and says he found depths in the book that were missing from the reviews. (McNamara was ambivalent at first about the film idea, but eventually agreed to a series of interviews.) A key to the depth in Morris’ film is his camera: This is one of those interview-based films (interlaced with previously unaired historical footage) in which the camera stares hard into the man. And the man, for the most part, does not look away. He stares back, ever straining to make his case to the audience, revealing, perhaps, more than he imagines.

Such a moment comes when, during some network television footage about American casualties in Vietnam, Morris’ voice (he remains off-camera throughout the film) asks McNamara whether he felt he was “the author of stuff” or merely “an instrument of things outside your control.”

“Well, I don’t think I felt either,” says the former defense secretary. “I just felt that I was serving at the request of the president, who had been elected by the American people. And it was my responsibility to try to help him to carry out the office as he believed was in the interest of our people.” I wonder if McNamara realizes that many people will hear this response as just another version of “I was only following orders.”

Morris’ documentary oeuvre, which has drawn applause and earned awards, includes *Gates of Heaven* in 1978, about two pet cemeteries in California, and

FILM



Master of War: Robert McNamara comes clean—but only up to a point.

Soul on Ice

The Robert McNamara of Errol Morris’ new documentary is clearly a tortured soul. But is he tortured enough?

BY SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG

IN *THE FOG OF WAR*, A REVELATORY new documentary about his life and times, a disquieted Robert McNamara implores us to understand why he did the things he did as an Air Force lieutenant colonel who helped plan the fire-bombing of Japanese cities in World War II, and, later, as a secretary of defense and pivotal decision-maker during Vietnam, which some Americans

came to call “McNamara’s War.”

In his 1995 memoir, *In Retrospect*, McNamara said of himself and the other architects of the Vietnam conflict, “[W]e were wrong, terribly wrong. We owe it to future generations to explain why.” But he prefaced this nostra culpa by explaining that their intentions had always been honorable. “We of the Kennedy and Johnson adminis-

The Thin Blue Line in 1988, which helped solve the murder of a Dallas policeman and free from prison a man who had been wrongfully convicted and was facing execution. Morris' most recent film before the McNamara saga was 1999's *Mr. Death*, the story of Fred Leuchter Jr., a Massachusetts engineer who designed gas chambers, electric chairs, gallows and other death-penalty tools with a view toward making the execution process more humane—and then destroyed his reputation by becoming a Holocaust denier.

Intimate, intense effects are Morris' signature. They are produced in large part by an interviewing device he created and named the Interrotron. I've never seen the machine, but the filmmaker's notes describe it thus: "A system of modified Teleprompters, the Interrotron allows Morris to project his

happen." McNamara replies: "Well, I was part of a mechanism that in a sense recommended it. I analyzed bombing operations, and how to make them more efficient." McNamara then recalls a moment after the war ended when he was standing with LeMay and the controversial general said to him, "If we'd lost the war, we'd all have been prosecuted as war criminals." "And I think he's right," says McNamara. "He, and I'd say I, were behaving as war criminals."

And then he does one of his flip-flops. He starts talking about the fuzziness of "the rules of war," apparently referring to the Geneva Conventions. "Was there a rule then," he asks rhetorically, "that said you shouldn't bomb, shouldn't kill, shouldn't burn to death 100,000 civilians in one night? ... LeMay recognized that what he was doing would be thought immoral if his side

in all his revisionist books and speeches, has never admitted to a single regret or mistake. McNamara's admissions may be incomplete, but they are nonetheless a contribution to history, and the act must have taken a certain kind of courage, for he knew that by coming forward at all he was offering himself up for the slaughter.

That exposure to vilification is clearly on McNamara's mind when Morris, at the end of the documentary, puts to him the two seminal questions the filmmaker has obviously been saving up. McNamara doesn't disappoint him, showing agitation as he evades both probes.

Morris: "After you left the Johnson administration, why didn't you speak out against the Vietnam War?"

McNamara: "I'm not going to say any more than I have. These are the kinds of questions that get me in trouble. You don't know what I know about how inflammatory my words can appear. A lot of people misunderstand the war, misunderstand me. A lot of people think I'm a son of a bitch."

Morris: "Do you feel in any way responsible for the war? Do you feel guilty?"

McNamara: "I don't want to go any further with this discussion. It just opens up more controversy. I don't want to add anything to Vietnam. It is so complex that anything I say will require additions and qualifications."

After such words, there can be no doubt in the viewer's mind that McNamara is a tormented being. Uncomfortable in his skin. Not knowing which group of people he wants to stand with. He has had a life in the establishment—Harvard Business School, president of the Ford Motor Company, a member of Washington's power elite, president of the World Bank. Is he afraid that if he acknowledges his responsibility and speaks truth to the power circles he was once a fixture of, he will betray some code of the elite or lose something he worked so hard to acquire, such as his social standing?

After watching him under Morris' filmic microscope and listening to his guarded phrasing, my instincts tell me he is crying out for forgiveness but unable to get the words out. In his book

McNamara has put himself on trial, seeking acquittal and absolution. Yet he cannot bring himself to say the ultimate words: that he bore personal responsibility.

image on a monitor placed directly over the camera's lens. Interviewees address Morris' image—while looking directly at the camera, which lets ... the audience achieve eye contact with his subjects."

One of the movie's most powerful passages covers McNamara's little-known service in World War II, when he was attached to Gen. Curtis LeMay's 21st Bomber Command stationed on the Pacific island of Guam. LeMay's B-29s showered 67 Japanese cities with incendiary bombs in 1945, softening up the country for the two atomic blasts to come. McNamara was a senior planning officer. He describes in particular the firebombing of Tokyo, then a city of wooden houses and shops. "In that single night," says McNamara, his eyes filling with tears, the first of his several emotional moments in the film, "we burned to death 100,000 Japanese civilians in Tokyo—men, women and children." Newly retrieved military film taken from the air pans across 50 square miles turned to ash.

At this point, Morris abruptly asks McNamara if he knew "this was going to

has lost. But what makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win?"

He holds the same kind of self-discussion about the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam, saying, "Now what kind of law do we have that says these chemicals are acceptable for use in war and these chemicals are not? We don't have clear definitions. I never in the world would have authorized an illegal action. I'm not really sure I authorized Agent Orange—I don't remember it—but it certainly occurred, the use of it occurred while I was secretary."

McNamara's detractors will likely say that instead of shedding tears now about the victims of war and engaging in legalisms, he could have saved a lot of lives when he was running the Pentagon for John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson by going public with his knowledge that the Vietnam War was a lost cause—and that Johnson had admitted this in private.

But it must also be said that it is McNamara alone, among the many planners of the war, who has come forward to say he was wrong. Henry Kissinger,

and in this film, he has put himself on trial, seeking acquittal and absolution. Yet he cannot bring himself to say the ultimate words: that he bore personal responsibility. Maybe he hasn't taken the necessary first step, which is to forgive himself.

You can hear McNamara's neediness throughout this film. He compulsively says at every turn how smart he is, and how at every stage of his life he rose above the rest. In grammar school, he recalls, smiling in remembered triumph, he had a teacher who gave a test every month and put the pupil with the highest grade in the first seat on the left-hand row. "I worked my tail off to be in that first seat," McNamara says. His competition, he adds, "were Chinese, Japanese and Jews," and they tried and tried "to beat that damn Irishman. But they didn't do it very often."

And then on to college at the University of California, Berkeley, where, McNamara happens to mention, he was one of only three out of his class of 3,500 to be elected to Phi Beta Kappa at the end of the sophomore year. After Berkeley, Harvard Business School, where he did so well they asked him back as an assistant professor. World War II was approaching and the business school, to keep from losing all its students to the draft, negotiated a government contract to set up an officer-training school in "statistical control" for the Air Force. And that's how he got to be a lieutenant colonel on Guam.

After the war, Ford Motors grabbed up McNamara and a bunch of other classmates from Harvard, gave them tests ("In some tests, we actually had the highest marks that had ever been scored.") and installed them in executive positions. In 1960, he got the top job. ("I was the first president of the company—in the history of the company—that had ever been president other than a member of the Ford family.") Less than five weeks later, a newly elected U.S. president, John Kennedy, asked him to be secretary of defense. McNamara was flattered and honored, so despite the smaller government paycheck and his ties to Ford ("I was one of the highest-paid executives in the world, and the future was, of course, brilliant."), he took the job.

Perhaps these badges of success that McNamara clings to are the crutches that hold him up in a time of inner darkness. That's just a guess. All I can really say with certainty is that this is a film that needs seeing and is worth seeing because, no matter how often one of our politicians announces that we have put it behind us, the pain of Vietnam still hovers over this country. The new film footage and previously unheard tapes of Johnson's telephone conversations

with McNamara make the movie a potent history lesson at a moment when the nation needs all the history reminders it can get. ■

SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG *reported on the wars in Vietnam and Cambodia for The New York Times and was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in international journalism for his coverage "at great risk" in Cambodia in 1975. He now writes for The Village Voice.*

BOOKS

The Life of the Parties

PARTY OF THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF THE DEMOCRATS

BY JULES WITCOVER • RANDOM HOUSE • 758 PAGES • \$35.00

GRAND OLD PARTY: A HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICANS

BY LEWIS L. GOULD • RANDOM HOUSE • 588 PAGES • \$35.00

BY RONALD BROWNSTEIN

FEW INSTITUTIONS OF ANY SORT IN American life have remained relevant for as long as the two national political parties. The Democratic Party traces its roots back to Thomas Jefferson and James Madison in the 1790s. The Republican Party will celebrate its 150th anniversary next year. Not many other products on the shelf in 1854, much less the 1790s, are still attracting customers today.

Even more remarkable than the sheer longevity of the two parties is their dominance. No other major party has emerged since the Republicans replaced the Whigs as the principal rival to the Democrats in the 1850s, though a steady procession of third-party movements, breakaway insurgencies and charismatic leaders (from Theodore Roosevelt to Ross Perot) have regularly offered alternatives. Invariably, reports of the demise of either or both parties have proven premature. During the Civil War, Democrats seemed so tainted by the stain of rebellion that one pro-Republican newspaper editor dismissed them as "a myth, a reminiscence, a voice from the tomb, an ancient, fishlike smell." Both Barry Goldwater's landslide defeat in 1964 and Watergate 10 years later seemed to threaten the Republicans

with marginalization. In the 1980s and 1990s, many commentators thought the rise in independent voters challenged the relevance of both parties.

Yet as the 21st century begins, the parties appear not only relevant but vital in shaping the way Americans look at politics. After all the focus on independent and swing voters in the early and mid-1990s (from soccer moms to Perotistas), America appears to have made a sharp turn into an era of intense partisanship. The gap in the approval ratings President Bush receives from Republicans (around 90 percent) and Democrats (usually less than 30 percent) is the widest ever recorded in polling. Party-line voting is rising in Congress. Crossover voting in presidential and congressional elections appears to be declining. In 2000, fully nine of 10 Republicans voted for George W. Bush, while nearly that high a percentage of Democrats voted for Al Gore.

Enough voters still call themselves independents that neither party can claim a stable majority of support. But many political operatives believe the number who don't at least lean strongly toward one party or the other is now much smaller—perhaps less than 10 percent of the electorate—than was com-

monly assumed 10 and 20 years ago.

In this climate of heightened partisanship and sharpening polarization, strategists in both parties have been shifting their emphasis from courting swing voters to mobilizing and exciting their bases. On virtually every major issue—from the environment to taxes to the prosecution of the war in Iraq without broad international support—Bush has chosen policies far more popular with his conservative base than among swing voters. The move toward the base isn't as uniform among the 2004 Democratic presidential contenders. But on a series of major issues—from affirmative action to gay rights to free trade and the level of domestic spending they are willing to propose—most of the leading candidates are perceptibly tilting away from the centrism associated with Bill Clinton and toward more tradition-

project, Random House is simultaneously publishing narrative histories of the Republican Party, by University of Texas historian Lewis L. Gould, and the Democratic Party, by veteran political journalist Jules Witcover. It's a grandly conceived effort written by two authors whose enormous knowledge of American politics is matched by their obvious affection for it. Still, the project is a mixed success.

Overall, Witcover has written a more sprightly and entertaining book. Yet the two works share many common strengths and weaknesses. The best thing about both books is their inclusiveness. These are by far the most comprehensive histories of the political parties I've seen under one cover. For political junkies, it's all here: all the highlights and many of the forgotten moments in the development of both

Leadership Council has tried to usurp the proper role of the national party over the past 15 years might be surprised to learn that the liberal-dominated Democratic Advisory Council faced the same charge in the late 1950s when it tried to redefine a party then dominated by a conservative congressional leadership. And amid all of today's political bitterness in Washington, it's refreshing to be reminded that Thomas Jefferson once complained, "Men who have been intimate all their lives cross the street to avoid meeting, and turn their heads another way, lest they be obliged to touch their hats." That was during John Adams' presidency.

Witcover in particular has a knack for unearthing surprising facts; every few pages taught me something new. Did you know that a cartoonist named Rollin Kirby helped cement the identity of Franklin Roosevelt's 100-day agenda as the New Deal? Or that delegates for the presidential nominating convention were selected through primaries for the first time in 1912? Or that the Anti-Masons, a third party devoted to combating the Society of Freemasons, held the first national political convention in September 1831? Both books, but especially Witcover's, display a breathtaking amount of research.

The authors also advance some provocative judgments. Gould modestly attempts to refurbish the reputations of such middling GOP presidents as Rutherford B. Hayes and Calvin Coolidge. And he spikes his generally favorable history of the Republicans with the tough judgment that the party too often—from the Civil War through Joe McCarthy—has portrayed its Democratic rivals as not just wrong or misguided but unpatriotic and disloyal. For his part, Witcover is unsparing on the ideological confusion of today's Democrats.

Unfortunately, neither author spends enough time assessing the implications of the facts they have collected. Each focuses far more on narrative than analysis. Both books slight the intellectual history of the parties. Gould is more conscientious than Witcover about tracking the shifts in the two parties' thinking over time; but often Gould simply identifies the change (such as the rise in Republican isolationism after World War I) without

Only a few years after some analysts worried that the two parties were converging into a bland middle, differences are sharper than they've been in decades.

ally liberal positions popular with the party core. In Congress, meanwhile, the ideological gap between the parties has widened to a chasm with the decline of both the northeastern center-left Republican and the southern center-right Democrat. Only a few years after some analysts worried that the two parties were converging into a bland middle, ideological differences appear sharper than they've been in decades.

FOR ALL OF THEIR CONTINUING importance, however, the political parties have been slighted by historians. Excellent accounts of the electoral and intellectual competition between the parties are available in works that examine discrete periods in American history, such as David M. Potter's classic study of antebellum America, *The Impending Crisis*, or Arthur M. Schlesinger's monumental accounts of the Andrew Jackson and Franklin D. Roosevelt presidencies. But popular histories of the two political parties as institutions have been difficult to find.

Not anymore. In a hugely ambitious

parties and their 150-year rivalry—everything from "Ma, Ma, where's my pa? Gone to the White House, Ha! Ha! Ha!" (the taunt Republicans aimed at Grover Cleveland over reports that he had fathered an illegitimate child) to "Where's the beef?" (the missile Walter Mondale fired to knock Gary Hart out of orbit during a debate in the 1984 Democratic primary). Free-soil advocates, copperheads, stalwarts, half-breeds, Mugwumps—warriors in political fights long forgotten—all parade through the pages of these books.

The long view both authors provide offers fresh perspective on many of today's political arguments. When Arnold Schwarzenegger complains that Democratic taxes dog Californians through every step of their day, I wonder if he knew he was channeling the Democratic attack on Republican high-tariff policies in the 1890s that Gould quotes: "The McKinley [tariff] is with us always, at the table, at the bedside, in the kitchen, in the barn, in the churches and to the cemetery." Those liberals who complain that the centrist Democratic

explaining its cause. Both books could likewise have benefited from more social history that explored how demographic changes (such as the movement to the suburbs after World War II) have affected the parties' fortunes.

Instead, the emphasis in both books is on recounting elections, especially presidential elections. At times that produces significant rewards. Witcover offers a fascinating history of how presidential campaigns were conducted in the early 19th century. But the focus on the presidency is too constricting in both books. By dwelling so heavily on presidential races and the administrations they produce, the authors say too little about members of Congress—much less governors or intellectuals—who have been important in shaping their party's agendas and viewpoints over the years. Meanwhile, too much of the presidential history they recount has been covered, in greater depth, elsewhere.

NEITHER BOOK SPENDS MUCH TIME addressing the threshold question of why the parties have endured for so long when so much in American life has changed around them. Yet both offer clues to the answer.


One obvious factor has been that the parties have also changed during their long lives. Both have been remarkably resilient and adaptable. Through almost all of the 19th century, the Democrats were the small-government, states-rights party. Meanwhile, the Republicans, born to resist the spread of slavery, offered an agenda of federal activism sweeping in its ambition. As Gould writes, "[T]hey established a national banking system, imposed an income tax, created a system for dispersing public land in the West, and started a transcontinental railroad." Today, of course, the two sides have completely reversed roles; it is Republican leaders in the executive branch, Congress and the courts who mouth the arguments of 19th-century limited-government Democrats.

These evolving positions, though, don't so much explain the parties' durability as point to the real secret of their success. In revising their views, the parties have followed the shifting interests of their core constituencies. Though each party's electoral coalition has evolved

substantially over time, the Republicans have always been the party most identified with business, while Democrats focused most on courting average working people. Republicans favored activist government during the Lincoln administration, when business needed government assistance to build roads and railroads; when business later recoiled against government regulation and taxes, most Republicans followed. Likewise, the Democrats abandoned their resistance to federal activism at the turn of the 20th century when union leaders, agrarian activists and other social reformers flowing into the party came to see Washington as

Witcover quotes: "In every free and deliberating society, there must, from the nature of man, be opposite parties ..."

It's telling that the greatest threats to the dominance of the parties have come when both have ignored a significant interest in society. The Republicans were born in 1854 when neither the Whigs nor Democrats would reflect the anti-slavery outrage over the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which cleared the way for slaveholding to spread through the territories. Likewise, the failure of both parties to respond to farmers and workers fearful of emerging corporate power during the Gilded Age led to the formi-



an indispensable counterweight to the growing power of corporate America.

So while the parties' views have evolved, their allegiances to the interests of their constituencies have remained constant. That may be the key to their survival. The most important divisions in American politics today aren't solely the class lines between capital and labor; cultural attitudes toward issues such as abortion, gay rights and gun control are now at least as important in driving voters' choices. But whether the cause is cultural or economic, the one guarantee in a society this big and diverse is that interests will clash. The parties endure, above all, because they have proven the most effective vehicles for those contending interests to advance their causes in the political arena where any democratic society resolves its disputes. Jefferson, again, got it right, in a letter that

dable challenge of the Populist Party (which Democrats eventually stifled by adopting much of their agenda). Perot's rise in the early 1990s, and the intense interest that swirled around potential third-party bids from Colin Powell and John McCain later, suggested the parties could theoretically open the door for a centrist competitor by diverging too sharply and alienating voters in the middle. But these twin histories show that in practice the parties have mostly run into trouble when they converge too closely and leave too many voters feeling disenfranchised by a cramped consensus.

By that test, the parties appear in strong shape today. The Democrats might not confront business aggressively enough for those attracted to the Greens, and Republicans might be too timid in slashing big government for the libertarians. But few Americans are likely to complain that they are being

presented with an echo, not a choice, in 2004. President Bush and whichever candidate the Democrats nominate are on track for an election that will offer voters a stark choice on the full range of domestic and foreign issues (even the Democrats who supported the war in Iraq have been loudly condemning Bush's broader approach to interna-

tional affairs). Everything points toward a presidential campaign that will be polarizing, acrimonious and probably quite bitter—all the ingredients that make for the life of the parties. ■

RONALD BROWNSTEIN is a national political correspondent for the Los Angeles Times.

BOOKS

It Wasn't Deficit Reduction

THE ROARING NINETIES

BY JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ • W.W. NORTON AND COMPANY • 379 PAGES • \$25.95

BY LOUIS UCHITELLE

LIKE MANY ACADEMIC ECONOMISTS, Joseph E. Stiglitz went into government hoping to tutor as well as to serve. Unlike most, Stiglitz has significant doubts about whether markets usually work as advertised. His research in this genre won him the Nobel Prize. Stiglitz's four-year stint in the Clinton White House was marked by the tension between his own powerful views and the pressure on a high public official to be a loyal team player.

As chairman of Bill Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), Stiglitz attempted to influence policy quietly from the inside, putting a brave face on policies he opposed. In his second government position, as chief economist for the World Bank, Stiglitz went public with his criticisms, and eventually was fired for his candor. Now Stiglitz is back in academia, at Columbia University, and he can tell us what he really thinks, as he does—often insightfully—in *The Roaring Nineties*.

He has written an important revisionist critique of the conventional view that budget balance and deregulation powered the 1990s boom. Even so, Stiglitz the critic and Stiglitz the loyalist are still somewhat at odds in this book, and he remains protective of Bill Clinton personally, blaming wrongheaded policies instead on Clinton's lieutenants.

WHEN I FIRST COVERED STIGLITZ, then CEA chairman, his briefings for reporters never suggested the devastating

criticism that would burst from him later. I had been the lead reporter for a series of articles on layoffs published in *The New York Times* in March 1996, the year Clinton was up for re-election. In response, the council produced a white paper that sought to shift public attention to the job market's strengths—and away from the spreading layoff problem—in an election year.

The white paper, which Stiglitz signed, argued that jobs were not only multiplying, which they were, but that most of the new jobs paid well, a questionable reading of the data. Layoffs were dismissed as insignificant in number, unless one noticed a brief caveat in the white paper. Mostly at the insistence of then-Labor Secretary (and current TAP Chairman) Robert B. Reich, who also signed the document, the administration acknowledged that permanent layoffs had increasingly replaced temporary ones, and "the average real wage loss due to [permanent] displacement was significant and persistent."

Clinton wanted to focus on good news, and his lieutenants furnished it. Going against layoffs would have meant trying to restrict the behavior of the nation's executives, a confrontation that might have spared the nation the waves of layoffs that plague the workforce today. But instead of pushing for alternatives—shorter hours, for example, rather than fewer workers—or even attacking the practice, Clinton accepted

layoffs. His administration, instead, would subsidize the retraining of some of the victims, for the next job and the next and the next (though the subsidies would be constrained by budget cuts). Intervention "would have been inconsistent with the deregulation policies of both parties," Stiglitz explained to me years later. In his loyalty to his president, Stiglitz the official spokesman ended up steering the public away from the kind of government intervention that Stiglitz the economist had so brilliantly advocated as a means of improving market outcomes.

A year after the white paper appeared, Stiglitz left the White House and the second aspect of his public persona came to life. From his new perch at the World Bank, protected by the bank's president, James D. Wolfensohn, Stiglitz opened fire on the shortcomings of the administration's economic policies and the Washington Consensus of fiscal discipline, market liberalization and debt collection imposed on poor countries. The public criticism persisted for two years until Wolfensohn, under pressure from the Clinton administration, told Stiglitz that he must either curb his outspoken views or resign.

Stiglitz resigned and kept talking. His first popular book, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, published last year, challenged the standard story about the benefits of speculative global capital markets. And now its sequel, *The Roaring Nineties*, gives us a revisionist assessment of the American economy in the Clinton years, and a fundamental critique of many Clinton policies.

THE NEW ECONOMY, STIGLITZ WRITES, was real. "The Internet was real. The innovations, advances in telecommunications, and new ways of doing business which followed were real." The stock-market bubble and the recession and weak recovery that followed are temporary setbacks. What remains, Stiglitz argues, is an enduring improvement in productivity. As the output of the American worker rose, the supply of goods and services exceeded the demand for them. The problem now is ratcheting up demand, to take advantage of the prosperity that the new efficiencies make possible, a potential

prosperity no longer threatened by the shortages that breed inflation.

Most economists would agree that part of the recent boom was a result of rising productivity. Where Stiglitz departs from the standard story, however, is in his insistence that the credit belongs almost entirely to the higher productivity and not to the tax increases, spending cuts, resulting budget balance and bond-market reaction that usually get so much credit.

He may be right about productivity, or at least partly right. We don't really know definitively how much of the improvement is the enduring result of innovation and high-tech investment and how much is a temporary fix—management squeezing fewer employees to work faster. But Stiglitz is certainly correct to debunk the view, so much promoted at the Clinton White House, that budget balancing generated the recovery by restoring the confidence of bankers and investors. Or, as he wryly puts it, "Thus reassured, business went back to investing in growth and inno-

vation, consumers began spending again, and the recovery gained momentum. The agenda of the deficit hawks was clear: keep deficits low (even in recessions) and listen to what the financial markets want—for if you alienate them, you are lost."

Stiglitz offers a different and more illuminating sequence of events, one that helps to free us from blind faith in deficit reduction and the endless pressure from investors and executives for deregulation and unfettered markets. The true sequence of events was largely fortuitous: The Federal Reserve, eager to recapitalize banks damaged in the massive loan defaults of the late 1980s and early '90s, encouraged banks to invest their deposits in U.S. Treasury bonds, and held down interest rates long enough to help make a risky venture less risky and ultimately successful. Later, in the absence of inflation and concerned about bank exposure to foreign defaults, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan lowered rates again and the boom accelerated, bubble and all.

Stiglitz is properly critical of Greenspan for failing to act against the bubble, which Greenspan had warned about as early as 1996. He faults Greenspan in particular for not lobbying "behind the scenes against the huge capital gains tax cut of 1997, which sent a fresh torrent of investor capital into the markets at a time when a shift in the opposite direction" might have helped to subdue the bubble. But neither did the White House raise an alarm about the bubble, happy enough to have prosperity as a tailwind, whatever the reasons and the danger. Along the way, the overenthusiasm for deficit reduction and budget balancing damaged the economy, mainly through underinvestment in the public sector. In other words, while deficits on a scale wrought by Reagan or either Bush are damaging, there was plenty of room for moderate deficits and more social outlay, which might have helped productivity. The allegiance to deregulation turned out to be even more damaging, but the financial markets insisted and the Clinton administration complied.

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STIGLITZ IS PARTICULARLY GOOD AT describing the failure to strengthen government's hand in a market economy. He shared a 2001 Nobel Prize in Economic Science for his pathbreaking contributions to the concept that markets function imperfectly, hurting many people, because the information available to market participants is inadequate. So government has to intervene, adroitly through rules and regulations, to make markets function properly.

The Roaring Nineties makes that case effectively in the scandal-ridden aftermath of the 1990s bubble. For Stiglitz, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in the Clinton years was madness. No longer required to stay away from trading stocks and investment operations, the banks fell into the schemes that made the Enron debacle possible. Or, as Stiglitz put it with blunt simplicity, "Investment banks push stocks, and if a company whose stock they have pushed needs cash, it becomes very tempting to make a loan Under the old regime, investors at least had some assurance that if a firm was in trouble, it would have trouble borrowing money. This provided an important check, which helped make the whole system work."

Stiglitz the economist understood, when he joined the administration in 1993—first as a member of the CEA, then as its chairman—the damage inherent in the deregulation that later took place on his watch, particularly the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the freeing of electric power companies from government rules. In *The Roaring Nineties*, he explains the sequences that made disaster inevitable. He tells us that his warnings were ignored within the administration, including his caveat that cutting the capital-gains-tax rate was bad policy, and not just for its contribution to inflating the bubble but for its long-run damage. The cut would bulk up tax revenue in the short run as more people sold assets, particularly stocks, but it would lower revenues later. "If the government is concerned with its *long-run* deficit position, as it should be, the lowering of the capital gains tax rate," is bad policy, even chicanery, Stiglitz writes. His advice was ignored; with Clinton in agreement, Congress cut the rate.

READING ALL THIS IN *THE ROARING Nineties*, one marvels that Stiglitz stayed for four years in the Clinton administration, and that he is still so loyal to Clinton personally. The policy failures that Stiglitz so effectively describes are blamed on a handful of advisers—principally Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers, his deputy—who misled or misinformed the president more than once, Stiglitz tells us. Or it was the fault of the Republican congressional victory in 1994 that tied the president's hands, thwarting his "bold, broad-gauged agenda to address America's problems."

But Bill Clinton was a very engaged

president, one who personally bought into the deregulation and the alleged efficiency of unfettered markets, sharing the views of Rubin and Summers. In his post-presidential years, Clinton's public commentary suggests that he still favors deregulation and budget balance. This book cries out for a chapter in which a former insider of Stiglitz's stature expressly challenges these views of his ex-boss—policy errors that the current crop of Democratic presidential hopefuls are in grave danger of repeating. ■

LOUIS UCHITELLE covers economics topics for The New York Times.

BOOKS

End of the Line

FIRING BACK: AGAINST THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET BY PIERRE BOURDIEU, TRANSLATED BY LOÏC WACQUANT • NEW PRESS • 112 PAGES • \$14.95

BY MARK GREIF

AT THE TIME OF PIERRE BOURDIEU'S death in January 2002, he stood as the dominant intellectual in France, if not in Europe. Only Jürgen Habermas in Germany, now age 74, is of the same stature, but Bourdieu's last years had turned him into far more of an activist as a visible opponent of the neoliberal dismantling of social protections.

Just as Puritan divines once preached an annual election sermon, every dominant French intellectual since Émile Zola has made a public pronouncement on the duties of intellectuals. Bourdieu's declaration could be expected to be different. He defined himself as a sociologist, not a philosopher. His most famous work anatomizes how thinkers, artists and educators establish superiority as dominant "cadres" even without appeal to money. His best-known book in this country, *Distinction*, could have been called *Pretension*. He was out to skewer pretense, with scientific precision. The book gave a drubbing to fellow intellectuals who felt their taste for "The Well-Tempered Clavier" hoisted them above working-class admirers of the "Blue Danube Waltz."

Born into a peasant milieu in 1930, Bourdieu's task all along was to use sly means to draw academics and intellectuals into solidarity with workers. Exhortation had been the style of Jean-Paul Sartre's communist comrades. Armed with charts, statistics and a devotion to empirical methods, Bourdieu instead made intellectuals' exclusionary systems look embarrassing. He used the tools of reason to shame those who took reason as their guide.

In his other work, meanwhile, Bourdieu demonstrated how a social-scientific scholar could contribute expertise to the most pressing political issues of his era: Algeria, student life before May 1968 and, finally, economic globalization. A wonderful book from the early 1990s organized a large team of sociologists to interview people left behind by recent economic changes. Bourdieu came out looking like Studs Terkel by way of an *aggregation* in philosophy and an intellectual dialogue with Immanuel Kant.

Sad, then, that the lectures and addresses collected in the posthumously translated *Firing Back: Against the*

Tyranny of the Market are so weak. They give little sense of Bourdieu's genius. The book covers three topics: neoliberalism in Europe, market threats to true culture and the role of the intellectual. It reads like a string of back-to-back editorials from *The Nation*. Bourdieu calls for "coalitions." He calls intellectuals to organize themselves, to retain their autonomy, to develop a progressive program, to be scientific. These are ineffectual pleas in an almost desperate tone. It is as if, in his last years, Bourdieu could see everything Europe's social movements had achieved being liquidated and knew he didn't have enough time to contribute to a solution.

There are emotional highlights. A few direct confrontations hint at the courage and tenderness that came through very differently in the sometimes Olympian tone of his other books. In Bourdieu's contribution to *Télérama*—a French equivalent to *TV Guide*—he pleads with employees of the magazine to use their minor positions to defend true culture from the powerful. He asks of a Paris

convention of worldwide media CEOs, headed by Henry Kissinger: "[M]asters of the world, do you have the mastery of your own mastery? Or, to put it more simply, do you really know what you are doing, all the consequences of what you are doing?" Bourdieu was cashing in his chips at the end, trying to intervene with audiences that agreed to hear him only because of his eminent name. Yet this book of speeches is most likely to be read by people concerned professionally with scholarship or policy. For them, Bourdieu's most interesting charge rests on his idea of the "intellectual."


The intellectual, in French terms, is what Americans often call a "public intellectual"—someone who not only works with intellect but intervenes authoritatively in political life on the basis of the central values of art, culture or scholarship. Intellectuals, Bourdieu always argued, don't just bring to the table relevant expertise or skill at public presentation. They import the moral norms of another social field.

Presumption is the intellectual's

strength and weakness. Zola and Sartre are the two outstanding protagonists in this figure's development in France. Over the course of his career, Bourdieu had plenty to say about both. Zola created the modern image of the intellectual in 1898, when he famously came to the defense of a Jewish army officer, Alfred Dreyfus, falsely accused of treason. He used the bohemian writer's studied indifference to money and power—and, indeed, to ordinary politics—to make a political stand. The consequences were not all good. Zola's example instilled in artists the determination to speak up for public causes, but his gambit also suggested that intellectuals must be still somehow above the reach of day-to-day affairs, superior and aristocratic.

The villain in Bourdieu's history of the intellectual was Sartre, who claimed to inherit the mantle of the "omnipotent intellectual." According to Bourdieu, Sartre had yoked together mediocre versions of several previously separate intellectual vocations: academic philoso-

SPEAKING OUT




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


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pher, avant-garde writer and Marxist, among others. Dismissing rivals whose personal situation made them professionally competent in only one of these disciplines, Sartre narrowed the useful breadth of the intellectual field. The likes of Albert Camus became unskilled by comparison—less-than-total. Much worse, Sartre thereby dismissed the remaining threads of life training and experience that had connected intellectuals to the lives of other people.

The major shift in Bourdieu's late lectures is his defense of certain institutions he was famous for critically examining. His concern was always at bottom that "cultural capital" not be restricted to a few. But there are two ways to equalize a differential between the few and the many: by spreading resources to wider groups of people or by annihilating the privileges in question. In *Firing Back*, Bourdieu finds himself vigorously on the side of cultural capital—high art, higher education, elite taste—because the new market ideology of limited government and profit-driven media would simply destroy it for

everyone. "This situation is all the more paradoxical in that one is led to defend programs or institutions that one wishes in any case to change," Bourdieu writes.

As a defender of what he had criticized, though, Bourdieu can't bear to make the intellectual a hero on the old model. So he waffles, calling on intellectuals to collaborate in vast organized projects or to advance others' programs. One of Bourdieu's projects calls for a pan-European initiative by social scientists to develop an alternative economics and social policy. It is an embarrassingly fuzzy idea in the absence of any institution to lead the charge. Bourdieu falls back on phrases about the "autonomous collective intellectual" and the "production of *realistic utopias*." The lessons of this last of the French *maître-penseurs* will be carried forward from his earlier books. The best advice he could have given would have been to encourage budding Jean-Paul Sartres to become humbler Pierre Bourdieus. ■

MARK GREIF is a Prospect senior correspondent.

a female Jack Kerouac. Novelists, she writes, "are the traditional ethnographers of their own cultures."

But although she also cites Saul Bellow and Philip Roth, Weequahic High School's most famous alumnus, as literary influences, Ortner is much more burdened by the theories and vocabulary of Jean-Paul Sartre, Karl Marx and Pierre Bourdieu. Too often, her academic determination to make the data fit a pattern fails to account for the irrepressible life revealed in the fascinating stories she tells.

New Jersey Dreaming is divided into two chronological—and stylistic—parts. In the book's more academic first half, Ortner examines the making of the class of '58 in terms of its class background, ethnicity, race and gender. Then, in a more novelistic voice, she traces the class members' lives up to the present. Before the 1967 race riots drove Jewish families away, Weequahic High was 83 percent Jewish; Roth unforgettably recites the school cheer in *Portnoy's Complaint*: "Ikey, Mikey, Jake and Sam / We're the boys who eat no ham / We play football, we play soccer / We keep matzos in our locker."

The class of '58 was also overwhelmingly white and heterosexual, with only 19 black members, and even today no "out" lesbians and only three gay men. But in Ortner's view, race, ethnicity and even sexuality are really displacements of class. She sees Weequahic as typical of late-'50s America in a couple of respects: its middle- and lower-middle-class distribution and its participation in the "renormalization of the family" after the war, which endorsed conventional gender and family models and disguised serious disruption. The upward mobility of the Jewish alumni of Weequahic, Ortner argues, was representative of the class of '58 in the United States as a whole: "People's individual fates are best seen as tied to larger social movements." Her classmates' economic and professional advancements, she maintains, reflected the decline of anti-Semitism and rise of the civil-rights movement and women's liberation, as well as the economic surge of the post-World War II decades.

Although Ortner decided not to let her interviews with classmates stand

BOOKS

Up from Weequahic

NEW JERSEY DREAMING: CAPITAL, CULTURE AND THE CLASS OF '58
BY SHERRY B. ORTNER • DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS • 334 PAGES • \$29.95

BY ELAINE SHOWALTER

SOMETIMES THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF a book just leaps out of a publisher's catalog and grabs you by the throat, and such was the case with this study by Sherry Ortner, a MacArthur Prize-winning anthropologist who has made her career as an authority on the Sherpas and on gender. Ortner and I were at Bryn Mawr together, and a decade ago she mentioned that she was beginning a study of her own class at Weequahic High School in Newark, N.J., as an ethnographic experiment in American class mobility. Although I grew up in suburban Boston, I graduated from high school in 1958 as well, and this book is very much the story of my generation of American Jews, who

came out of the sedate '50s and encountered the next decade's social turbulence and excitement.

To understand their experience of social mobility, Ortner decided to track down her 304 classmates at Weequahic, conduct interviews with them and analyze the way that cultural capital, movements of the '60s and economic changes had influenced their lives. She found 246 of them and interviewed about 100. Ortner is an entertaining writer with a strong personal voice, and indeed, as she traveled to about 80 cities and drove (usually white-knuckled) over thousands of miles of American highways, she sometimes thought of the book as a road novel and herself as

alone as an oral history in the manner of Studs Terkel, the characters, memories, and opinions of these people will be the most interesting part of the book for most readers. Their accounts of how immigrant families planned for their children, the encouragement and opportunities offered to Jewish men, and the role of accident and luck in their destinies suggest a rather different story from Ortner's academic and theoretical arguments. Individual voices and personalities also seem to have more to do with individual fates than Ortner wants to concede; shifting social movements alone, for example, can't explain why Ortner herself has been more professionally successful and adventurous than any other woman in her high-school class.

In particular, Ortner's insistence that the Jewishness of Weequahic was not a very significant factor in the life experiences of the class members seems to ignore or deny some of the most intriguing implications of the study. The non-Jewish members of the class cer-

tainly thought it mattered. "Sometimes when there was a Jewish holiday," recalls Marie Rio, "I would be one of maybe ten in the whole school [who didn't celebrate it]." Elaine Colechio pretended that she had a Jewish mother in order to claim kin with the majority.

Although Ortner looks at marriage patterns in the class, she does not study the rate of intermarriage. Some of the Jewish girls rebelled in high school by dating "hoody" non-Jewish boys from the working class, while the boys declare themselves to have been terrified of shiksas. But once they went to college, how many eventually were part of the great wave of Jewish intermarriage in the 1960s, a development I suspect was related to class mobility and cultural capital? Ortner's Marxist definitions of class miss the force of cultural change in the '60s as well, a time when my own formerly ghettoized Jewish relatives started joining Alcoholics Anonymous, dealing drugs or painting in acrylics.

Above all, I wonder about the next

generation. In her project journal, Ortner notes, "I'm thinking to do something about show business, in which a number of the children of the Class of '58 were [trying to be] involved." This comment strikes home, as not just my son but the sons of most of my friends and editors want to be actors, screenwriters, comedians and producers. I don't think Marxist theory can explain this shift. Is it an overall American pattern, produced by Hollywood and the celebrity culture? Is it an indication that the children of the assimilated Jewish professional class have a yearning for the Catskills? Is it the attraction of a "creative" life opposed to the workaholicism of their upwardly mobile parents?

I would be eager to read Ortner's sequel, but I hope she will listen more to what her subjects say and pay less attention to the voices of her theoretical masters. More Bellow, less Marx! ■

ELAINE SHOWALTER is a culture critic and a professor emeritus at Princeton University.

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
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A Fan Gloats

BY CHARLES P. PIERCE

I would point out for the everlasting record that so-called serious people who discuss serious issues in a serious way for serious paychecks still believe that Rush Limbaugh knows what he's talking about. I also would point out that he lasted less than a month

on ESPN, where he attempted to fit Philadelphia Eagles quarterback Donovan McNabb and my sportswriting colleagues onto the back of a couple of his old, battered—Affirmative action! Liberal media!—hobbyhorses. It seems sportswriters know a grotesque public charlatan when they see one; after all, many of them have covered boxing.

It's a good time of year to examine the sports-politics confluence. All of the sports come together: The World Series is upon us, the NFL season is winding into its cold-and-fracture phase, and hockey and basketball are hitting the quarter pole. Also, in case it got by you, we're a year out from an election in which we will determine if we're to be governed for another four years by a man who once traded Sammy Sosa for a bag of magic beans—and who has since traded the international credibility of the United States for far less than that.

It's plain to me that over the coming months, the people covering sports will inform and entertain their audiences far more honorably than will most of the media superstars who cover politics. Sportswriters endure lots of jokes about working in the "toy department," but let it be said that they laughed Limbaugh out of their universe in less time than it took his maid to score down at the Gas-n-Sip. The elite political media, though, are still impressed by the likes of him. And don't you doubt that after he waltzes out of Rehab Mansion, he'll be given license to pick right back up where he left off. Political journalism in this country is a whorehouse with 500 piano players.

Why the difference? Because every day, sportswriters are dealing with a genuine meritocracy. In the NFL, daddy's rich buddies cannot bail you out when Warren Sapp comes to sit on your head. In baseball, you actually have to hit a triple to earn your way to third base. There was a damn good reason why George W. Bush was first a cheerleader and then an owner.

Every so often, in an attempt to pretend that they are just regular Joes and Jills, modern movement rightists come a-wanderin' into sports, often with hilarious consequences.

Back in 1996, Fred Barnes wrote a lengthy essay in *The Weekly Standard* on what he called a "taxonomy of liberal and conservative games." The piece glistened with gems of hard-bitten barstool acuity.

For example, "That brings us to basketball, the sport that went from liberal to conservative." Why? Because the sport has moved from Bill Bradley to Charles Barkley. It is to marvel. Yes, the NBA—a living symbol of all those virtues limned so well by Bill "Sportin' Life" Bennett in that big, heavy book that he forgot on top of that slot machine at Caesar's Palace. Actual sportswriters haven't stopped laughing at this non-

sense yet. But Barnes' spurious mooing on the topic of the NBA is not much more spurious than his mooing on Bill Clinton was. Where's the toy department now?

Confronted with an authentic meritocracy unmarred by the inherent disadvantages of race and class, the modern rightist is lost. Oh, put together a gerrymandered one, based on hereditary privilege, white skin and a network born of mommy's influence and daddy's checkbook, and the rightist is first in line for


the kind of ideological affirmative action that has allowed Peggy Noonan to read the minds of dolphins.

Or the kind that caused ESPN to hire Limbaugh in the first place. Once there, Limbaugh beheld a world that didn't fit easily into the tinhorn categories that had made him rich. He found himself confronted with colleagues and with an audience that realized that he didn't know enough about football to throw to a cat. As truthless on Donovan McNabb as he ever was on Newt Gingrich, Rush found there were consequences for being an empty blowhard this time. The games flowed on without him, and he went back to a familiar place, at least for a couple of weeks, where he could stand under the red glow of the Tiffany lamps, hopping from one foot to another, waiting for his turn at the piano bench. ■

CHARLES P. PIERCE is a staff writer at *The Boston Globe Magazine* and the author of *Sports Guy* and *Hard to Forget: An Alzheimer's Story*. Robert B. Reich will return next issue.

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
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
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
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